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Soft Power, Religion, and Anti-Americanism in the Middle East

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This study presents the first systematic analysis of the public opinion dimension of soft power competition in the contemporary Middle East. Building on the scholarship on perceptions of foreign states and Arab public opinion, it proposes a series of hypotheses about sectarian identity, religious worldviews, and anti-Americanism as determinants of attitudes toward Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia in the context of regional rivalry. It then presents multivariate probit estimations utilizing Pew Global Attitudes Survey to test these hypotheses. The findings suggest that religious identity and worldviews directly affect favorability ratings of these three powers in the Arab Middle East. While Sunnis favor Saudi Arabia and Turkey over Iran, religious individuals demanding Islamic law favor the Islamic Republic. Furthermore, anti-Americanism translates into lower support for Saudi Arabia and Turkey, but greater support for Iran. Democratic attitudes have no influence over perceptions of these three powers indicating the limits of democracy promotion as a foreign policy tool.

The Middle East has been one of the most contested geopolitical environments of contemporary times. The US emerged as the hegemon in the region in the post-Cold War era. However, the gradual decline of the US hegemony in the aftermath of the invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 generated opportunities for regional powers to pursue a more active foreign policy. The Arab uprisings of 2011 generated turmoil in Egypt and Syria, two historically leading Arab states alongside with Iraq, and severely diminished their ability to engage in foreign policy activism. The diminishing influence of Baghdad, Cairo, and Damascus was conducive to the rise of Saudi Arabia and two non-Arab countries, Iran and Turkey, who cater to the Arab publics with different religious–political arrangements. It also stokes the fire of sectarian conflict involving these three powers that took a particularly ominous turn with the fall of Mosul to the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant in June 2014.

In this historical juncture, this study presents the first systematic analysis of the public opinion dimension of this regional rivalry in the Middle East. More specifically, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Iran present distinct models of political

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governance and state–religion relations, each with a different vision of political Islam ranging from Muslim secular-democratic model of Turkey to Wahhabi brand of Saudi system and to Iran's populist theocracy. The governments in these three countries actively promote their version of political Islam as an ideal configuration to be emulated in the region. The increasing salience of the public opinion in the aftermath of the Arab Spring makes the study of this timely topic important especially given our meager understanding of how ordinary people in the Arab Middle East perceive these regional powers.

Our theoretical framework builds on scholarship on public perceptions of foreign states and Arab public opinion. As we discuss in detail below, attitudes toward democracy, religious values, and anti-Americanism may have strong influence over how publics evaluate foreign states, in this case, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. While some recent studies focus on the perceptions of American soft power in the Arab Middle East (e.g., Jamal 2012), this article is the first study examining public views about soft power strategies within a regional rivalry framework. Furthermore, it also contributes to the scholarship on the determinants of public perceptions of foreign states in international relations.

In the next section, we offer a discussion of soft power and its public opinion dimension as it relates to the Arab Middle East. We then briefly discuss how distinct international images of Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey are perceived in the context of a regional rivalry. All three countries appeal to the citizens of the Arab Middle East with competing versions of governance principles and political Islam. We provide a theoretical framework about the impact of democratic orientations, religious values, and anti-Americanism on perceptions of these three countries. On the basis of this theoretical framework, we formulate five hypotheses about the determinants of Arab public opinion toward regional foreign states. Data for the statistical analyses come from survey responses from Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Project (GAP) conducted in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Tunisia. We employ a series of *multivariate probit* estimations to test these hypotheses.

The results show that sectarian and secular-Islamist cleavages and support for Islamist governance are the main driving forces shaping public perceptions of regional powers in the Middle East. The strongest effect is associated with Sunni–Shiite division. Those who identify as Sunni are more likely to favor Turkey and Saudi Arabia, but more strongly the latter, as opposed to those who identify as Shiite who hold favorable views of Iran. While Sunni–Shiite division has a long history and is primarily associated with Iran and Saudi Arabia, the emergence of Turkey as a "Sunni power" is a relatively new phenomenon reflecting Turkey's foreign policy activism in the Middle East. More surprisingly, attitudes toward democracy do not seem to influence how Arab publics perceive these foreign states. The Turkish model of "Muslim democracy" does not have strong appeal as individuals who favor Turkey tend to have secular orientations. Individuals with Islamists vision tend to exhibit support for Islamic Republic of Iran, more so than Saudi Arabia. While personal religiosity does not have a strong impact, anti-Americanism has significant effects on the perceptions about regional powers in the Middle East. The conclusion discusses the broader implications of these findings for regional rivalries and democracy promotion efforts and identifies avenues for future research for studying public opinion and foreign policy.

Soft Power and Arab Public Opinion

Nye (1990) defines soft power as the ability to attract, persuade, and co-opt as opposed to coercion in international relations.[1] According to Nye, soft power "occurs when one country gets other countries to want what it wants" without

[1] Soft power is criticized by scholars for being ineffective (Mearsheimer 2001; Ferguson 2004).

the use of any hard power means like military intervention or economic sanctions (166). Soft power helps a country to persuade others by setting an example or by power of attraction. As Nye (2004:5) states "a country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries—admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness—want to follow it." As such, soft power requires a voluntary and positive attitudinal or behavioral change on part of the elite or the public in target states.

Such attitude shifting strategies can occur through multiple means and allow states to establish spheres of influences by becoming attractive role models in the eyes of an international audience.[2] The legitimacy and attractiveness of a state's political, social, and cultural resources gain currency to the extent that a state is able to hold an image which is perceived as a role model by others. This image rests on the *perceptions* of the others who view this state in favorable terms (Shih 2012). Thus, the success of states' soft power appeal is highly dependent on whether the ideas representing a state are acceptable to the publics in target countries. As much as it is important to have ideas or institutions that attract the others and give legitimacy to the foreign policy goals of a state, more significant is winning the hearts and minds of publics in other countries.

Despite its increasing salience, until recently, Arab public opinion subsumed under the notion of the "Arab street" has not been subject of serious inquiry. The "Arab street" was synonymous with unpredictable, angry, and irrational people with potential to cause violence (for a critical view, see Bayat 2010:209–220). The authoritarian Arab rulers and the US could afford to ignore Arab public opinion and pursue their own interest as long as they appeased popular sentiments and kept popular discontent manageable through policies of coercion and rhetorical co-optation. This image of Arab public opinion has been since discredited. The advent of satellite television and the digital technologies generated a transnational public sphere with profound implications for Middle Eastern politics (Lynch 2003). Even the authoritarian Arab leaders need to engage with the Arab public sphere and to mobilize support for and justify their policies (Lynch 2003; Jamal 2012). The popular uprisings of 2011 further undermined the image of Arab public opinion viewed as composed of fixed and reactionary convictions (Tessler, Jamal, and Robbins 2012).

In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, many Arab citizens became more receptive to different models of governance after decades of corrupt and repressive rule (Ciftci 2013b). In this context, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey promote distinctive religious and political models as part of their soft power oriented foreign policy in the region (Aras and Gorener 2010). Since Arab public opinion is becoming more important in domestic and international politics of the region, the appeal of these states will be intrinsically linked to their perceived image in the transnational Arab public sphere. Thus, soft power strategies aiming for regional leadership are likely to work insofar as foreign states manage to win the hearts and minds of ordinary people.

Regional Power Rivalry in the Middle East

As indicated above, Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia emerged as powerful contenders in the contemporary Middle Eastern geopolitical context. Iran and Saudi Arabia represent two conflicting models of Islamic governance as historically high oil prices finance their foreign policy ambitions. While Saudi Arabia emphasizes its unique role as the custodian of Mecca and Medina, the two holiest cities in the Muslim World, the populist Islamic government in Iran presents

[2] Some of these means include trade relations (Rosecrance 1986), state institutions (İpek 2013), and nonstate actors (Bertelsen 2012).

a direct challenge to the legitimacy of the Saudi monarchy (Mabon 2013:4–5). Meanwhile, Turkey, after achieving impressive economic growth under the AKP (Justice and Development Party) rule, rediscovered the Middle East and pursued an increasingly active regional foreign policy. As a country ruled by a popularly elected Islamic party in a secular system, Turkey presents a very different model of political Islam than both the Saudi and Iranian regimes. Thus, despite being two non-Arab powers, both Turkey and Iran cater to the Arab public opinion with different religious–political arrangements in the aftermath of the 2011 uprisings.

Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Iran have basically three ways to achieve influence in the region: military involvement, economic linkages, and dissemination of cultural and political norms. While all three states used military means, none of them have enough resources to establish dominance over other regional states through military means. Furthermore, the US continues to have a significant military presence in the region and would use overwhelming power to prevent any changes opposing its interests. Hence, these three countries would be more influential through soft power strategies.

Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey have considerable economic clout and are the largest economies in the region. Economic linkages can be one mechanism through which these countries may project soft power in the Middle East. According to the IMF, Turkey was the world's 17th largest economy followed by Saudi Arabia (19th) and Iran (32nd) in 2013.[3] While intraregional trade in the Middle East has historically been low (Malik and Awadallah 2013), the 2008 economic crisis has contributed to the improvement in regional trade relations. As Figure 1 shows, China has emerged as the top trade partner of the MENA countries after the 2008 economic recession, as the share of the US exports and imports in the Middle East decreased. Besides, Turkey and UAE overtook Germany and France between 2008 and 2012.[4] Saudi Arabia's dependence on oil reduces its regional trade given the concentration of oil-based economies in the Middle East. Iran has a more diverse economy than Saudi Arabia, but international sanctions over its nuclear program significantly limit its trade. Saudi Arabia was ranked the 13th, and Iran the 17th largest trade partner of Middle Eastern economies in 2012.

Figure 2 shows top 10 trade partners of Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Tunisia (four countries analyzed in this article). Turkey is among the top 10 trade partners of each of these four countries in 2012. Turkish exports (rather than imports) account for most of these trade relations (Tezcür and Grigorescu 2014). Saudi Arabia is the top trade partner of Jordan and has considerable trade with Egypt. Iran does not rank among the top 10 trade partners of any of these countries primarily due to the expansion of the sanctions regime since 2011. Overall, this overview of trade relations suggests that Turkey is likely to have relatively higher favorable ratings in Lebanon and Tunisia; Saudi Arabia in Jordan; and both Turkey and Saudi Arabia in Egypt.

A third way through which these three countries seek regional influence is through disseminating their cultural and political norms. Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey represent competing models of political governance and make appeals to Arab publics in a time of change. In this regard, religion is central to their international image and soft power politics (Haynes 2008). The appeal of these

[3] IMF, World Economic Outlook Database. Available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2014/01/weodata/index.aspx(Accessed on May 16, 2014).

[4] In fact, some observers argue that rise of Turkey as a "trading state" is one of the primary drivers of its foreign policy (Kirişci and Kaptanoğlu 2011).



FIG 1. Top 10 Trade Partners of MENA Countries in 2008 and 2012. Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, Yearbook 2012 and IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Quarterly, December, 2013. The bubbles represent combined exports and imports in Billions of US Dollars



FIG 2. Top 10 Trade Partners of Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Tunisia in 2012. Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, Quarterly December, 2013. The bubbles represent combined exports and imports inMillions of US Dollars

models can be best understood by examining the views of ordinary citizens about these countries.[5]

Iran presents itself as a nonsectarian power "resistance" against the US imperialism and Israeli aggression in the region (Adib-Moghaddam 2007). That strategy had considerable success during the Israeli–Hezbollah war in the summer of 2006. However, as Iran has thrown its weight behind the Assad regime waging a

[5] For an empirical analysis of public opinion in relation to foreign policy in the Middle East, see Ciftci (2013a).

vicious fight of survival, Iran's characterization of the popular uprisings as an "Islamic awakening" is likely to fall on deaf ears in the Sunni world (Jones 2013). At the same time, Iran has a hybrid populist theocratic regime that has proved to be more resilient than the Arab republican regimes and to be more participatory than the absolute Arab monarchies. As such, despite being a non-Arab nation, Iranian model may be appealing to pious individuals, to Shiites and to supporters of Islamic rule in the Arab Middle East.

Saudi Arabia as an absolute monarchy with no tolerance for dissent has been on the defensive in the face of massive popular demonstrations shaking the authoritarian order in the region (Ennis and Momani 2013; Matthiesen 2013). The Saudi regime exerts strong influence in the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Arab League, and the Organization of Islamic Conference. Most notably, as the home of Islam's holy places, Saudi Arabia continues to be a center of religious training and its soft power influence in the Sunni World is unmatched (Gause 2002). The Saudi government spends billions of dollars to promote a Wahhabi brand of Sunni conservative Islam and back Salafi movements across the region. It advertises its own Islamic state model which relies on the symbiotic relationship of religious scholars and the Saudi rulers. The Saudi influence can be particularly strong among pious Sunni Arabs with weak democratic commitments.

As mentioned above, Turkey has pursued a very active foreign policy in the Middle East especially since 2007, as the AKP consolidated its power (Bank and Karadag 2013; Öniş 2014). Economic expansion and political stability under a popularly elected Islamic government contribute to the image of Turkey as a model country combining Islam, democracy, and neoliberal economics. Turkey's foreign policy activism partly relies on the rediscovery of the Ottoman heritage and its utilization as a positive cultural trait without any references to the imperialist past (Tuğal 2012; Öniş 2014).[6] Turkish exports, bilateral aids programs of the TİKA (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency), the rapidly growing flight network of the Turkish Airlines, Turkish soap operas which carry an Ottoman/Turkish pop-culture to large segments of Arab societies, and increased tourism activity to and from the region are cited as examples of Turkish soft power capabilities (Oğuzlu 2011). The bold discourse of Recep Tayyip Erdogan and anti-Israeli foreign policy position may have raised concerns in the West about Turkey's new orientation, but the factors above may have a "demonstrative effect" (Kirişci 2011) and inspire the Middle Eastern policymakers and publics to desire similar economic and political gains. Overall, while many observers remain skeptical of the applicability of the "Turkish model" to other Middle Eastern countries (Çavdar 2006; Öniş 2012), Turkey has emerged as a model country in the eyes of many Arabs in the wake of the popular uprisings (Salem 2011; Telhami 2011).[7]

In summary, all three countries have economic resources to gain advantage in this competition, but they have increasingly used religious ideology and proposed distinct models of political governance in the post-Arab uprising period. As the uprisings have demonstrated the importance of public opinion, these countries are likely to gain regional influence insofar as they appeal to the hearts and minds of ordinary Arab citizens. In the light of this discussion, we formulate a series of hypotheses about the perceptions of Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey in the Arab public sphere largely drawing from recent advances in the literature on international relations theories and public opinion.

[6] The Gülen movement, Turkey's most influential religious organization, promotes a more Turkish nationalist agenda with important differences from the AKP's more Islamist foreign policy agenda.

[7] Turkey's overengagement in the Middle East has undermined its image as a benign power (Öniş 2014). However, as a relatively prosperous and democratic Muslim polity, Turkey's image in the Middle East remains more positive than many other states in the eyes of Middle Eastern politics (see Akgün and Gündoğar 2014).

Hypotheses

We formulate five hypotheses, based on the international relations literature that identifies religiosity and political attitudes as being central to public perception of foreign states. First, we focus on religiosity as a multidimensional phenomenon consisting belief, behavior, and belonging (Glock and Stark 1965). Recent international relations scholarship suggests that shared religious identity affects attitudes about foreign states. British and American publics are most likely to endorse attacks against an Islamic dictatorship, and both publics are likely to support war against an Islamic democracy as much against a Christian dictatorship (Johns and Davies 2012). Furthermore, religiosity is likely to shape public perceptions of foreign powers as state leaders instrumentally use religious messages and images to bolster their international appeal (Fox and Sandler 2004; Hurd 2007; Philpott 2009; Warner and Walker 2011:119–120). These findings are consistent with the image theory's insight that the nature of intergroup relations is critical to the formation of stereotypes about out-groups (Alexander, Brewer, and Livingston 2005).

In terms of religious belonging, recent developments in the Middle East have increased the salience of transnational sectarian identity (that is, Sunni versus Shiite) over transnational ethnic identities (that is, Pan-Arabism). The Sunni–Shiite divide was the subject of the rivalry between the Ottomans and Safavids for centuries. In modern times, Iran and Saudi Arabia have been the main contenders of this cleavage. Sectarianism became central to geopolitical conflicts due to the US invasion of Iraq and the turmoil in the post-Arab uprisings period (Nasr 2007). While Turkey is also a predominantly Sunni power like Saudi Arabia, it promotes an image of a state ruled by popularly elected pious Sunni Muslim politicians especially since 2007. Turkey's overengagement in the domestic politics of Egypt and Syria has drawn Turkey into the sectarian politics of the region (Tuğal 2012; Öniş 2014). In the aftermath of the Arab uprisings, Turkey has supported the Islamist movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Sunni insurgent groups (e.g., Al-Nusra) in Syria. Thus, Turkey's regional policy ambitions might have transformed its image from a Western oriented secular democracy to the leader of Sunni religious movements. Consequently we propose that:

Hypothesis 1: *Individuals with Sunni identity will hold favorable views of Saudi Arabia and Turkey and less favorable views of Iran.*

A second dimension of religiosity concerns the state–religion relationship. The secular-Islamist cleavage has been central to political struggles in the Muslim world since the early twentieth century (Zubaida 1993). Islamist ideologies demanding Islamic state gained popular influence and swept the Arab world especially after the demise of the pan-Arab nationalism in the 1970s (El-Affendi 2003; Kepel 2006; Ayoob 2007). Both Iran and Saudi Arabia are religious regimes where Islam plays a central role in shaping the parameters of social life despite their sectarian differences. Furthermore, both states implement Shari'a rule that has been the demand of many Islamist movements in the broader Muslim world. In contrast, Turkey remains a secular state whose laws are not based on Shari'a despite the increasing public influence of Islam under the AKP rule. While some Arab citizens may not find the religious rule of Iran and Saudi Arabia appealing, Iranian and Saudi models are more likely to be popular among those who desire a greater role for Islamic principles in government.

Hypothesis 2: *Individuals who desire a greater role for Islamic principles in government will hold more favorable views of Saudi Arabia and Iran and less favorable views of Turkey.*

A third dimension of religiosity concerns personal belief and piety. Public opinion scholarship has reached conflicting findings about the effect of religiosity on political attitudes. For example, some scholars find no relationship between religiosity and democratic orientations (Tessler 2002), while others find this relationship to be context dependent (Tezcür, Azadarmaki, Mehri Bahar, and Nayebi 2012) or be conditional on the regime type (Ciftci 2013b). Furthermore, the effect of religiosity on attitudes toward violent religious groups and foreign states also remains ambivalent (Tessler and Robins 2007; Berger 2014). A similar ambivalence may characterize the relationship between religiosity and views of foreign states in the Arab Middle East. On the one hand, religious individuals may be more supportive of Saudi and Iranian models that give more weight to Islamic principles in governance as opposed to the Turkish secular model. On the other hand, pious individuals may not like the Saudi or Iranian models more or less than the Turkish model given the rigid and narrow interpretations characterizing the former two. Thus, our third hypothesis tests both the null and directional associations between religiosity and views of foreign states.

Hypothesis 3a: *There is no relationship between religiosity and favorable views toward Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey.*

Hypothesis 3b: *Religious individuals will hold more favorable views about Iran and Saudi Arabia and less favorable views about Turkey.*

Our fourth hypothesis concerns the impacts of political attitudes on foreign state evaluations. An increasing number of scholars highlight the role of public opinion as one of the primary causal factors characterizing the democratic peace argument (Doyle 1986; Russett 1993) that democracies rarely go to war with each other. According to an earlier study, when Americans perceive a country ruled by a nondemocratic regime, their support for war against this country significantly increases (Herrman, Tetlock, and Visser 1999). As public in democratic states feel less threatened by a moral common ground with other democratic states, they are less likely to support the use of military force against democracies than nondemocracies (Johns and Davies 2012; Tomz and Weeks 2013). Iran and Saudi Arabia remain bastions of authoritarian rule in the region while Turkey has a history of free electoral competition going back to 1950. We expect to find Turkey having the highest favorable ratings in Tunisia and Lebanon that had more pluralistic and democratic regimes than Jordan in 2012. We do not have strong expectations about Egypt in this regard given deep political turmoil and polarization in that country in 2012. By the same logic, citizens with prodemocracy views should have more sympathy for Turkey, an electoral democracy, over both the authoritarian regimes of Iran and Saudi Arabia. This is because prodemocratic Arab citizens are likely to share greater affinity with Turkey and feel less threatened by Turkish foreign policy given its relatively higher democratic credentials.

Hypothesis 4: *Individuals who support democracy will hold more favorable views of Turkey and less favorable views of Iran and Saudi Arabia.*

From a realist perspective, it can be argued public attitudes toward foreign states are ultimately shaped by the behavior rather than identity of these states. Building on Hans Morgenthau's insights (1954), Furia and Lucas (2008) find that Arab publics evaluate foreign states on the basis of its behavior regarding issues they care about rather than its identity. Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey have different types of relations with the US, the hegemon in the region since the Cold War. Anti-Americanism, which is widespread in the Middle East, has

strong influence on the Arab public opinion (Chiozza 2006; Blaydes and Linzer 2012). It has multiple dimensions; people may resent America for its culture and way of life, or for its foreign policy (Katzenstein and Keohane 2006). While most research to date has focused on the sources of anti-Americanism, it has substantial implications for the US foreign policy. High levels of anti-Americanism translate into weaker voting support for the US favored positions in the United Nations General Assembly, declining American trade, and smaller contributions to American war efforts in Afghanistan (Datta 2014). Anti-Americanism can also affect perceptions of regional powers. More specifically, Arab citizens who are resentful of the US influence in the region may also have unfavorable views of regional states perceived to be closely aligned with the American interests.

Consequently, we expect that anti-American views are also associated with unfavorable views of Saudi Arabia and Turkey, which continue to have close relations with the US despite diverging interests, and more favorable views of Iran, the main power challenging the US in the region.

Hypothesis 5: *Individuals who hold anti-American views will hold more favorable views of Iran and less favorable views of Saudi Arabia and Turkey.*

Data and Variables

We use Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Project (GAP) which conducts public opinion surveys around the world about issues ranging from people's own lives to national and global problems.[8] The empirical analysis utilizes data from the 2012 GAP surveys and includes responses from Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan, and Lebanon. We include these countries because they include questions necessary for testing our hypotheses. In addition, the four countries in the sample have different political systems and they represent different arrangements in state–religion relations. Tunisia remains one of the most secular countries in Arab world; Lebanon a confessional system with 18 officially recognized sects; Egypt sustains a precarious and ambiguous secular political system where Islam plays a dominant role; and Jordan refers to Islamic principles in legislation but also limits the role of Islam in policymaking. Jordan and Tunisia have dominantly Sunni populations; Lebanon is a diverse country with significant Sunni, Shiite, and Christians communities; and Egypt has a Sunni majority with a sizeable Coptic Christian minority. Egypt, Lebanon, and Tunisia are republics while Jordan is ruled by the Hashemite dynasty as a kingdom since its foundation in 1921. The uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia overthrew long-serving dictators, but democratization has been more successful in Tunisia than in Egypt.

The surveys include questions about attitudes toward various countries and many items tap respondents' religiosity, identity, and their views about state–religion relations along with demographics (see Appendix 1 for the exact wording of the questions). The dependent variable asks the respondents whether they favor certain countries or not. We create a dummy variable taking the value of 1 when the respondents have very favorable or somewhat favorable views of these countries and 0 when they hold somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion. Figure 3 shows the percentage of respondents with favorable views of Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Iran in comparison to US and China, two superpowers with considerable interest and involvement in the Middle East. Overall, Iran and US have lower ratings than Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and China. Saudi Arabia has the highest favorability ratings in Jordan and Egypt, 91% and 81%, respectively, but only 38% of the respondents hold favorable views of this country in Lebanon

[8] More information about these surveys can be found at http://www.pewglobal.org/about (Accessed on May 16, 2014).



Fig 3. Favorability of Regional and Global Powers by Country. Source: Pew Global Attitudes Survey (2012)

and 41% in Tunisia. The popularity of Saudi Arabia in Jordan is expected given these two countries' extensive trade partnership and monarchial regimes. In contrast, in all four countries, more than 60% of the respondents hold favorable views of Turkey with the highest ratings in secular Tunisia (78%). As noted above, Turkey's growing trade relations with Tunisia and its image as a Muslim democracy are likely to contribute to these ratings. These patterns provide support for trading state and public opinion dimensions of democratic peace arguments. Iran has very limited appeal among the Egyptian and Jordanians, but is viewed more favorably in Tunisia and especially in Lebanon. Positive perception of the US is the lowest in Jordan (12%) and highest in Tunisia (45%), whereas China enjoys much higher favorability ratings, more than 50% in three of the four countries analyzed here, a finding consistent with the earlier discussion about its growing economic presence in the region.

Pew surveys include many items asking the respondents about religious values and practices. To test *Hypothesis 1* about sectarianism and perceptions of regional powers, we use a question about their sectarian identity. A dummy variable is created to separate those who identify themselves as Sunni from the others who identify as Shiite, other, or choose not to identify with any religious sect.

Hypothesis 2 proposes that individuals who espouse greater role of Islam in politics are likely to favor Iran and Saudi Arabia over Turkey. To test this hypothesis, we use two variables measuring individual preferences about secularism and Islamic governance. The first variable, *secular,* is a conditional index of two items

about the role of Islam in politics and ranges from 1 (nonsecular) to 4 (secular). To measure preferences for *Islamic governance*, we use an item asking the respondents their views about the implementation of Islamic principles and the teachings of Quran in legislation. We use an index combining responses about frequency of prayer and fasting to measure personal religiosity. Since these items are measured with different scales, we recode the responses about fasting into a 7-point scale (1 = 1, 2 = 3, 3 = 5, 4 = 7) and then form an additive index of personal religiosity ranging from 2 to 14. This variable allows us to test *Hypotheses 3a* and *3b* that posit null and positive relationships between religiosity and views of Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey.

As shown in Figure 4, there is significant variation in the distribution of these measures across the four countries in the sample. The figures represent the mean values of three variables, religiosity, secular, and support for Islamic legislation, which are recoded to 0–100 scale to allow comparison. As expected, the level of religiosity is very high ranging from 69 in Lebanon to 84 in Jordan. The mean level of secularist orientations is relatively low reaching only 27 in Jordan, 34 in Tunisia, 37 in Egypt, and 39 in Lebanon. In contrast to low levels of support for Islamic legislation in Lebanon (49), this figure reaches very high levels in Egypt (79) and Jordan (87).

We generate a composite variable to test *Hypothesis 4* suggesting that Arab citizens with prodemocratic attitudes are more likely to favor Turkey over Iran and Saudi Arabia. The index variable is based on three questions about: (i) the preference for democracy over other types of regimes, (ii) the ability of democracy versus a strong leader to solve problems, and (iii) the trade-off between democracy and strong economy. It ranges from 0 to 3 with higher values representing more support for democracy. Finally, we use six items (see Appendix 1) to measure anti-Americanism. This index ranges from 0 to 6 (the alpha coefficient for both indices is well over the .50 threshold).



FIG 4. Secularist Orientations, Islamic Governance, and Religiosity: Average Scores. All variables are standardized along a 0–100 scale. The numbers represent mean scores

We use age (in years), education (dichotomous, university education is 1), income, and country dummies as controls in the models. The response scales for income are different across the sample countries. So, we obtain the 25th percentile distributions from these items to generate harmonized variables measured with a 4-point scale for income levels. Then, we create three dichotomous variables, and middle income is the reference category. Appendix 2 shows the descriptive statistics for the variables included in the statistical models.

Findings and Discussion

When asked about their views toward Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, individuals are likely to compare the different models presented by these countries in their cognition. When making up their mind about one of these countries, they also refer to their opinion of the other countries. In other words, attitudes toward Iranian, Turkish, and Saudi models are dependent on each other in the attitude formation process. A multivariate probit analysis (trivariate probit) taking this dependency into account is theoretically the most appropriate approach to test our model of public opinion. In each of the estimations presented below, the joint likelihood ratio tests confirm the dependency among the error terms in three equations justifying the use of multivariate probit estimation. According to the results of these tests, the choice of whether or not to favor any of these three countries is not independent of the attitudes toward other countries. In models where the bivariate likelihood ratio test of the error terms is not statistically significant, we prefer this approach over separate probits as multivariate probit provides more efficient estimations. We use the R package "mvProbit" (Henningsen 2012) with 500 simulation draws of the GHK algorithm to compute integrals of the multivariate normal distribution.

Table 1 presents the results of our multivariate probit estimations testing the first four hypotheses. As expected according to *Hypothesis 1*, Sunni identity leads to favorable views of Turkey and Saudi Arabia but decreases the likelihood of favorable orientations toward Iran in all models. Thus, we find strong support for the sectarian identity hypothesis. We have limited support for *Hypothesis 3a*

TABLE 1. Multivariate Probit Estimations of Favorable Attitudes Toward Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Iran

	Saudi Arabia	*Turkey*	*Iran*
Secularist	−0.024 (0.022)	0.042 (0.019)**	−0.048 (0.019)**
Islamic legislation	−0.081 (0.044)*	−0.061 (0.044)	0.117 (0.045)***
Religiosity	0.002 (0.009)	−0.004 (0.009)	0.015 (0.009)*
Sunni identity	0.553 (0.069)***	0.23 (0.068)***	−0.835 (0.062)***
Support for democracy	0.04 (0.029)	0.013 (0.027)	−0.02 (0.027)
Education	−0.01 (0.073)	0.101 (0.069)	−0.028 (0.067)
Age	0.004 (0.002)**	0.003 (0.002)	−0.004 (0.002)*
Female	0.102 (0.053)*	−0.058 (0.049)	−0.084 (0.051)
Low income	0.017 (0.06)	−0.048 (0.057)	0.035 (0.058)
High income	−0.141 (0.073)*	−0.099 (0.067)	−0.022 (0.069)
Egypt	1.079 (0.073)***	−0.371 (0.071)***	−0.371 (0.067)***
Jordan	1.506 (0.086)***	−0.202 (0.076)**	−0.6 (0.076)***
Lebanon	−0.069 (0.093)	−0.461 (0.089)***	0.101 (0.104)
Constant	−0.675 (0.173)***	0.632 (0.175)***	0.238 (0.171)
N	3,037		
Rho21	0.464 (0.03)***		
Rho31	−0.083 (0.035)**		
Rho23	0.054 (0.035)		

(*Notes.* Likelihood ratio test of rho21 = rho31 = rho32 = 0: *$p < 0.05$, **$p < 0.01$, ***$p < 0.001$.)

regarding the effects of religiosity that does not appear to have a consistent impact on opinion of Turkey and Saudi Arabia. At the same time, religious individuals are more likely to favor Iran partially consistent with *Hypothesis 3b*. These findings show that Iran's religious governance model finds a more receptive audience among pious Arabs than the Saudi model. There is more support for *Hypothesis 2* tested by two variables. Secularists are less likely to hold favorable attitudes toward Iran and more likely to hold favorable views of Turkey. Furthermore, those who want Islamic legislation are more favorable of Iran while they are indifferent toward Turkey. Unexpectedly, they are less favorable of Saudi Arabia. Finally, there is no support for *Hypothesis 4* suggesting a relationship between support for democracy and favorable views of Turkey. This finding is different from Johns and Davies (2012) study establishing an association between public opinion and democratic peace. However, overall support for the Turkish model is higher in Lebanon and Tunisia, implying that this association might operate at the national level rather than at the individual level (see Figure 3). As for demographic controls, women and older people hold more favorable views of Saudi Arabia and less favorable views of Iran, whereas they remain indifferent about Turkey. The fixed effects also reveal an interesting pattern. *Ceteris paribus*, Jordanian and Egyptian citizens are more likely to hold positive views of Saudi Arabia and negative views of both Iran and Turkey vis-à-vis the citizens of other categories (Tunisia is the reference category).

We calculate marginal effects using the estimation results from Table 1. Figure 5 shows the conditional marginal effects calculated at all observations included in the model for variables of interest assuming that all other dependent variables are one.[9] This preference (as different from assuming all other dependent variables are as observed) imposes a more robust test as the calculation assumes existing support for the two countries as the value of the third dependent variable changes. We show the average marginal effects for religious variables with 95% confidence intervals and report those for other variables in Appendix 3. Sectarian identity has the largest impact on favorability ratings of Saudi Arabia (average conditional marginal effect of 0.14% or 14% likelihood of favorability), followed by Turkey (3% likelihood, significant at 90%). Consistent with *Hypothesis 1*, individuals who identify as Sunni are 30% less likely to favor Iran. As we discussed above, Saudi Arabia and Iran have been the main contenders in the Sunni–Shiite division, whereas Turkey has recently involved in this sectarian politics. Thus, the substantive effects may reflect the current geopolitical configuration. Furthermore, individuals with secular attitudes are more likely to favor Turkey (about 1.6% increased marginal likelihood) and less likely to favor Iran (1.6% less likelihood) and Saudi Arabia (1.1% in both panels). While average marginal effects are statistically significant in all equations, the substantive effects remain relatively small in relation to the effect of Sunni identity. Third, the marginal effects show that individuals who desire an Islamic legislation are about 4% more likely to hold favorable views of Iran. The same variable has a significant but negative effect for Saudi Arabia and insignificant effect for Turkey. This finding suggests that the populist Islamic model of Iran may be more appealing than the rigid monarchial Saudi model. Furthermore, the results confirm that, *ceteris paribus*, Turkey's appeal is based on its secular character rather than the so-called Muslim democratic model. Scholars are right to be skeptical about the exportability of this dubious model to other contexts (Bali 2011). Finally, the marginal effects do not show any substantive effect associated with personal religiosity.

Table 2 reports the results from multivariate probit estimation that also tests *Hypothesis 5* about anti-Americanism. In substantive terms, the results remain the

[9] We also calculated the conditional marginal effects for all observations at existing values of dependent variables. Marginal effects for all independent variables with both calculation methods are presented in Appendix 3.



FIG 5. Marginal Effects

TABLE 2. Multivariate Probit Estimations of Favorable Attitudes Toward Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Iran (With Anti-Americanism)

	Saudi Arabia	*Turkey*	*Iran*
Secularist	−0.031 (0.024)	0.04 (0.021)*	−0.058 (0.021)***
Islamic legislation	−0.029 (0.051)	−0.057 (0.05)	0.139 (0.05)***
Religiosity	0.013 (0.01)	0 (0.009)	0.02 (0.01)**
Sunni identity	0.533 (0.077)***	0.179 (0.077)**	−0.913 (0.068)***
Support for democracy	0.039 (0.033)	−0.006 (0.03)	−0.033 (0.03)
Anti-Americanism	−0.114 (0.017)***	−0.086 (0.016)***	0.028 (0.016)*
Education	−0.027 (0.079)	0.048 (0.075)	−0.02 (0.072)
Age	0.093 (0.059)	−0.058 (0.055)	−0.062 (0.056)
Female	0.005 (0.002)**	0.005 (0.002)**	−0.005 (0.002)**
Low income	0.011 (0.067)	−0.012 (0.063)	0.046 (0.064)
High income	−0.224 (0.079)***	−0.152 (0.073)**	−0.054 (0.074)
Egypt	1.238 (0.081)***	−0.329 (0.08)***	−0.347 (0.073)***
Jordan	1.684 (0.094)***	−0.057 (0.083)	−0.678 (0.084)***
Lebanon	−0.013 (0.102)	−0.481 (0.099)***	0.097 (0.112)
Constant	−0.589 (0.192)***	0.902 (0.198)***	0.223 (0.189)
N	2,575		
Rho21	0.441 (0.034)***		
Rho31	−0.107 (0.038)***		
Rho23	0.024 (0.039)		

(*Notes.* Likelihood ratio test of rho21 = rho31 = rho32 = 0: *$p < 0.05$, **$p < 0.01$, ***$p < 0.001$.)

same. Secularists have more favorable views of Turkey and less favorable views of Iran, religious individuals demanding Islamic legislation support Iran, and Sunnis favor Saudi Arabia (strongly) and Turkey over Iran. Different from Table 1, Islamic legislation is no longer a significant coefficient in the Saudi Arabia equation. This result, once again, confirms that the religious models of Iran and Saudi Arabia are not necessarily appealing among religious Arab citizens. Consis-

tent with *Hypothesis 5*, anti-Americanism decreases the favorability of Turkey and Saudi Arabia and increases the likelihood of holding positive views toward Iran controlling for a range of religious, political, and demographic variables. This finding provides an interesting insight that may inform the foreign policy strategies of these countries in their pursuit of regional dominance. Increasing levels of anti-Americanism are likely to hurt regional powers that are perceived to be aligned with the US interests and bolster popular images of powers that are perceived to challenge the world's leading economic and military state. In this regard, anti-Americanism that is inherent to Iranian foreign policy since 1979 may have a strategic value in the Islamic Republic's quest for greater influence and prestige in the Middle East.[10]

Conclusion

The Arab uprisings of 2011 are often viewed as the awakening of people whose aspirations were long suppressed by ossified and brutal regimes. As the dictators trembled, ordinary people asserted their right to decide on their collective fate and demanded a realignment of not only the domestic but also the regional political order.[11] These monumental transformations inevitably facilitated the retrenchment of the American power in the Middle East and paved the way for the rise of a competition for geopolitical supremacy among regional powers. As three traditional Arab powers, Egypt, Iraq, and Syria, fall into political turmoil, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey sought greater influence among the Arab publics. In this historical context, this study presents the first systematic analysis of the public opinion dimension of competition among these three countries. Providing the first systematic analysis of soft power capabilities of these three states vis-à-vis the views of Middle Eastern citizens, this study also finds that anti-Americanism is a major factor directly affecting the perceptions of these three states among the Arab publics. The Saudi and Turkish alliance with the US is a liability undermining these two regional power's quest for greater influence among the Arabs who resent American involvement in the Middle East. Consistent with national role conception approaches (Holsti 1971), this study proposes that religion is central to both the self-image of these countries and their perception among the Arab publics. In this regard, in the Middle East, an analysis of public opinion data reveals that religious identity and worldviews directly inform the favorability ratings of these powers among the Arab publics. Religion shapes the parameters of soft power projection by Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey in the region. Growing sectarianism limits the appeal of Iran among the Sunnis, who constitute an overwhelming majority of the Arabs. It is actually in the self-interest of Saudi Arabia to play the sectarian card to limit the Iranian soft power. While Turkey under the AKP also aimed to increase its popularity among Sunni Arabs, the success of this strategy has been limited. At the same time, the Iranian model combining Islamic rule with regular electoral competition and populism has appeal among religious Arabs citizens who demand greater role for Islam in legislation. Turkey's pursuit of greater involvement in the Middle East, often dubbed as "neo-Ottomanism" and most visibly seen in the pop-culture, seems to be of some appeal not because of Turkey's image as a "Muslim democracy" but rather thanks to its secularism. Turkey retains a positive image especially among Arabs who favor secular rule. Interestingly, Arabs who are more supportive of democracy are not more likely to

[10] Turkey's increasingly positive image is also attributed to the popularity of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan in the Middle East. We run a multivariate probit estimation including Erdogan's favorability ratings as an independent variable and a bivariate probit estimation using favorability of Erdogan and favorability of Turkey as dependent variables. In these analyses, the results do not change significantly.

[11] For example, see Mishra (2012).

hold Turkey in a more positive light compared to Iran and Saudi Arabia. This finding is consistent with Jamal's (2012) argument that popular demands for democracy do not necessarily translate into favorable views of the US, the beacon of democracy. Religiosity matters more than attitudes about democracy in shaping perceptions of regional states. More broadly, democracy promotion as a tool of serving foreign policy interests is likely to fail. Arabs demanding democracy seems to make a crucial distinction between their domestic political systems and foreign policies of the external states. A paradoxical implications of this study is, then, democracy promotion in the region is unlikely to transform the Arab public opinion into favoring the states with democratic regimes.

Naturally, this study has numerous limitations that can be addressed in future research. First, studies utilizing survey data over time will be more effective in distinguishing between contextual and predispositional nature of these evaluations. For instance, it is not clear whether Sunnis disfavor Iran because of its Shiite identity or policies in the increasingly sectarian geopolitical struggles in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings. Iran used to have strong appeal in 2006 when Hezbollah fought against Israel.[12] Finally, studies based on survey experiments employing vignettes will be useful to flesh out causal mechanisms linking political attitudes and religiosity to foreign policy views. For instance, it remains unspecified how anti-Americanism informs unfavorable views of Saudi Arabia and Turkey, as both of these countries' relations with the US are characterized by tensions. Finally, it is not clear how favorable images of foreign states in Arab public opinion help them to pursue their agendas. In this regard, Datta's innovative study (2014) arguing that anti-Americanism leads to decreasing support for the US positions in the UN General Assembly, economic relations with the US, and cooperation with the US in Afghanistan can be insightful. Along similar lines, it would be productive to explore how public evaluations of regional powers affect Arab states' foreign policies vis-à-vis these states.

Appendix 1

These are the GAP survey questions used in the analyses.

Views of foreign powers (dependent variable):

Q8. Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of [Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran].

Questions on religiosity:

Q 148. Are you Sunni (e.g., Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi, or Hanbali), Shi'a (e.g., Ithnashari/Twelver or Ismaili/Sevener), or something else? (1) Sunni (e.g., Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi, or Hanbali) (2) Shi'a (e.g., Ithnashari/Twelver or Ismaili/Sevener) (3) Ahmadiyya (91) Something else.

Q 149. How often, if at all, do you pray: hardly ever, only during religious holidays, only on Fridays, only on Fridays and religious holidays, more than once a week, every day at least once, or every day five times? (7-point scale).

[12] http://www.aaiusa.org/dr-zogby/entry/the-rise-and-fall-of-iran-in-arab-and-muslim-public-opinion (Accessed September 19, 2014).

Q 151. How often, if at all, do you fast—hardly ever, some days during Ramadan, during most or all days of Ramadan, OR during all of Ramadan and other religious holidays? (4-point scale).

Q 62. How much of a role do you think Islam plays in the political life of our country—a very large role (1), a fairly large role (2), a fairly small role (3), or a very small role (4)?

Q 63. [Follow up to the previous question] In your opinion—is this good or bad for our country? (1) Good (1), (2) Bad.

Q 39. Which of the following three statements comes closer to your view: Laws should not be influenced by the teachings of the Quran, laws should follow the values and principles of Islam but not strictly follow the teachings of the Quran, or laws should strictly follow the teachings of the Quran?

Questions about democracy:

Q21. And which of these three statements is closest to your own opinion: (1) Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government, (2) in some circumstances a non-democratic government is preferable (3) For someone like me, it doesn't matter what kind of government we have.

Q71. Some feel that we should rely on a democratic form of government to solve our country's problems. Others feel that we should rely on a leader with a strong hand to solve our country's problems. Which comes closer to your opinion?

Q72. If you had to choose between a good democracy or a strong economy, which would you say is more important?

Questions about the US (anti-Americanism index):

Q54. Which of the following phrases comes closer to your view? It's good that American ideas and customs are spreading here, OR it's bad that American ideas and customs are spreading here.

Q55. And which of these comes closer to your view? I like American ideas about democracy, OR I dislike American ideas about democracy.

Q 56. Which comes closer to describing your view? I like American ways of doing business, OR I dislike American ways of doing business.

Q 57. Which is closer to describing your view—I like American music, movies and television, OR I dislike American music, movies and television.

Q 58. And which comes closer to describing your view? I admire the United States for its technological and scientific advances, OR I do not admire the United States for its technological and scientific advances.

Q8. Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of USA

Appendix 2: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Observations	Mean	*SD*	Min	Max
Favors Saudi Arabia	3,037	0.65	0.48	0	1
Favors Turkey	3,037	0.72	0.45	0	1
Favors Iran	3,037	0.31	0.46	0	1
Secular attitudes	3,037	2.37	1.33	1	5
Prefers Islam in law	3,037	2.39	0.65	1	3
Anti-Americanism	2,575	3.29	1.84	0	6
Religiosity	3,037	11.43	3.01	2	14
Sunni	3,037	0.78	0.41	0	1
Support for democracy	3,037	1.72	0.95	0	3
Education	3,037	0.18	0.38	0	1
Age	3,037	37.62	13.87	18	88
Female	3,037	0.49	0.50	0	1
Low income	3,037	0.34	0.47	0	1
High income	3,037	0.20	0.40	0	1

Appendix 3: Full Marginal Effects

	Model 1			Model 2		
	Saudi Arabia	Turkey	Iran	Saudi Arabia	Turkey	Iran
Panel A: Conditional marginal effects calculated at all observations assuming that all other dependent variables are as observed						
Secular	−0.011***	0.016***	−0.016***	−0.012*	0.015**	−0.019***
Islamic legislation	−0.016**	−0.015	0.036***	−0.001	−0.017	0.043***
Religiosity	0.001	−0.002	0.005*	0.004	−0.001	0.006**
Sunni	0.134***	0.043*	−0.295***	0.124***	0.026	−0.321***
Anti-Americanism				−0.024***	−0.02***	0.007
Support democracy	0.01**	0.001	−0.006	0.01	−0.004	−0.01
Education	−0.011	0.034	−0.01	−0.011	0.017	−0.007
Age	0.001***	0.001	−0.001**	0.001	0.001*	−0.001**
Female	0.032***	−0.026	−0.024**	0.028*	−0.024	−0.017
Low income	0.009	−0.018	0.012	0.005	−0.005	0.015
High income	−0.033**	−0.022	−0.008	−0.052**	−0.033	−0.019
Egypt	0.322***	−0.21***	−0.089***	0.342***	−0.197***	−0.078***
Jordan	0.401***	−0.186***	−0.151***	0.421***	−0.14***	−0.169***
Lebanon	0.02	−0.16***	0.038	0.033	−0.166***	0.035
Panel B: Conditional marginal effects calculated at all observations assuming that all other dependent variables are 1						
Secular	−0.011**	0.013**	−0.016***	−0.013*	0.012**	−0.019***
Islamic legislation	−0.016*	−0.011	0.036***	−0.001	−0.013	0.043***
Religiosity	0.001	−0.001	0.005*	0.004	−0.001	0.006**
Sunni	0.137***	0.031	−0.297***	0.128***	0.016	−0.322***
Anti-Americanism				−0.026***	−0.015***	0.007
Support democracy	0.01*	0.001	−0.006	0.011	−0.004	−0.01
Education	−0.01	0.025	−0.01	−0.011	0.013	−0.007
Age	0.001**	0.001	−0.001**	0.001	0.001	−0.001**
Female	0.032***	−0.02	−0.024	0.028*	−0.02	−0.017
Low income	0.009	−0.014	0.012	0.005	−0.004	0.015
High income	−0.034**	−0.016	−0.008	−0.055**	−0.024	−0.02

(continued)

Appendix 3. (continued)

	Model 1			Model 2		
	Saudi Arabia	Turkey	Iran	Saudi Arabia	Turkey	Iran
Egypt	0.321***	−0.168***	−0.092***	0.35***	−0.163***	−0.081***
Jordan	0.391***	−0.139***	−0.157***	0.421***	−0.105***	−0.173***
Lebanon	0.017	−0.128***	0.038	0.031	−0.135***	0.036

Note. Marginal effects are calculated using R package mvProbit developed by Henningsen (2012).
***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$, *$p < .1$.)

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Globalization, Contact, and Religious Identity: A Cross-National Analysis of Interreligious Favorability*

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Objectives. This article examines cross-national variation in interreligious favorability across the globe. We develop and test several hypotheses linking globalization to attitudes toward the religious other through mechanisms of religious belonging and contact. *Methods.* Utilizing cross-national data in 20 countries from the Pew Global Attitudes Surveys (2011), we run a series of multilevel and logistic regression estimations to test our hypotheses about global contact, religious identity, and interreligious favorability. *Results.* We find that global contact has a positive effect on interreligious favorability, whereas holding religious identity increases negative sentiments toward religious outgroups. We also find that increased levels of globalization inhibit the negative impact of religious belonging and threat perceptions on favorable views of the religious other. *Conclusion.* Although globalization increases the salience of religion as an exclusive identity category at the expense of decreased interreligious favorability, individuals become more conducive to interreligious tolerance thanks to frequent social contact at higher levels of globalization.

Scriptures of major world religions promote tolerance of and love for fellow human beings. This stands in sharp contrast to the resurgence of religious intolerance in the global age. Whether it is Islamophobia, anti-Semitism, or anti-Christian views, unfavorable views of the religious other have been on the rise in a globalized world. This study examines the determinants of interreligious favorability and aims to answer the following questions: What explains negative sentiments about religious outgroups cross-nationally? What role, if any, does religious belonging play in shaping these views? Does increased global contact make individuals more favorable toward other religious groups?

We develop an interdisciplinary explanation utilizing insights from scholarships in political tolerance, psychology of religious belonging, and social contact to explain the unfavorable views of religious outgroups across the globe. Students of political tolerance persistently demonstrate that religiosity is linked to political intolerance (Nunn, Crockett, and Williams, 1978; Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus, 1982; McClosky and Brill, 1983; Gibson, 2010; but see Eisenstein, 2006). In a similar vein, social and political psychologists argue that religious identity can be a powerful cognitive anchor embedded in a system

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of truth and infallible guiding principles and may generate unfavorable views toward the religious other (Kinnvall, 2004; Juergensmeyer, 2008; Ysseldyk, Matheson, and Anisman, 2010). However, it is also known that meaningful social contact may inhibit prejudice about outgroups to promote racial (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew and Tropp, 2000) and religious tolerance (Putnam, Campbell, and Garrett, 2012; Campbell, Green, and Monson, 2012).

Building on these studies, we specify two mechanisms that link globalization, contact, and religious identity to attitudes toward the religious other. First, globalization increases the salience of religious identity and facilitates the demarcation of individuals in terms of ingroup versus outgroup belonging. Second, globalization increases contact among the followers of the world's major religions thanks to the increased movement of people across borders and new communication technologies. We argue that holding exclusive religious identity may undermine interreligious favorability whereas global contact is likely to inhibit unfavorable views toward religious outgroups. To test these hypotheses, we use the Pew Global Attitudes Survey (2011) including about 20,000 respondents from 20 countries around the world. In addition to developing a new theoretical framework about the effects of religious identity and social contact on individual views toward the religious other, this study also presents the first systematic cross-national analysis of religious outgroup attitudes.

In the next section, we provide a brief review of scholarship on religion and tolerance. Then, we examine how globalization makes religion a salient anchor for social identity and at the same time increases opportunities for interreligious contact. After introducing the data and variables, we run a series of multilevel and logistic regression models to test our hypotheses about unfavorable views toward the members of the world's major faiths (Islam, Christianity, and Judaism). The results confirm that holding exclusive religious identity reduces interreligious favorability whereas the level of globalization and contact with religious minorities increases tolerant views of the religious other. The net effect of contact on interreligious favorability is most visible in countries with high levels of globalization. We also found some evidence about the conditional effect of globalization and size of religious minorities on interreligious favorability. Ceteris paribus, an average individual who considers the members of outgroups as a threat or who holds exclusive religious identity becomes less likely to view the religious other in unfavorable terms as the level of globalization and size of religious minorities increase. We conclude the article by discussing the implications of these findings in the context of rising religiosity and religious intolerance in a globalized world.

Religion and Tolerance

Scholarship on religious racism finds that, on average, religious people are more intolerant, racist, and homophobic than their nonreligious counterparts (Allport and Ross, 1967; Herek, 1987; Hall, Matz, and Wood, 2010). Similarly, students of American politics show that religiosity is a robust determinant of political intolerance (Stouffer, [1955] 1992; Nunn, Crockett, and Williams, 1978; Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus, 1982; Gibson, 2010). This finding introduces an interesting puzzle as the scriptures of major religions promote tolerance of and love for fellow human beings. To solve this puzzle, a considerable deal of attention has been focused on how different dimensions of religion ("the 3Bs"—belief, belonging, behavior) are linked to political intolerance (Kellstedt et al., 1996) (see Burge (2013) and Eisenstein (2008) for two excellent reviews). Some scholars argue

that members of only certain denominations are politically intolerant in the United States (Nunn, Crockett, and Williams, 1978; Beatty and Walter, 1984; Gay and Ellison, 1993), while others explain religious intolerance by strict beliefs—for example, biblical literalism (Wilcox and Jelen, 1990; Green et al., 1994) or religious convictions (Gibson, 2010).

Since the focus on denominations in the United States makes it harder to generalize to other cases, some scholars have chosen to focus on general theoretical underpinnings of political tolerance. For example, utilizing liberal democratic theory, Gibson argues that stigmatization of minorities can cause a general "silence," further increasing intolerance (Gibson, 2010). Employing social identity theory, Gibson and Gouws (2000) find that attitudes toward group solidarity predict intolerance better than group membership in South Africa. Others find that social capital/membership in various groups can increase tolerance, as it creates norms of reciprocity and increases a need for compromise and respect for the other (Cigler and Joslyn, 2002).

To solve the stated puzzle, students of social psychology (Allport and Ross, 1967) differentiate between intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity where the former refers to the experience of religion as an end itself and the latter to the utilization of religion as a source of security and status. According to this approach, only extrinsically religious people are more prejudiced toward outgroups. However, controlling for additional factors, some students of political tolerance do not find supportive evidence for this negative relationship (Gaddy, 2003; Eisenstein, 2006; Eisenstein and Clark, 2014). Marie Eisenstein, for example, criticizes the existing models and methodologies for being too simplistic. Using structural equation modeling, she finds no direct link between religiosity and political intolerance, but rather a link between religious commitment and doctrinal orthodoxy on threat perception (Eisenstein, 2006),[1] which then increases intolerance toward the perceived outgroups (Gibson, 2010; Haas and Cunningham, 2014).

Overall, there is considerable evidence supporting the link between various forms of religiosity and intolerance, but there are also critical accounts of this proposed relationship. While this research focuses on religiosity, identity, and threat perceptions as determinants of interreligious favorability, or its lack thereof, most studies, with few exceptions (Gibson and Gouws, 2000; Verkuyten et al., 2014), pertain to the American case. As globalization increases contact among the members of the world's major religions, it becomes imperative to cross-nationally examine how religion inspires or inhibits favorable views toward religious outgroups. In the next section, we explain how religion and contact may inform individual perceptions toward the religious other in a globalized world and we propose several hypotheses.

Hypotheses

Globalization has facilitated the movement of not only goods and people but also ideas by reducing the transaction costs (Hollingsworth, 1998; Manners, 2000). This process has introduced many new economic opportunities, along with big social transformations (Therborn, 2000; Goldsmith and Mander, 2001). There are two mechanisms through which globalization processes may shape individual views about religious outgroups. First, globalization increases the salience of religious identity, which may pit social

[1]Eisenstein (2006) links psychological security, which is composed of dogmatism, self-esteem, and social trust, to intolerance. In rather surprising findings, she argues that social trust, the factor least linked to religiosity, affects intolerance the most, while dogmatism has a minor effect and self-esteem has no discernable effect (Eisenstein and Clark, 2014).

groups against each other to generate unfavorable views of the religious other. Second, globalization creates new opportunities for social contact and this is likely to facilitate interreligious favorability. We explain both mechanisms below.

The global rise of religiosity can partly be attributed to a general fear of existential security emanating from the uncertain conditions accompanying globalization (Juergensmeyer, 2005; Kinnvall, 2004). While national identity continues to be an important part of individuals' self in this context, religion, as an idealized/sacred collection of guiding principles and as a shared group worldview involving affection and strong moral authority (Ysseldyk, Matheson, and Anisman, 2010; Kinnvall, 2004; Stark, 2001), becomes a powerful cognitive anchor providing a feeling of security. However, in a setting where interreligious contact is frequent and not necessarily always meaningful, the psychological security of religious belonging may gain salience at the expense of religious intolerance. Although religious participation and religious orthodoxy may also affect the perceptions of religious outgroups (Burge, 2013), we argue that globalization has increased the salience of symbolic attachments (e.g., religious identity) in shaping individual attitudes in relation to the other dimensions of religion.

Religion can play an important role in identity construction in both secular nation-states (Brubaker, 2012; Voicu, 2012; van der Veer, 1994) and settings where religion and the state are very much intertwined (Friedland, 2001). As Juergensmeyer argues (2005:8), "the crucial problems in an era of globalization are identity and control. The two are linked, in that a loss of a sense of belonging leads to a feeling of powerlessness. What has been perceived as a loss of faith in secular nationalism may be experienced as a loss of agency. For these reasons, the assertion of traditional forms of religious and ethnic identities is linked to attempts to reclaim personal and cultural power." In a similar vein, Kinnvall (2004) asserts that globalization deteriorates old identities and their protective aura to increase the need for psychological security. While this conclusion echoes the findings of political tolerance scholars highlighting the intermediary role of threat perceptions in creating intolerance (Eisenstein, 2006; Eisenstein and Clark, 2014; Gibson, 2010), Kinnvall builds on the work of Kristeva (1982), who argues that in order to securitize subjectivity, we create an "other" and fill this concept with hatred. Consequently, the temporal durability of religion makes it an important anchor in a changing world through creation and maintenance of traumas (Kinnvall, 2004).

While religious identity gains prominence in shaping individuals' worldviews in the global age, it is hardly the only or most significant form of belonging. Religious attachment may be a type of identity in itself when individuals accept it as a primary group belonging or it may overlap with other identity categories. Proponents of social identity theory argue that social group membership forms the basis of a positive self-identity, leading people to compare their own groups (ingroups) with outgroups where the evaluations of the former are generally positive and those of the latter are negative (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Tajfel, 1981; Brewer, 1999). It is evident that those who define their identities in relation to religion will be more likely to hold negative views about the members of other faiths. Religion as a unique social identity category gains prominence to the extent that "religious identification offers a distinctive 'sacred' worldview and 'eternal' group membership unmatched by identification with other social groups" (Ysseldyk, Matheson, and Anisman, 2010). One can argue that a similar dynamic is in order for national identity as well. However, the power of religious identity comes from its unique ideological position carrying affection and moral authority that emanates from a truth claim (Stark, 2001; Kinnvall, 2004) or through the cognitive processing of shared memories bound to create ingroup cohesion (Whitehouse,

2004).[2] The perception that one's own religion is the correct set of guiding principles to follow generates a psychology of ingroup superiority (Roccas, Yechiel, and Ido, 2006) or dehumanization of the other (Waller, 2002). Therefore, religious identity, through these processes, is very likely to inform unfavorable views of the religious other. Furthermore, religious identity may help individuals to make sense of complex issues. Political scientists found that group-based attitudes provide cognitive structures that help individuals simplify the political world (Wald, Owen, and Hill, 1989; Brady and Sniderman, 1985; Wilcox, 1987; Jelen, 1993; Hayes, 1995). Thus, religious identity will be instrumental in helping people to make sense of complex globalization processes and consequences of increased visibility of religious outgroups.

Overall, one can expect that individuals with strong nationalist and religious attachments will hold negative sentiments toward the religious other. However, with its unique ideological and psychological characteristics, religious identity could be a more salient factor explaining negative religious outgroup attitudes compared with national identity in the global era. Based on the above discussion, we generate the following hypotheses.

Hypothesis 1: Individuals who hold religious identity as their primary attachment will be negatively oriented toward the religious other.

Hypothesis 2: Individuals who hold both religious and national identity as their primary attachment will be negatively oriented toward the religious other.

Hypothesis 3: Individuals who hold religious identity as their primary attachment will be "more strongly" inclined to hold unfavorable views of religious others than those who hold only national identity or are equally attached to both religious and national identity.

Social contact provides a second mechanism through which globalization may exert an effect on interreligious favorability. According to Allport (1954), under certain conditions, interpersonal contact may help reduce prejudice against minority groups. Contact will increase tolerance if those who interact have equal status, have common goals, have a supportive normative/institutional environment, and engage in personal interaction over a period of time (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1998; Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006). Recent scholarship has found that friendship and interaction among family members make "meaningful contact" possible and hence reduce prejudice toward outgroups (Pettigrew and Trop, 2000). As Putnam, Campbell, and Garrett (2012) succinctly put it in the *American Grace,* despite growing polarization between religious conservatives and nonreligious liberals, American society resiliently remains tolerant toward the religious other. They explain this tendency by meaningful interaction thanks to social ties that connect the members of different denominations in a nonreligious sphere (i.e., bridging).

Globalization processes have made interreligious contact more frequent in both physical and symbolic senses. The movement of people, increased stocks of immigrants (Lucas, 2008), and ease of cultural interactions thanks to the new technologies generate frequent interreligious contact. Not only movies and television but also the Internet revolution and social media are some of the means of these frequent interactions, dubbed as "electronic contact" (Amichai-Hamburger and McKenna, 2006), among world citizens. While this new form of contact is mostly indirect, there is also some evidence demonstrating that both direct and indirect contacts with minority ethnic and religious groups will decrease

[2]In a more elaborate account, Whitehouse (2004) defines religiosity as an analytical category where different modes of religiosity, "doctrinal" and "imagistic," are related to episodic memory (unique personal events) and semantic memory (general), respectively. Representations of religious identity encoded in semantic memory produce imagined religious communities whereas unique, life-changing events (episodic memory) feed an "imagistic" mode of religiosity, forming "enduring and particularistic social bonds" (Whitehouse, 2004:2).

prejudice toward outgroups (Pettigrew et al., 2007). This discussion leads us to a hypothesis that consists of two parts.

Hypothesis 4a: A high level of globalization is likely to decrease negative sentiments toward the religious other.

The contact hypothesis relies on the idea that increased personal interaction and high levels of meaningful knowledge of outgroups will reduce prejudice against the members of these groups. However, as Campbell, Green, and Monson (2012) have demonstrated in a recent study, this linear logic is problematic in the American context. They find that in addition to the existing prejudice due to the insulated status of Mormons as a religious outgroup, those who have moderate contact with this group were more responsive to either positive or negative political messages about Mitt Romney's presidential candidacy in 2008 than those with little or very high levels of contact. While contact opportunities have increased in the global era, social interaction is not personal and close enough to offset the stereotypes about religious outgroups. A recent cross-national study found that globalization increases prejudice toward immigrants (Kaya and Karakoc, 2012). Likewise, globalization may fuel negative sentiments toward the members of other religions.

Hypothesis 4b: A high level of globalization is likely to increase negative sentiments toward the religious other.

The increased movement of people across borders introduces an additional mechanism for new global social contact. As a large number of people migrate and settle in other countries, particularly the Western societies, the composition of the population changes and religious minorities become more visible. For example, the population of Muslims in Western societies has been increasing exponentially. These shifts in demographics may overwhelm the natives and create a feeling of threat but at the same time they may generate new opportunities for meaningful social contact. According to the racial threat theory (Blalock, 1967), increased visibility of minorities leads to discriminatory practices and threat-oriented ideologies carried by the members of the majority group.[3] An increase in the size of outgroup membership may generate a feeling of threat against the ingroup values among the locals. Such threat perceptions are also likely to apply to religious group attitudes (Campbell, 2006). Some scholars find that an increase in the size of ethnic minority groups creates opportunities for frequent interaction and reduces prejudice against outgroups (Wagner et al., 2006). However, largely due to the perceived economic threats by the members of the majority group, the size of minority groups is likely to increase prejudice (Scheepers, Gijsberts, and Coenders, 2002; Semyonov, Raijman, and Gorodzeisky, 2006). Members of nonhegemonic religions, who become more visible thanks to their increased interactions with the dominant religious group as a result of globalization processes (e.g., mass immigration, communications, advances in digital technologies), may be perceived as a threat to the economic and social order. This kind of threat perception is more likely to be symbolic, as demonstrated by E. Campbell (2003) in his study of contact and xenophobic attitudes in Botswana. Thus, we can suggest the following hypotheses.[4]

[3] Perceived threat can have two forms: realistic threat and symbolic threat. The former concerns the perceived threats to the physical and material well-being of ingroups (Sherif, 1966). The latter, symbolic threat, is derived from symbolic racism theory (Sears et al., 1980; Kinder and Sears, 1981) and its proponents argue that people are worried about national unity or cultural values more than they are about economic wellness.

[4] Our theoretical argument also implies interaction between globalization and religious identity, globalization and threat perceptions, and globalization and size of religious minorities. While we do not present these hypotheses due to space limitations, we test them in the models presented below and in the additional analyses that are available upon request.

Hypothesis 5: Individuals who perceive threats from other religious groups are more likely to hold negative views toward the religious other than those who do not perceive threats from other religious groups.

Hypothesis 6: An increase in the size of religious minorities is likely to increase unfavorable attitudes toward the religious other.

Data and Variables

We use the Pew Global Attitudes Survey (Spring 2011) to examine negative sentiments toward the religious other for the world's major religions (anti-Christian, anti-Muslim, and anti-Jewish sentiments) in a selected sample of 20 countries. Despite some limitations, these surveys allow testing of the proposed effects of globalization, contact, and religious identity on religious outgroup attitudes across the globe. We first run a series of multilevel models to account for the cross-national variation and random effects. Then we split countries into three different groups according to the majority religion and run fixed-effects models in subsamples to predict attitudes toward the religious other (Christian, Muslim, or Jew).[5] The data set includes Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Pakistan, and Turkey from Muslim-majority countries, as well as Brazil, Britain, France, Germany, Kenya, Lithuania, Mexico, Poland, Russia, Spain, Ukraine, and the United States from Christian-majority countries. Other countries in the sample are Israel (Jewish majority), India (Hindu majority), and Lebanon with equal Muslim- and Christian-majority populations. We exclude China, Palestine, and Japan from our sample because the main questions we use in the analysis are not asked in these countries. In all countries, representative national samples were drawn with multistage clustered sampling.

Before estimating each model, we filter the respondents who belong to the religion that is the target of negative sentiments to create a general measure of attitudes toward the religious other. For example, in Muslim-majority countries, we capture the perceptions about Christians and Jews. Similarly, in Christian-majority countries the perceptions about Muslims and Jews are the focus of our analysis. We pay special attention to India, Israel, and Lebanon[6] by filtering the respondents according to their religious denominations and include them in appropriate models. The main dependent variable measures the unfavorable views about the members of other religions. The Pew Global Attitude Survey (2011) includes the following question about unfavorable views of the religious other:

> Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of (OUT-GROUP)?[7]

For multilevel estimation, we created an index combining the responses about the religious outgroups (e.g., unfavorable views of Christians and Jews among Muslims). This index can take 12 different values and since it calculates the mean score for each respondent it

[5]These sample countries were divided based on the proportion of majority Muslim, Christian, Jewish, and Hindu populations for the analysis presented below. The data are from *The World Fact-Book* available at the Central Intelligence Agency website at ⟨https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/⟩.

[6]We also ran the same models dropping Lebanon from the estimation and the results do not change. These results are available upon request.

[7]The survey directly asks the respondents their opinions about a number of groups along with Jews, Christians, and Muslims. For details, see Q-3 in the Pew Global Attitudes Survey (2011), available at ⟨http://www.pewglobal.org/category/datasets/2011/⟩. While this question is likely to introduce a response bias based on the context of the interviews, we use weights and include country fixed effects to partially offset this limitation. Additional robust analysis is reported in the Supporting Information.

FIGURE 1

Worldwide Attitudes Toward the Religious Other



NOTE: The numbers inside the bars represent percentage of respondents who hold unfavorable views toward the members of the target religion.
SOURCE: Pew Global Attitudes Survey (2011).

ranges from 1 (*favorable views*) to 4 (*unfavorable views*). For fixed-effects models, we created a dichotomous variable to capture anti-Christian, anti-Muslim, and anti-Jewish views. This variable takes a value of 1 for *somewhat unfavorable* or *very unfavorable* responses and 0 otherwise.[8] We dropped the "don't know" and "refused" responses. Figure 1 shows the percentage of respondents holding negative sentiments toward the religious other in split samples.

The first panel in Figure 1 shows that anti-Semitic feelings are the highest in Muslim-majority countries. About 98 percent of the Jordanian respondents voiced unfavorable opinions toward the Jews, whereas the United States has the lowest percentage of respondents with anti-Semitic views. Given the political histories of these countries in relation to Israel, this is hardly a surprising finding. As for anti-Muslim views, 63 percent of the Lithuanians hold unfavorable opinions of Muslims, while this figure is 29 percent and 27 percent in the United States and Russia, respectively. Britain has the lowest percentage of respondents holding anti-Muslim sentiments. Figure 1 shows that the Turkish respondents expressed the highest percentage of negative sentiments toward Christians (82 percent) followed by the Pakistani respondents (64 percent). Lebanese respondents have the lowest level of anti-Christian sentiments in the entire sample. We use the following item to measure the self-reported social identity:

> Do you think of yourself first as (name of survey country's nationality) or first as a (name of the dominant religion in the survey country)? Name of survey country's nationality (1), dominant religion (2), both equally (3).

[8] We prefer to report the logistic regression estimations because in most ordered logit models the proportional odds assumption does not hold. The results in ordered logit estimations do not differ significantly.

We created dichotomous variables for each of these responses to capture religious, national, and religious-nationalist identities. In the empirical estimations below, we keep national identity as the reference category. Ideally, multiple items measuring the levels and strength of different identity categories would have provided a better assessment of the first three hypotheses. Unfortunately, the Pew surveys do not include additional items; neither do they provide an ideal measure of religious nationalism as defined by Juergensmeyer (1993, 2008). Thus, our measure does not allow us to compare different identities at different levels of strength. However, with the existing measures we can test our hypotheses about the unique effect of religious identity and whether individuals' exclusive religious identity has stronger effects on religious outgroup attitudes compared with the effects of national identity and hybrid identity (both equally) on these views. Overall, the percentage of respondents who identify with exclusive religious identity is higher in the Muslim countries as well as in Israel and the United States. Most European countries have higher rates of national attachment, whereas a moderate proportion of respondents describe their identity as "equally based on religion and nation."

We use the KOF Swiss Economic Institute globalization index incorporating the economic, social, and political dimensions of globalization as of 2010 as our first measure of contact.[9] We also use the percentage of each religious minority in all countries based on the Global Religious Landscape data provided by the Pew Religion and Public Life Project as an additional measure of social contact. For each model, the percentage of religious minority was selected according to the target population (e.g., Muslim percentage used in anti-Muslim sentiment estimations). We use an item asking the respondents whether they believe other religions are violent or not as a measure of threat perception (1 if members of other religion perceived as violent). We expect that the size of religious minorities and threat perceptions will increase unfavorable views of the religious other. We test both positive and negative contact hypotheses for the proposed effect of globalization on attitudes toward the religious other. Figure 2 shows the relationship between interreligious favorability and the main independent variables using average scores by country. As expected, religious identity increases unfavorable views of the religious other and the level of globalization is more conducive to interreligious favorability based on national averages. The size of religious minority and threat perceptions also appear to decrease unfavorable views of religious outgroups; however, this relationship is not very strong.

We also include additional control variables in our models and report the summary statistics for all variables in the Appendix. Personal religiosity is measured by the frequency of respondents' religious and prayer service attendances. This variable is measured along five- , seven- , or nine-point scales in different countries. We synchronized this measure with a five-point scale ranging from *hardly praying and hardly attending religious services* (1) to *praying five times a day and frequent visits* (5). For responses with seven and nine categories, we combined the lower- and upper-end responses and kept the middle responses to form a five-point scale in all countries. We use an item tapping respondents' overall opinion of the economy ranging from *economic situation is very good* (1) to *economic situation is very bad* (4). We utilize a dummy variable for measuring satisfaction with life and this variable takes a value of 1 when a respondent is dissatisfied with her personal life. We expect that individuals who are dissatisfied with their personal life and overall economic conditions will be more likely to hold negative sentiments about the religious other. We also control for the respondents' belief in the superiority of their own culture (four-point scale), education,

[9]Although the measures of contact are not ideal, these measures allow us to test the effect of general contact on attitudes toward the religious other. Details about the Kaufman Index can be found at ⟨http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch⟩.

FIGURE 2

The Determinants of Interreligious Favorability



NOTES: The figures represent mean or percentage scores (scaled 0–100) for each variable by country. The panels for religious identity and threat perceptions show the proportion of respondents who identify themselves by religion and who perceive other religions as violent. BRA = Brazil, BRI = Britain, CHI = China, EGY = Egypt, FRA = France, GER = Germany, IND = India, INDO = Indonesia, ISR = Israel, JAP = Japan, JOR = Jordan, KEN = Kenya, LEB = Lebanon, LIT = Lithuania, MEX = Mexico, PAK = Pakistan, POL = Poland, RUS = Russia, SPA = Spain, TUR = Turkey, UKR = Ukraine, US = United States.
SOURCE: Pew Global Attitudes Survey (2011).

gender, age, income, and employment status. These items have different categories across the sample. Therefore, we synchronized the categories to create dichotomous variables measuring high income, middle income, college education, and full-time employment. This was our best way of creating consistent measures to capture the socioeconomic background of the respondents.

Results

Table 1 presents the results of the multilevel model estimations. The first model is the base model and we add the interaction terms between measures of contact and religious identity in Models 2–4. Our results provide strong support for the religious identity hypothesis (Hypothesis 1) and positive global contact argument (Hypothesis 4a). In all models, exclusive religious identity increases, whereas globalization decreases unfavorable views of the religious other. The results do not substantiate a negative relationship between the size of religious minority and unfavorable views of religious outgroups. However, as expected, those who view other religions as violent are more likely to be unfavorable toward religious outgroups in Models 1–3 (threat perceptions hypothesis). This variable becomes

TABLE 1

Multilevel Estimation Results for the Unfavorable Views of the Religious Other

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Religious identity	0.145***	0.202**	0.0798***	0.144***
	(0.014)	(0.084)	(0.019)	(0.014)
Religious and national identity	0.052***	0.027	0.004	0.051***
	(0.02)	(0.125)	(0.024)	(0.019)
Globalization index	–0.020***	–0.021***	–0.022***	–0.023***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Percentage other religion	–0.518	–0.513	–0.705	–0.584
	(0.834)	(0.834)	(0.846)	(0.832)
Globalization × Religious identity		–0.000		
		(0.001)		
Globalization × Religious and national identity		0.000		
		(0.002)		
Percentage other religion × Religious identity			0.588***	
			(0.115)	
Percentage other religion × Religious and national identity			0.432***	
			(0.154)	
Religiosity	–0.017***	–0.016***	–0.015***	–0.017***
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)
Other religion violent	0.135***	0.135***	0.135***	–0.170**
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.073)
Globalization × Other religion violent				0.004***
				(0.001)
Percentage other religion × Other religion violent				0.208**
				(0.093)
Belief in cultural superiority	0.028***	0.028***	0.029***	0.027***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Satisfaction with life	0.040***	0.040***	0.041***	0.041***
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Sociotropic economic expectations	0.046***	0.046***	0.047***	0.047***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Education	–0.069***	–0.069***	–0.069***	–0.069***
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Middle income	–0.022	–0.022	–0.024	–0.023
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
High income	–0.000	–0.001	–0.001	–0.0004
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Female	–0.028*	–0.028**	–0.027**	–0.030***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Age	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***	0.002***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Employment status	–0.026**	–0.026**	–0.026**	–0.027**
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Constant	3.849***	3.833***	3.890***	3.990***
	(0.556)	(0.557)	(0.564)	(0.556)
Random effects constant	0.153***	0.153***	0.157***	–0.940***
	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.05)	(0.159)
Residual variance	0.483***	0.483***	0.482***	–0.364***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
N2/N1	20/16,909	20/16,909	20/16,909	20/16,909
Likelihood ratio (LR) chi-square	3,627.43***	3,607.93***	3,630.31***	3,593.77***

Standard errors are in parentheses.
*$p < 0.1$, **$p < 0.05$, ***$p < 0.01$.

FIGURE 3

Marginal Effects of Contact, Religion, and Perceived Threat on Unfavorable Views of the Religious Other



NOTE: Marginal effects are calculated from the estimations presented in Model 1 (Table 1).
SOURCE: Pew Global Attitudes Survey (2011).

negative in Model 4 when it is interacted with indicators of contact (globalization and size of religious minority). Controlling for interaction terms between indicators of contact and identity (Model 2 and Model 3), we still find strong support in favor of the contact and religious identity hypotheses. However, the interaction terms between the size of religious minority and identity variables turn out to be positive. As expected, dissatisfaction with life, negative sociotropic economic expectations, and belief in cultural superiority increase unfavorable views of the religious other. Finally, those with higher levels of education and female respondents are less likely to hold unfavorable views of religious outgroups.

We also calculated the marginal effects from Model 1 for indicators of contact and religious identity (Figure 3). The top panel shows that as the level of globalization in a country increases, those who hold exclusive religious identity become less likely to view religious outgroups in unfavorable terms. For example, a British citizen (highest score of globalization) who defines her identity in religious terms would be about 20 percent less likely to hold unfavorable views of religious outgroups compared with a Kenyan citizen with the same characteristics (lowest score of globalization). A similar conditional impact is also observed for the size of religious minority. As the size of religious outgroups increases, individuals become less likely to hold unfavorable views of the religious other even if they hold exclusive religious identity or view members of other religions as a threat. This second conditional effect, however, is moderate in comparison with the conditional effect of globalization. In our additional analysis (available upon request), we also found that religious identity has a substantively larger effect on intolerant views of the religious

other compared with the effects associated with hybrid and national identities. In sum, globalization reverses the positive relationship between religious identity and unfavorable perceptions of religious outgroups to bring about favorable views toward the members of other religions. Therefore, we find strong support for the positive effect of global contact on interreligious favorability cross-nationally.

We continue our analysis by examining the effects of religious identity and global contact on perceptions of specific religious outgroups (Christians, Muslims, and Jews). Since the dependent variable measuring attitudes toward the religious other is dichotomous, we use logistic regression estimation in the following models. For each type of sentiment, we first run a base model and compare this to the fixed-effects model using weights in all models. Overall, the results in Table 2 lend strong support to the religious identity and positive contact hypotheses. Holding exclusive religious identity increases, whereas both contact and the size of religious minorities decrease unfavorable views of the religious other in all models. While those who identify with both religion and nation are more likely to hold anti-Christian and anti-Jewish sentiments in the base models, this effect remains most robust in predicting the anti-Muslim sentiment. Exclusive religious identity strongly predicts both anti-Christian and anti-Muslim views in the base and fixed-effects models. In multilevel and split-sample estimations, we empirically confirm the implications of the studies theorizing about the salience of religious identity in forming attitudes toward the religious outgroups in the global age (Juergensmeyer, 1993; Kinnvall, 2004; Voicu, 2012; Whitehouse, 2004; Gibson and Gouwas, 2000). Since a significant cross-cultural variation exists in the meaning and strength of these identity categories, we need to exercise caution about these results. However, to the extent that religious identity in itself or in combination with the national attachment becomes one's primary identity, its effect on religious outgroup attitudes appears to be stronger than national identity. Furthermore, the results lend strong support to the positive global contact hypothesis, showing that even general and indirect forms of contact may reduce interreligious unfavorable perceptions (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006; Pettigrew et al., 2007; Putnam, Campbell, and Garrett, 2012; Campbell, Green, and Monson, 2012). While the size of religious minorities is a robust predictor of only anti-Christian sentiments, we find strong support for the threat perceptions hypothesis in all six models. These results agree with the findings of recent research highlighting the importance of threat perceptions in mitigating the effect of religiosity on political tolerance (Eisenstein, 2006; Eisenstein and Clark, 2014).

Overall, these results confirm that religious identity and global contact carry a significant independent effect after controlling for factors such as personal religiosity, perceptions of cultural superiority, education, and other demographic factors. Interestingly, being religious decreases negative sentiments toward Christians and Muslims, but this impact does not remain robust in explaining negative views toward Jews. The cross-cultural variation in the patterns and meanings of religious service attendance and prayer may account for this inconsistency. Unfortunately, the Pew surveys do not have additional measures of religious belief and practice and this limitation prevents further investigation. Dissatisfaction with life, belief in one's own cultural superiority, and negative evaluation of general economic conditions increase the dislike of the religious other, as expected. Another consistent finding is the statistically significant and negative effect of education on negative sentiments toward Jews, Christians, and Muslims.

Finally, religious identity categories do not explain anti-Jewish sentiment when we control for the fixed effects. As we show in Figure 1, anti-Semitism is very high in Muslim societies and some European countries. The dislike of Jews may be explained by political factors related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and opposition to the creation of a Jewish

TABLE 2

Determinants of Negative Sentiments Toward the Religious Other: Logistic Regression Estimations

	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10
	Anti-Christian	Anti-Christian (Fixed Effects)	Anti-Muslim	Anti-Muslim (Fixed Effects)	Anti-Jewish	Anti-Jewish (Fixed Effects)
Religious identity	0.658***	0.430***	0.262***	0.287***	0.582***	0.076
	(0.075)	(0.088)	(0.067)	(0.076)	(0.060)	(0.082)
Religious and national identity	0.530***	0.111	0.469***	0.316***	0.349***	–0.128
	(0.097)	(0.118)	(0.089)	(0.096)	(0.071)	(0.092)
Globalization index	–0.020***	0.074***	–0.010***	–0.074***	–0.028***	–0.165***
	(0.004)	(0.010)	(0.003)	(0.014)	(0.003)	(0.019)
Percentage other	–13.316***	–17.193***	2.773***	–32.009	–267.843***	–29.030
Religion	(0.919)	(0.927)	(0.441)	(19.705)	(27.709)	(17.838)
Religiosity	–0.071***	–0.001	–0.080***	–0.072***	0.082***	0.017
	(0.023)	(0.027)	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.017)	(0.025)
Other religion violent	0.990***	0.537**	0.690***	0.847***	1.748***	0.530***
	(0.210)	(0.212)	(0.051)	(0.055)	(0.093)	(0.128)
Belief in cultural superiority	0.179***	0.151***	0.257***	0.142***	0.276***	0.070**
	(0.040)	(0.043)	(0.027)	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.034)
Satisfaction with life	0.231***	0.192**	0.173***	0.217***	–0.052	0.089
	(0.076)	(0.083)	(0.062)	(0.067)	(0.063)	(0.079)
Sociotropic economic expectations	0.128***	0.093**	0.036	0.169***	0.093***	0.145***
	(0.039)	(0.043)	(0.033)	(0.038)	(0.033)	(0.042)

continued

TABLE 2

Continued

	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10
	Anti-Christian	Anti-Christian (Fixed Effects)	Anti-Muslim	Anti-Muslim (Fixed Effects)	Anti-Jewish	Anti-Jewish (Fixed Effects)
Education	–0.286***	–0.375***	–0.240***	–0.252***	0.008	–0.188***
	(0.086)	(0.091)	(0.058)	(0.062)	(0.059)	(0.072)
Middle income	–0.169	–0.207*	0.123*	–0.006	0.286***	0.077
	(0.106)	(0.107)	(0.068)	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.088)
High income	0.153	–0.097	0.079	0.018	0.677***	0.256**
	(0.111)	(0.116)	(0.075)	(0.085)	(0.076)	(0.100)
Female	–0.260***	–0.199**	0.051	0.052	–0.195***	–0.155**
	(0.074)	(0.079)	(0.051)	(0.054)	(0.051)	(0.061)
Age	0.002	0.002	0.007***	0.008***	–0.005***	0.004*
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Employment status	–0.200***	–0.126	–0.014	–0.064	0.072	–0.049
	(0.075)	(0.079)	(0.054)	(0.058)	(0.053)	(0.065)
Constant	0.832**	–3.291***	–0.752***	3.428***	0.910***	9.031***
	(0.364)	(0.671)	(0.262)	(0.856)	(0.245)	(1.162)
Observations	8,268	8,268	10,946	10,946	13,538	13,538

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Fixed effects are available in the Supporting Information.
***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.1$.

state in the Middle East. The unconditional American support for Israel has increased anti-Israeli and anti-American sentiment in Arab societies (Jamal, 2012) and beyond. Some violent organizations such as Al-Qaeda have used these political issues to generate a dislike of Israel and, more broadly, Jews among Muslim publics. Some Middle Eastern leaders (e.g., Nasser in Egypt, Saddam Hussein in Iraq, and Erdogan in Turkey) have exploited Arab-Israeli conflict to gain domestic political capital and international popularity (Ciftci and Tezcür, 2015). The extreme-right parties in Europe have also used anti-Muslim and anti-Jewish rhetoric in their manifestos. Historically, anti-Semitism has been prevalent in a number of countries around the world, including Western societies. According to the Pew surveys, anti-Jewish sentiments remain at very high levels in Muslim-majority countries, but most European and Christian publics demonstrate lower levels of anti-Semitic attitudes. Relatively more favorable views of Jews may be attributed to the changing perceptions in the aftermath of World War II in Europe and support for Israel among evangelicals in the United States.[10] Therefore, deep historical and political reasons may make religious identity less relevant in shaping anti-Jewish sentiment.

We conclude our analysis by presenting the substantive effects of all variables on dislike of the religious other to compare the magnitudes of the proposed effects. Figure 4 presents the rate of change (predictive margins) associated with each independent variable for Models 6, 8, and 10 in Table 2, with 95 percent confidence bounds.

According to Figure 4, the substantive effect of globalization is smaller than the effect of exclusive religious identity on negative sentiments toward the religious other. While the effect of hybrid identity (both religious and national) is larger, this marginal effect is statistically relevant in explaining only anti-Muslim sentiment. The predictive margins of globalization are negative in the models explaining anti-Muslim and anti-Jewish sentiments, but they remain positive (to increase unfavorable views) in the first panel. The largest substantive effect is associated with threat perceptions, whereas the marginal effect of education consistently reduces dislike of religious other. These results provide additional support for the religious identity and global contact hypotheses.[11]

Additional Analysis

We ran additional models to validate our findings. First, we included the interaction terms between measures of contact, identity, and threat perceptions in estimation of specific religious outgroup attitudes to expand the analysis presented in Tables 1 and 2. Second, since threat perception is proposed as a mechanism through which religious identity may inform attitudes toward other religious groups, we ran additional models with multiplicative terms of religious identity/religious nationalism and the indicator of threat perceptions. Third, given the high degree of correlation between religious identity and religiosity, we ran a series of models excluding religiosity. Fourth, given the weakness of our measure of identity, we created an alternative three-point ordinal variable measuring social identity

[10] See Pat Robertson's account of this support at ⟨http://www.patrobertson.com/Speeches/IsraelLauder.asp⟩. When we estimate anti-Jewish sentiment in Muslim majority countries, religious identity turns out to be significant in the expected direction. This result confirms the salience of religion as an identity category in the Muslim world (Zubaida, 2012). This is also in line with Oliver Roy's (1996) argument about the increasing salience of Islamic identity as a symbolic attachment. The fact that some political Islamists have also exploited anti-Semitic feelings may also account for these results.

[11] We prefer not to report the marginal effects for the size of religious minority as the large substantive effects distort the presentation of the other figures in the model. It should be noted that this marginal effect barely reaches statistical significance in only Model 6 and is not statistically significant in the other models.

FIGURE 4

Predictive Margins



NOTE: Predictive margins are obtained from Models 6, 8, and 10 in Table 2.

categories of interest (ranging from national to religious identity) and ran all models with this alternative operationalization. Finally, we estimated additional models with different subsamples. For example, we estimated all models dropping Lebanon and India from the analysis. We also ran models predicting anti-Jewish and anti-Christian sentiments in the Muslim-only sample and anti-Muslim sentiment in the Christian-only sample. By and large, in all of these models, our substantive conclusions about religious identity and global contact hypotheses do not change. Some of these additional analyses are available in Supporting Information ⟨http://sabriciftci.com⟩ and all estimation results are available upon request.

Conclusion

The purpose of this article was to examine the cross-national variation in interreligious favorability across the globe. The theoretical argument focused on two factors that are closely related to globalization: the increasing salience of religious identity and global contact. Our results show that religious identity, as an individual's primary attachment, is positively related to unfavorable views of the religious other. We contribute to the existing scholarship by empirically confirming the independent role of religious identity and broader applicability of theories dealing with the increasing salience of religious belonging on a global scale (Juergensmeyer, 2008; Kinnvall, 2004). The robustness of the proposed relationship in predicting unfavorable views of the religious other confirms the findings of students of political tolerance (Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus, 1982; Gibson, 2010), as well as of

those who argue that with globalization religion has become a salient feature of social and political life in the Middle East (Zubaida, 2012), Western societies (Kinnvall, 2004; Voicu, 2012), or less-developed parts of the world (Juergensmeyer, 1998; Whitehouse, 2004). Our results also show that threat perception is a robust predictor of interreligious nonfavorability when we control for globalization and religious identity. Thus, in our analysis, we also find indirect support for the wider applicability of theories linking religiosity to intolerance through mediation of threat perceptions (Eisenstein, 2006).

We find that individuals are more favorable toward religious outgroups at higher levels of globalization. Ceteris paribus, individuals who live in a highly globalized society are less likely to hold unfavorable views of the religious other than those who reside in a less-globalized society. Therefore, global contact, albeit indirect and less meaningful, has a potential for generating favorable views toward the religious other on a global scale. This result supports the findings of the contact theory (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006) and recent scholarship on contact and religious tolerance in the United States (Putnam, Campbell, and Garrett, 2012; Campbell, Green, and Monson, 2012). Accordingly, our analysis allows us to make a second contribution by demonstrating the cross-national relevance of contact theory with respect to religious outgroup attitudes. We take one step further and demonstrate that the positive effect of globalization through contact also offsets the negative effects of religious belonging and threat perceptions on interreligious favorability. A similar pattern is observed with respect to our second measure of contact: the size of a religious minority. Individuals who live in a highly globalized society with a relatively large religious minority are less likely to hold unfavorable views toward religious outgroups even if they hold exclusive religious identity and perceive a general threat from other groups. Globalization increases the salience of religious identity and that may be more conducive to interreligious intolerance. However, globalization also provides new opportunities for social interaction that may reverse the negative effect of religious identity on interreligious nonfavorability.

Unavoidably, there are certain limitations of this analysis that hopefully will motivate future studies. Although the Pew Global Attitudes Survey provides a large number of items asked in a wide array of countries, it does not allow the direct test of theories about religious tolerance and contact. We relied only on indirect measures, interreligious favorability and global contact, in our analysis. Scholars could collect new data to carry out a direct test of the contact and religious tolerance hypotheses on a global scale. Second, we cannot make a causal claim about the direct effect of globalization and contact on religious outgroup views. Future experimental studies can manipulate the causal factors (forms of global social contact and perceived threat) in settings with different religious institutions, varying levels of globalization, and different sizes of religious minorities to account for the causality. Finally, our analysis examines only interreligious favorability toward the members of Christianity, Islam, and Judaism. Future studies could expand the scope of this research by examining the religious outgroup views about Buddhism, Hinduism, and other faiths.

Globalization has increased the salience of religious identity, which can be a source of prejudice toward members of other religions. Unfortunately, this process leads to less understanding among religious communities and this may justify religious violence among the adherents of the world's major faiths. However, globalization also makes contact more likely to offset this negative impact. Therefore, in a world where people have more opportunities to interact, religious tolerance could overtake prejudice and inhibit religiously justified violence.

Appendix: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	*N*	Mean	*SD*	Min.	Max.
Unfavorable views of religious other	20,398	2.71	0.85	1	4
Unfavorable views of Muslims	13,415	2.63	0.95	1	4
Unfavorable views of Christians	9,757	2.61	1.05	1	4
Unfavorable views of Jews	16,759	2.84	1.06	1	4
Exclusive religious identity	22,433	0.29	0.46	0	1
Religious and national identity	22,433	0.11	0.31	0	1
Globalization index	22,435	65.73	11.73	48.79	85.39
Percentage other religion	22,436	0.12	0.13	0.001	0.384
Percentage Christian	22,436	0.41	0.38	0.004	0.951
Percentage Muslim	22,436	0.32	0.39	0.001	0.98
Percentage Jewish	22,436	0.03	0.15	0.001	0.756
Religiosity	21,735	3.21	1.53	1	5
Other religion violent	22,436	0.40	0.49	0	1
Christians violent	21,787	0.03	0.18	0	1
Muslims violent	21,787	0.26	0.44	0	1
Jews violent	21,787	0.11	0.32	0	1
Belief in cultural superiority	21,551	2.91	0.97	1	4
Satisfaction with life	21,825	0.67	0.47	0	1
Sociotropic expectations	22,078	2.91	0.95	1	4
Education	22,239	0.19	0.39	0	1
Income	20,094	2.25	0.69	1	3
Female	22,433	0.51	0.50	0	1
Age	22,357	40.97	16.39	18	97
Employment status (full-time)	22,353	0.44	0.50	0	1

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Who Favors al-Qaeda? Anti-Americanism, Religious Outlooks, and Favorable Attitudes toward Terrorist Organizations

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Abstract

This study examines why ordinary people sympathize with a terrorist network in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Holding literalist religious outlook resonating with al-Qaeda's marginal interpretation of Islam constant, it is maintained that anti-Americanism and its varieties matter a great deal in explaining attitudes toward al-Qaeda. Using Pew Global Attitudes Surveys conducted in Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, and Tunisia, the authors run conditional mixed process estimations combining seemingly unrelated regressions with selection models to account for the missing values and endogeneity problems. The analysis reveals significant variation both cross-nationally and in the effects of varieties of anti-Americanism on favorability of al-Qaeda. While the dislike of certain aspects of American culture generates sympathy toward al-Qaeda, anti-Americanism as a general attitude does not. More interestingly, dislike of American democracy, technology, and policy has either negative or no effect on favorable views of al-Qaeda. Literalist religious outlook generates positive views of al-Qaeda, but religiosity has a negative impact. These findings imply that we need to draw careful distinctions between politicized Islamic preferences and personal religiosity as well as the different types of anti-American sentiments in understanding Muslim political attitudes about terrorist groups.

Keywords

anti-Americanism, al-Qaeda, Islam, shari'a, Muslim religiosity

Introduction

Public opinion polls show that an overwhelming majority of Muslims are very concerned about violent extremism and that only a tiny fraction support terrorist organizations that justify their violent acts in the name of Islam (Esposito and Mogahed 2007; Telhami 2013).[1] This article explores why ordinary people in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) hold favorable views toward al-Qaeda, the prime example of transnational terrorist organizations. Examining individual determinants of favorability toward al-Qaeda in MENA is likely to improve our understanding of attitudinal and behavioral support for religiously inspired militant groups in Muslim majority societies.

Existing scholarship finds that only a minority of Muslims holding specific religious ideologies support militant organizations (Fair, Littman, and Nugent 2017; Wiktorowicz and Kaltner 2003). Rather than Muslim religiosity (Huntington 1993; Lewis 1990), we argue that a literalist orientation in the legal sphere (i.e., preference for strict implementation of scriptural teachings in law) as a politicized religious outlook generates sympathy toward al-Qaeda. Do other factors carry some weight once we control for a specific religious outlook resonating with al-Qaeda's ideology? We argue that anti-American orientations matter a great deal for understanding the favorability of groups such as al-Qaeda, but in highly nuanced ways. Common wisdom assumes a positive relationship, and sometimes an overlap, between anti-Americanism and support for terrorist acts against the American targets.[2] In our explanation, we first treat the two sets of attitudes as conceptually and empirically distinct. Then, we distinguish between varieties of anti-Americanism and propose that various types of anti-American sentiment will differently inform opinions toward al-Qaeda. Our explanation also addresses the cross-national variation in this relationship and moves away from a "one size fits all" approach.

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The empirical analysis uses data from the Pew Global Attitudes Project Survey (2012) conducted in Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia, and Turkey. We run a series of conditional mixed process (CMP) estimations that combine seemingly unrelated regressions with a selection model to account for (1) the large number of "no response" categories seen in survey items tapping individuals' views about militant groups, and (2) the possible endogeneity problem concerning anti-Americanism and favorable views of al-Qaeda.

Once we control for an individual's religiosity and religious outlook, a highly nuanced relationship emerges between various types of anti-Americanism and favorable views of al-Qaeda. Taking into account the missing values and endogenous effects, the association between anti-Americanism and favorable views of al-Qaeda either disappears (Egypt and Tunisia) or takes a negative sign in some secular polities (Turkey) and client regimes (Jordan). More interestingly, negative views of the United States, the Americans, the American technology, and anti-Americanism as a general attitude decrease favorability of al-Qaeda. However, we find that deeper resentment toward certain aspects of American culture (customs, movies, and music) may breed sympathy toward this organization. These results imply that not all types of anti-American sentiments, and certainly not in every society, generate sympathy toward transnational terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda.

Our analysis demonstrates that individuals who desire the implementation of Islamic law based on a highly distinct interpretation of religious texts (literalist outlook) lean more favorably toward al-Qaeda. Religious individuals, however, are significantly less likely to hold positive orientations about this organization. Therefore, in addition to the highly variable effect of anti-Americanism, certain religious outlooks resonating with al-Qaeda's interpretation of Islam are the main reasons triggering favorable leanings toward this terrorist network.

Religiosity, Literalist Outlook, and Favorable Views of al-Qaeda

Religion and secular-Islamist cleavage has been central to political struggles since the nineteenth century in MENA (Zubaida 1993). We maintain that, in MENA societies, religion is likely to shape political attitudes toward the state, governance, and violent militant organizations. Religion can have formative effects on attitudes toward al-Qaeda through two mechanisms: personal religiosity and religious outlooks.

One view argues that adherence to Muslim faith may be sufficient in itself to generate favorable opinions about militant groups such as al-Qaeda. This approach builds on Huntington's (1993) clash of civilizations thesis predicting a fundamental conflict between the "modern" Western civilizations and Muslim world. According to Lewis (1990, 48), the source of "Muslim rage" is the religion of Islam, which, supposedly "inspired in some of its followers a mood of hatred and violence" against the West. There is some evidence showing that religiosity generates favorable views toward al-Qaeda (Mendelsohn 2005; Stern 2003). Others, however, find no relationship between religiosity and support for terrorist acts in several Muslim majority societies (Esposito and Mogahed 2007; Tessler and Robbins 2007). A recent study finds a negative relationship between knowledge of Islam and support for Islamist militant groups (Fair, Goldstein, and Hamza 2016). We test the hypothesis implied by the clash of civilizations theory against the propositions put forward by this recent scholarship.

Hypothesis 1 (H1): Religious Muslims will be more likely to favor al-Qaeda than nonreligious.

A second mechanism that may generate favorable views of al-Qaeda is a specific religious outlook concerning the implementation of shari'a (i.e., Islamic law). While most Muslims around the world desire implementation of shari'a in social life, analytical studies show that support for shari'a does not necessarily promote violence or contradict with democratic attitudes (Ciftci 2013; Esposito and Mogahed 2007). In a recent study, Fair, Littman, and Nugent (2017, 3) find that individuals who conceive shari'a as provision of security and government services are more supportive of democracy, but those who view shari'a in terms of physical punishments are more supportive of militancy.

There are significant differences about the meaning and implementation of shari'a among Islamist groups. Salafis, for example, take a literal approach to religious texts and promote strict implementation of scriptural rules inspired by the lifestyle of *Salaf al-Saleh* (early generation of Muslims; al-Anani and Malik 2013).[3] The rhetoric of violent extremists such as Bin Laden is closer to this literal interpretation. Quentin Wiktorowicz (2005a) argues that al-Qaeda is a radical fringe group promoting violent action within the larger Salafi community. In his notorious "Declaration of War," Bin Laden criticizes the Saudi government for failing to implement the true Islamic law, and he refers to the rulings of the medieval scholar Ibn-i Taymiyyah, acknowledged by many to be the founder of Salafi thought, to justify the war against the United States and the corrupt regimes in the Muslim world (Euben and Zaman 2009).[4]

Al-Qaeda and other radical organizations justify the holy war (i.e., jihad) against the United States, the incumbent Arab regimes, and both Muslim and non-Muslim civilians in the name of defending the Muslim lands and

establishing true Islamic law. A narrow and literalist interpretation of the Quran and *hadith* (the sayings of the prophet) underlies this justification.[5] Like all Islamist groups, al-Qaeda attempts to establish a monopoly on the interpretation of "True Islam." Mainstream groups, including a majority of Salafis, condemn al-Qaeda's ideology and its lethal acts carried against civilians. Nonetheless, al-Qaeda remains intent on gaining an authoritative position as a "defender" of the *da'wah* (i.e., Muslim cause).

Assuming the role of religious authority is no trivial issue in Muslim majority societies. Not all individuals can read the Arabic scripture, but most Muslims listen to the Quran on tapes, videos, and their phones. The majority of Muslims, like members of most other religions, however, are not well versed in the scripture. To make sense of complex religious doctrines, they rely on the guidance of scholars held in high esteem and regarded as inheritors of prophetic tradition (Fair, Goldstein, and Hamza 2016; Wiktorowicz 2005b). Al-Qaeda uses this knowledge gap to appeal to a small minority of pious individuals by establishing some kind of moral authority in religious matters. We argue that al-Qaeda's justification of violence for implementing shari'a according to the example of the prophet and his companions might find some resonance among individuals leaning favorably toward such world views. Although a small minority, these individuals may find the religious rulings (i.e., fatwas), issued by al-Qaeda, persuasive. Because al-Qaeda's interpretation follows the scriptural literalist ways, we can argue that individuals with religious outlooks favoring implementation of Islamic principles based on a literal interpretation of religious texts will lean more favorably toward al-Qaeda than those who hold a flexible approach.

> **Hypothesis 2 (H2):** Individuals who support the strict implementation of Islamic law according to the scripture will be more favorable of al-Qaeda than those who do not have such orientations.

We make note of two caveats in this proposition. First, many Muslim intellectuals advocate the implementation of a flexible and overarching set of Islamic rules in social and political life (Ayoob 2007; El-Affendi 2003; Ramadan 2009). These scholars argue that shari'a can provide a basis for modern legislation and democratic institutions (Ramadan 2009) and, as such, they diverge from the literalist interpreters of Muslim faith. Second, it can be argued that the proposition linking a literalist outlook to favorable views of al-Qaeda is already well established by the existing scholarship and that it is not novel. While we do not discard this criticism, our argument provides a very specific mechanism for explaining the formative effects of religion on Muslim political attitudes. We also believe that it is necessary to control for religious world views before we can assess the effect of other potential factors on favorability of al-Qaeda. For the goal of this paper, then, the question becomes: what role does anti-Americanism play in shaping attitudes toward al-Qaeda once we control for religiosity and a specific religious outlook?[6]

Anti-Americanism and Favorable Views of al-Qaeda

Anti-Americanism is a rather ambiguous term defined as "a psychological tendency to hold negative views of the United States and of American society in general" (Katzenstein and Keohane 2007, 12). Military intervention, U.S. support for nondemocratic regimes and Israel, and discontent about cultural imperialism are cited among the main causes of anti-Americanism in MENA (Abdallah 2003; Berger 2014; Chiozza 2007; Datta 2014; Furia and Lucas 2006; Jamal 2012; Katzenstein and Keohane 2007). There does not seem to be a singular origin or one type of this tendency, and it widely varies across countries (Chiozza 2007). For example, Katzenstein and Keohane (2007) differentiate between four types of anti-Americanism: liberal, social, sovereign-nationalist, and radical. Scholars commonly make a distinction between policy anti-Americanism (Esposito and Mogahed 2007; Makdisi 2002; Tessler 2003) and cultural anti-Americanism (Paz 2003). The former relates to "what America does" and the latter to "what America is" (Blaydes and Linzer 2012).

Anti-Americanism is not necessarily specific to any given region, but it is important to consider that, in MENA, there has been increased distrust toward the U.S. government and its foreign policies (Jamal 2012), especially following the U.S. involvement in Iraq (Chiozza 2007). This distrust may turn into favorable attitudes supporting militant organizations or, in extreme cases, may lead to violent acts against the United States. As Robichaud and Goldbrenner (2005, 12) noted, "acting on anti-American sentiment is contingent on opportunity. When all else is equal, anti-Americanism is more likely to lead to localized violence where American targets or symbols are pervasive and/or accessible."

Factors that affect anti-Americanism are likely to also inform attitudes about al-Qaeda. The complex interdependence between anti-Americanism and support for terrorist groups attacking American military and civilian targets makes the testing of this relationship challenging. Existing studies concurrently use survey questions measuring anti-American feelings, opposition to the U.S. policies, or the American culture as independent variables in the same models.[7] This scholarship, certainly,

provides important insights about the underlying attitudinal drivers of support for terrorist attacks on civilian and military targets. However, we argue that there is merit in separating anti-Americanism and favorable views of al-Qaeda due to the endogenous character of survey items simultaneously measuring anti-Americanism and support for terrorist groups acting against the American targets.

Does anti-American orientation always generate positive feelings toward al-Qaeda? We know that terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda exploit anti-American feelings to gain followers and to justify their acts against the United States and the governments in Muslim majority societies. The depiction of America as the "far enemy" (Gerges 2005) is the cornerstone of al-Qaeda's ideology. The image theory (Alexander, Brewer, and Livingston 2005) predicts that such image construction may lead to widespread stereotypes about foreign powers. Bin Laden made ample references to the American foreign policy and exploited anti-American feelings in his rhetoric to obtain public approval for terrorist acts. Over time, most of these acts turned against the regimes in several MENA countries, but the exploitation of anti-American sentiment by al-Qaeda remains unchanged. Individuals with anti-American feelings are likely to rely on this rhetoric and view al-Qaeda positively. Therefore, we hypothesize that,

> **Hypothesis 3 (H3):** Anti-Americanism is likely to increase favorable views of al-Qaeda.

Notwithstanding this rationale, assuming a homogeneous link between the two sets of attitudes across four MENA societies characterized by different social, economic, and institutional dynamics is not realistic. We should observe different patterns in the relationship between anti-Americanism and support for terrorist organizations. Amaney Jamal (2012) argues that in the client regimes of MENA, anti-Americanism may not lead to favorable views of Islamists due to the fear of losing American aid that benefits certain segments of the population. Islamists will be allowed to serve as drivers of democratization by the regime insofar as they are pro-American and when the state is dependent on the United States in economic and security terms (i.e., Kuwait). This dependence may prevent the opposition Islamists from playing a democratizing role if they hold anti-American attitudes (Jamal 2012). In our sample, Jordan and Egypt are client regimes, and most Islamists may hold anti-American attitudes. In these settings, anti-American feelings may increase favorable views of al-Qaeda in the form of protest against the regime, in relation to the less dependent countries (i.e., Turkey and Tunisia).

Attitudes toward al-Qaeda may also vary according to the type of anti-American sentiments. Ordinary Muslims may hold favorable views of American democracy, technology, and business, but may dislike the American foreign policy (Esposito and Mogahed 2007). Berger (2014), for example, finds that negative perceptions related to American support for Israel or beliefs about a Western conspiracy to weaken and divide the Muslim world are related to support only for the attacks on U.S. military targets. Negative perceptions about the U.S. culture and freedom of expression are likely to derive support for direct attacks on American civilians (Berger 2014, 783). All else equal, we can argue that policy anti-Americanism will be a strong predictor of favorability toward al-Qaeda whereas attitudes toward American democracy, technology, business, and American people will have variable effects. Strong resentment toward American culture leads to support for violent acts against the civilians (Berger 2014), and, by extension, this attitude may generate favorable orientations toward al-Qaeda. Based on this discussion, we propose the following hypotheses to test the nuanced relationship between anti-Americanism and favorable views of al-Qaeda in MENA societies:

> **Hypothesis 4 (H4):** The relationship between anti-American attitudes and favorable views of al-Qaeda will vary in magnitude and direction across MENA societies.
>
> **Hypothesis 5 (H5):** The relationship between anti-American attitudes and favorable views of al-Qaeda will vary in magnitude and direction by the type of anti-Americanism, such that policy and cultural anti-Americanism should lead to favorable views of al-Qaeda.

Alternative Explanations

While lack of education as a determinant of support for terrorist groups has been a usual suspect, scholarly research finds little support in that direction (Mousseau 2011). There is some evidence to suggest that individuals possessing higher levels of education are more supportive of violent organizations (Krueger and Maleckova 2003), but research does not correlate poverty with support for terrorist organizations (Krueger and Maleckova 2003; Shapiro and Fair 2010; Tessler and Robbins 2007). Unemployment, particularly among the urban youth, may increase support for militant groups (Robichaud and Goldbrenner 2005, 13). An additional factor explaining successful recruitment by and support for militant groups is related to individuals' identification with "terrorist organizations" rhetoric promoting traditional values (Mousseau 2011, 45). On the flip side of this rationale, cultural modernization, usually measured by egalitarian gender views (Inglehart and Norris 2003), may decrease anti-American feelings and favorable views of al-Qaeda

insofar as it erodes the appeal of traditional values. Finally, individual preferences about the role of religion in politics may inform individual views about al-Qaeda. Because al-Qaeda's religious discourse promotes a large and highly politicized role for Islam, we expect that individuals who desire a stronger place for religion in politics will lean more favorably toward al-Qaeda.

Data and Variables

We use the Pew Global Attitudes Project surveys conducted in 2012 for empirical analysis. This survey includes items measuring views of al-Qaeda, anti-American sentiment, perceptions of Islamic law implementation, religiosity, and demographic variables. The sample includes Muslim-only respondents in Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia, and Turkey.[8] These countries differ with respect to state-religion relations, implementation of Islamic law, and religious traditions. For example, Turkey and Tunisia are staunchly secular with moderate Islamist parties whereas the constitutions in Egypt and Jordan refer to Islamic principles. Salafi groups are active in political life in Egypt, but they have contentious relations with the regime in Tunisia and remain marginal in Turkey. Turkey is the most advanced of all countries in our sample, followed by Tunisia in terms of economic development and democratization. Jordan is a client state that is dependent on the Western powers in economic and security terms, whereas Egypt is one of the largest recipients of the U.S. military aid. Anti-American attitudes are more pronounced in Turkey compared with other countries in the MENA (Pew Global Attitudes Project Survey 2012). We present the operationalization strategies for the dependent and independent variables below. The detailed description of these variables is presented in the supplemental material.

Favorable Views of al-Qaeda

We use an item asking the respondents whether they have a *very unfavorable*, *unfavorable*, *favorable*, or *very favorable* opinion of al-Qaeda. The fieldwork for this survey was conducted after 2010, and, at this time, al-Qaeda was highly visible in most parts of the world through its leader's media appearances and its active chapters across the MENA region. At the time of the survey, al-Qaeda operatives carried out attacks in the West and MENA, killing scores of Muslim and non-Muslim civilians. These lethal attacks in the region and beyond might have increased awareness of this organization. Therefore, we believe this question is a good proxy for measuring sympathy toward al-Qaeda. However, this item has certain limitations. First, this question measures favorability of al-Qaeda and does not assess support for this organization. Favorability may or may not lead to support. Second, despite its increased visibility, not everyone in Muslim majority societies may have the necessary knowledge of this group and when they do, they may not be willing to express their opinions. This generates a high number of "Don't Know" responses. We take further precautions in the empirical estimations and use a selection model to account for the large number of missing values as described in the analysis section.

Anti-Americanism

We use eight survey questions to measure anti-American sentiment. The first two items asked the respondents, "Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of (Americans and the United States)." The survey in hand also asked respondents whether they like or dislike: the spread of American ideas and customs (Q54), American way of democracy (Q55), American way of conducting business (Q56), American movies and music (Q57), scientific and technological advances in the United States (Q58), and American war on terror (Q59). The first two questions are measured with a 4-point scale, and all others are dichotomous variables (*Yes* or *No*). An additive index was created for an overall measure of anti-Americanism ranging from 0 (*least*) to 7 (*most anti-American*).[9] This index allows us to separate individuals holding unwavering anti-American feelings in all areas from those who may hold favorable opinions in some areas. The distributions for the indicators of anti-Americanism are presented in Figure 1 below.

Significant differences emerge within and between the four countries with respect to the varieties of anti-American orientations (Figure 1). Individuals with intense anti-American attitudes (highest values on the index) constitute a small percentage of total respondents in all countries, but especially in Jordan (8%) and Tunisia (5%). Unfavorable opinion about "American customs" and "U.S. war on terror" is remarkably high in all countries (more than 70%). Contrary to the argument that it is the foreign policy, not the culture, that derives anti-American feelings (Esposito and Mogahed 2007), we see very high levels of disapproval toward *American movies*/*music, American way of democracy, the United States*, and *the Americans* in this sample. Anti-American sentiments of all varieties appear to be stronger in Turkey and less prevalent in Tunisia in relation to these figures in the two client states of MENA, Egypt and Jordan. In Figure 2, we present the joint distribution of attitudes toward al-Qaeda along three quantiles (low, medium, high) of the additive index of anti-Americanism.

As seen in Figure 2, very few individuals favor al-Qaeda in all four countries, but especially in Turkey. At



Figure 1. Varieties of anti-Americanism in four MENA societies.
Source. Pew Global Attitudes Project Survey (2012).
The bars represent percentage of anti-American individuals in each category. MENA = Middle East and North Africa.

the highest level of anti-Americanism, a slightly larger percentage of respondents hold favorable views toward al-Qaeda than those at the low and medium levels in Turkey and Jordan. The favorability of al-Qaeda is very small at the highest quantile of anti-Americanism. Overall, Figure 2 confirms that the relationship between anti-Americanism and favorable views of terrorist organizations may not always be positive and is much more complex than has been previously assumed.

Literalist Outlook

We use the following question to measure a literalist outlook favoring the strict interpretation of scripture in interpretation of Islamic law:

> Which of the following three statements comes closer to your view—laws in our country should strictly follow the teachings of the Quran, laws in our country should follow the values and principles of Islam but not strictly follow the teachings of the Quran OR laws in our country should not be influenced by the teachings of the Quran?

We create a dichotomous variable for the first response as our proxy for literalist religious outlook and keep the other responses as reference categories. While this measure is not ideal, it is the best item we were able to find in the survey that represents individuals' likelihood of leaning toward al-Qaeda's discourse promoting a literalist understanding of the scripture in implementation of religious rules.[10] The other two responses represent adherence to flexible interpretations of the scripture.

Religiosity

This is an index of questions combining responses about prayer frequency, fasting habit, and self-reported importance of religion. Respondents' prayer frequency ranges from *five times a day* to *hardly ever*. The other variables asked respondents how often they fast and if religion is important to them. To create an index, we coded the variables from the least to greatest (e.g., *hardly ever* to *five times daily*) and then dichotomized the variables on a 0 to 1 scale for scale consistency. Based on the results of factor analysis, we combined these items to obtain an index of religiosity ranging from 0 = *not religious* to 3 = *highly religious*. We believe this is the best measure capturing personal religiosity given the limitations imposed by the survey items in hand.[11]



Figure 2. Anti-Americanism and favorability of al-Qaeda.
Source. Pew Global Attitudes Project Survey (2012).
The y-axis shows the three quantiles for the anti-Americanism index. The bars represent the percentage of respondents falling within *very favorable, favorable, unfavorable*, and *very unfavorable* categories toward al-Qaeda.

Control Variables

We create an additive index to measure individual preferences about the role of religion in politics (*religion in politics*) using two survey questions. The first item asks the respondent how much of a role they believe Islam plays in their country on a 4-point scale (i.e., *very small role* to *very large role*). The second question asks whether they believe this is *good, bad*, or *neither*. The resulting index ranges from 1 to 5 with the higher end measuring strong preferences for a large role for religion in politics. Respondents' level of education, employment status, and their income is used to control for objective indicators of well-being. We use an additive index about egalitarian gender beliefs to test the implications of cultural modernization. This index includes two questions asking the respondents whether women should be allowed to work outside the home, and if they agreed that women have equal rights to obtain employment when there were few jobs available. Finally, we also control for two indicators of subjective economic evaluations: sociotropic and personal economic evaluations.

Model and Results

Anti-Americanism and favorability of al-Qaeda have several common underlying covariates. This introduces a problem of statistical dependency in empirical estimation. In addition to this dependency, our main dependent variable includes a large number of "don't know" or "no response" categories. When asked about al-Qaeda, 15 percent of the sample either did not respond or chose "Don't Know" for an answer. While the rate of these missing values is less than 10 percent in Egypt and Jordan, this figure reaches 20 percent in Turkey and Tunisia. As previous studies using the Pew surveys demonstrated, the missing cases for the question asking about al-Qaeda are not randomly distributed, because the urban dwellers with higher education are more likely to respond (Fair, Kaltenthaler, and Miller 2014). Our preliminary

Table 1. Favorable Views of al-Qaeda: Conditional Mixed Process Estimations (Ordered Probit).

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
	Base pooled	Full pooled	Egypt	Jordan	Tunisia	Turkey
Anti-Americanism Index	−0.030*** (0.01)	−0.056 (0.04)	−0.081 (0.39)	−0.049* (0.02)	0.0067 (0.11)	−0.14*** (0.04)
Literalist outlook		0.20*** (0.05)	0.19 (0.30)	0.26*** (0.09)	0.0072 (0.13)	0.43** (0.18)
Religion in politics		0.051*** (0.02)	0.0039 (0.04)	0.091** (0.04)	0.062 (0.05)	0.029 (0.05)
Egalitarian gender beliefs		−0.052*** (0.02)	−0.22*** (0.05)	0.17*** (0.04)	−0.11*** (0.04)	0.035 (0.05)
Religiosity	−0.071* (0.04)	−0.083* (0.05)	−0.22* (0.13)	−0.27*** (0.09)	0.15 (0.10)	−0.088 (0.09)
Personal economic expectations	0.049* (0.03)	0.037 (0.03)	−0.011 (0.10)	0.077 (0.06)	0.055 (0.07)	0.054 (0.09)
Sociotropic expectations	0.087*** (0.03)	0.068** (0.03)	−0.042 (0.10)	0.075 (0.06)	0.013 (0.09)	0.19** (0.09)
Income	−0.025 (0.02)	−0.0087 (0.02)	0.017 (0.12)	0.063 (0.05)	−0.0077 (0.05)	−0.0099 (0.06)
Education	0.035 (0.02)	0.040* (0.02)	0.14** (0.07)	−0.031 (0.04)	−0.071 (0.04)	−0.013 (0.08)
Age	−0.0018 (0.00)	−0.0025 (0.00)	0.013** (0.01)	0.0040 (0.00)	−0.013*** (0.01)	0.00092 (0.01)
Gender (Female)	0.041 (0.05)	0.078 (0.05)	0.31** (0.12)	0.51*** (0.09)	0.014 (0.11)	−0.042 (016)
Jordan	−0.23*** (0.05)	−0.40*** (0.08)				
Tunisia	−0.43*** (0.06)	−0.37*** (0.08)				
Turkey	−1.07*** (0.08)	−0.86*** (0.12)				
Constant	3.68*** (0.24)	4.05*** (0.30)	2.90*** (0.72)	4.21*** (0.49)	2.33*** (0.61)	5.86*** (0.44)
Observations	3,519	3,519	899	894	906	836

Source. Pew Global Attitudes Project Survey (2012).
Standard errors in parentheses. Only the coefficients from first equations are reported. Estimation results for the selection model and anti-Americanism equations are reported in the supplemental material. Egypt is the reference category in Model 1 and Model 2.
*p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01.

analysis confirms a significant positive correlation between these nonresponses and literalist religious outlook, education, and income, and a negative correlation with religiosity. To account for this missing value problem along with the statistical dependency between anti-Americanism and favorable views of al-Qaeda, we use fully observed recursive mixed process estimation, also known as CMP modeling, in Stata (Roodman 2011). CMP allows running two seemingly unrelated regressions with different kinds of dependent variables (e.g., categorical, continuous) while combining one of the models with a Heckman selection model. This strategy alleviates the concerns about a large number of missing cases by incorporating their selection into the statistical estimation. At the same time, it accounts for a possible endogeneity problem between two variables by linking the error terms from the two equations of interest. In the analysis presented below, CMP estimation includes three equations. First, we use a selection model in conjunction with an ordered probit regression predicting favorability of al-Qaeda. Then, CMP runs seemingly unrelated regression estimation by linking the error terms of ordered probit equation with a third model predicting anti-Americanism. For our estimation, this third model is either an ordinary least squares regression or a probit regression depending on the measurement level of anti-Americanism.[12] As we are mainly interested in explaining favorable views of al-Qaeda, we report the results from the first equation in Table 1 and present the full model estimations in the supplemental material.

Table 1 reports the results from the pooled models and separate country estimations. In these models, we use the additive index. Anti-Americanism is statistically significant and negative in the first model, but once we control for literalist religious outlook, this relationship disappears (Model 2). As for country estimations, anti-Americanism decreases favorability of al-Qaeda in Jordan and Turkey and has no effect in Egypt and Tunisia. We find that individuals who prefer implementation of shari'a based on a literalist understanding of the scripture (literalist outlook) are more favorably oriented toward al-Qaeda in the pooled sample, Jordan and Turkey.

What do these results imply for the MENA countries? Turkey is a secular country with a long history of democratization and is less dependent on American aid, whereas Jordan is a client state where the regime exploits religious symbols for generating legitimacy around the personality of the King. As Jamal (2012) argues, in client states such as Jordan, some individuals may support Islamist opposition to voice their anti-regime and anti-American stance. It appears that Jordanian citizens may be leaning favorably toward al-Qaeda to voice their opposition to the regime insofar as this organization represents an anti-American ideology, or support for it may be viewed as a form of protest. However, because a large number of Jordanian citizens (i.e., regime loyalists) benefit from U.S. aid, they may be more cautious in supporting groups with anti-American orientation (Jamal 2012). In Turkey, however, the findings can be explained by political and institutional factors. First, in Turkey, anti-Americanism is

a deep-rooted orientation that is exploited by political parties of both leftist and rightist ideology (Blaydes and Linzer 2012). Anti-American feelings stem from a variety of positions, including the anti-imperialism of socialist groups, resentment about U.S. foreign policies in the Middle East, religious factors, and the public suspicion of American involvement in the military coup of 1980 in Turkey. It is likely that Turkish citizens do not simply provide support to al-Qaeda just because it is an anti-American organization, and they may choose to delineate their views of al-Qaeda from those directed toward American policies.

The positive relationship between a literalist outlook and favorable views of al-Qaeda in Turkey presents a puzzle. At first sight, it seems unlikely that Turkish citizens would support an organization justifying violence based on a narrow interpretation of Muslim sources. Turkish Islamists, including the ruling Justice and Development Party, preach moderate views based on the flexible interpretation of the Hanafi religious school (Mardin 2005).[13] However, there are groups that preach a Salafi variant of Islamism, *a-la-Turca*. These groups were active in the 1990s and an offshoot of these groups, Turkish Hezbollah, carried out terrorist attacks in Southeastern Turkey and Istanbul in the 1990s (Orhan 2010). Albeit marginal, these groups preach a literalist understanding of Islam similar to al-Qaeda's ideology. We suspect that individuals who sympathize with these messages lean favorably toward al-Qaeda in the Turkish context. It should be noted that, unlike in Turkey and Jordan, we do not see any significant correlation between anti-Americanism or a literalist outlook and favorable views of al-Qaeda in Egypt and Tunisia. We explain this result by the declining appeal of violent groups and the rise of peaceful Islamist movements in Egypt (Wiktorowicz 2005a) in the late 1990s and by the relatively high level of U.S. favorability in Tunisia (40% in 2012) that makes anti-Americanism a secondary domestic issue in political competition.

Results show that religious individuals are less likely to favor al-Qaeda in the pooled sample as well as in Jordan and Egypt. Surprisingly, in two staunchly secular cases, religiosity does not inform attitudes toward al-Qaeda. Individuals who prefer a large role for religion in politics, however, are not more or less likely to hold positive views of al-Qaeda, with the exception of respondents in Jordan. These results imply that neither piety nor political preferences concerning religion's place in politics inform positive perceptions of al-Qaeda in our sample. To put these findings in perspective, we show the magnitude of these effects on favorable views of al-Qaeda in Figure 3.

In Figure 3, the diamonds represent the average effect of each variable (predictive margins) on favorability of al-Qaeda. Because the dependent variable has four categories, we present the marginal effects for the lowest (*very unfavorable*) and highest (*very favorable*) categories from the ordered probit estimations (first equation in CMP). As shown in Figure 3, we cannot always assume a positive relationship between anti-Americanism and favorable views of al-Qaeda. On average, an individual with anti-American orientations is less likely to hold *very favorable* and more likely to hold *very unfavorable* views toward al-Qaeda in Turkey and Jordan. The predictive margins corroborate the findings in Table 1 by confirming no such relationship in Egypt and Tunisia. Together, these results provide evidence supporting our fourth hypothesis (H4) about the cross-national variation in the relationship between anti-Americanism and favorable views of al-Qaeda.

The results show the opposite pattern for the impact of the "literalist outlook" on favorable views of al-Qaeda, but with larger substantive effects. For example, an individual who prefers the implementation of Islamic law according to the strict interpretation of religious texts is 9 percent less likely to hold a *very unfavorable* opinion of al-Qaeda in Jordan and 11 percent less likely to do so in Turkey. Ceteris paribus, personal religiosity decreases favorability toward al-Qaeda in the pooled model, as well as in Egypt and Jordan, with relatively large substantive effects. However, the predictive margins are at the margins of statistical significance in Egypt. Therefore, individual preferences about the implementation of law based on strict religious principles may play a role in shaping attitudes toward Islamist militant groups, albeit with significant variation. This effect appears to be prominent not only in secularist Turkey but also in Jordan, where authoritarian regimes and Islamist opposition are in a contentious relation. The negative coefficient of "religiosity" in certain countries provides evidence that it is the religious outlooks prioritizing politicized and strict interpretation of religious text rather than piety that derives positive attitudes toward al-Qaeda in MENA. This is opposite of what the "clash of civilizations" theory predicts (H1), but supports the argument that only those who adhere to a very narrow interpretation of Islam resonating with al-Qaeda's religious justification of violence will lean favorably toward this organization (H2).

Up to this point, we approached anti-Americanism as a single underlying attitude, neglecting the different types of anti-American orientations. What are the effects of these different kinds of anti-American sentiments on favorability of al-Qaeda once we control for religiosity and religious outlooks? We provide an answer in Table 2.

Table 2 shows the results from the first equation in the CMP estimation for nine different indicators of anti-Americanism. The model names show the type of anti-Americanism indicator used to predict favorability toward al-Qaeda. According to the results in Table 2, respondents



Figure 3. Predictive margins for the correlates of favorable views of al-Qaeda.
The diamonds show the average predictive margin for each variable holding other variables constant for the "*very favorable*" and "*very unfavorable*" categories of the dependent variable. Horizontal bars show 95% confidence intervals. The predictive margins are obtained from estimations presented in Table 1.

who prefer a role for Islamic principles based on a strict interpretation of the text (literalist outlook) as well as those who desire a role for religion are more likely to hold favorable views of al-Qaeda in most models. The evidence confirms the negative relationship between religiosity and favorable views of al-Qaeda. Controlling for these factors, we find that unfavorable views of the United States, the Americans, and the American technology are less likely to generate a positive opinion of al-Qaeda. While coefficients for "support for the American war on terror," "American business practices," and "American idea of democracy" do not reach statistical significance, some dimensions of cultural anti-Americanism matter. Respondents who dislike the American customs and the American movies/music lean favorably toward al-Qaeda, but dislike of "American technology" decreases favorability. This result stands in contrast to the findings of previous studies putting the policy anti-Americanism in the spotlight (Esposito and Mogahed 2007). We find that if individuals have a deep discontent about American values in the form of cultural anti-Americanism, this may breed support for al-Qaeda in the MENA region (see Berger 2014 for a similar view).

We also present the marginal effects from the models presented in Table 2 to show the magnitude of these effects. As Figure 4 shows, different kinds of anti-Americanism have larger substantive effects than those associated with religiosity and a literalist religious outlook. Individuals who dislike the spreading of American customs are 25 percent and those who have distaste for American movies and music are 21 percent less likely to hold *very unfavorable* views toward al-Qaeda. On the flip side, those with similar cultural anti-American orientations are 7 percent and 6 percent more likely to hold *very favorable* views of this organization. If anti-American orientation is about the Americans, the United States, or the American technology, this leads to less sympathy for al-Qaeda, as can be seen in the magnitude of marginal effects. Thus, while some forms of cultural anti-Americanism may generate favorability toward this lethal group, holding unfavorable views about American people or the United States as a country does not bring about the

Table 2. Varieties of Anti-Americanism and Favorability of Al-Qaeda: Conditional Mixed Process Estimations (Ordered Probit).

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
	United States	Americans	Customs	Democracy	Business	Music, movies	Technology	War on terror
Anti-Americanism	−0.069*** (0.04)	−0.73*** (0.05)	0.72*** (0.19)	0.19 (0.37)	−0.080 (0.31)	0.61** (0.30)	−1.35*** (0.14)	0.042 (0.14)
Literalist outlook	0.075 (0.05)	0.077 (0.05)	0.13*** (0.05)	0.17*** (0.06)	0.19*** (0.05)	0.14* (0.08)	0.23*** (0.05)	0.17*** (0.05)
Religion in politics	0.033* (0.02)	0.035* (0.02)	0.052*** (0.02)	0.041** (0.02)	0.047** (0.02)	0.048** (0.02)	0.028 (0.02)	0.045** (0.02)
Egalitarian gender beliefs	−0.0047 (0.02)	−0.033* (0.02)	−0.059*** (0.02)	−0.069*** (0.02)	−0.06*** (0.02)	−0.049** (0.02)	−0.091*** (0.02)	−0.07*** (0.02)
Religiosity	−0.17*** (0.04)	−0.15*** (0.04)	−0.16*** (0.04)	−0.14*** (0.04)	−0.12*** (0.04)	−0.18*** (0.05)	−0.11*** (0.04)	−0.099** (0.04)
Personal economic expectations	0.058** (0.03)	0.12*** (0.03)	0.044 (0.03)	0.024 (0.03)	0.020 (0.03)	0.023 (0.03)	−0.0014 (0.03)	0.014 (0.03)
Sociotropic expectations	0.12*** (0.03)	0.095*** (0.03)	0.12*** (0.03)	0.10*** (0.03)	0.083*** (0.03)	0.092*** (0.03)	0.033 (0.03)	0.10*** (0.03)
Income	−0.00088 (0.02)	−0.023 (0.02)	0.00072 (0.02)	0.00062 (0.02)	0.0064 (0.02)	0.017 (0.02)	−0.0094 (0.02)	−0.0055 (0.02)
Education	0.026 (0.02)	0.030 (0.02)	0.033 (0.02)	0.036 (0.02)	0.040* (0.02)	0.057** (0.02)	−0.0021 (0.04)	0.038* (0.02)
Age	−0.0029* (0.00)	−0.0025 (0.00)	−0.0041** (0.00)	−0.0041** (0.00)	−0.004** (0.00)	−0.007*** (0.00)	−0.0011 (0.00)	−0.005** (0.00)
Gender (Female)	0.13** (0.05)	0.13** (0.05)	0.058 (0.05)	0.083* (0.05)	0.050 (0.05)	0.045 (0.06)	0.14 (0.11)	0.052 (0.05)
Jordan	−0.28*** (0.07)	−0.25*** (0.07)	−0.32*** (0.07)	−0.38*** (0.07)	−0.34*** (0.07)	−0.32*** (0.10)	−0.28*** (0.08)	−0.41*** (0.08)
Tunisia	0.26*** (0.07)	0.058 (0.07)	−0.14* (0.07)	−0.20* (0.11)	−0.28*** (0.07)	−0.23*** (0.07)	−0.34*** (0.07)	−0.27*** (0.08)
Turkey	−0.97*** (0.08)	−1.25*** (0.08)	−0.92*** (0.08)	−0.97*** (0.14)	−0.87*** (0.16)	−0.96*** (0.08)	−0.34** (0.13)	−0.92*** (0.09)
Constant	0 (.)	0 (.)	1.36*** (0.23)	−0.16 (0.20)	−0.34* (0.20)	−0.59*** (0.20)	0.020 (0.20)	1.18*** (0.22)
Observations	3,459	3,459	3,459	3,459	3,459	3,459	3,459	3,459

Source. Pew Global Attitudes Project Survey (2012).
Standard errors in parentheses. Only the coefficients from first equations are reported. Estimation results for the selection model and anti-Americanism equations are reported in the supplemental material. Egypt is the reference category.
*$p < .1$. **$p < .05$. ***$p < .01$.



Figure 4. Predictive margins for favorable views of al-Qaeda by type of anti-Americanism.
The diamonds show the average predictive margin for each variable, holding other variables constant, for the *very favorable* and *very unfavorable* categories of the dependent variable. Horizontal bars show 95% confidence intervals. Predictive margins are obtained from the ordered probit regressions reported in Table 2.

same effect. Figure 4 also confirms the robust impact of religious outlook (positive) and religiosity (negative) on favorability of al-Qaeda, but these effects are relatively small compared with the effects of anti-American orientations.

In CMP estimations presented in Table 2, we also find evidence supporting the implications of cultural modernization theory as individuals with egalitarian gender beliefs lean less favorably toward al-Qaeda. The results do not show a statistically significant relationship between objective indicators of well-being (education and income) and favorable views of al-Qaeda but there is some evidence that women are more likely to favor this organization only in Egypt and Jordan.

Additional Analysis

We ran all the models presented in Table 1 and Table 2 after dropping the "literalist outlook" variable from the estimation. While the results, especially those about cultural anti-Americanism, do not significantly change in these estimations, the coefficients for religiosity, egalitarian gender views, and economic expectations perform better in statistical significance. We also ran separate country estimations for all the models with different types of anti-Americanism. Several of these models do not converge, but we also detect some interesting associations between varieties of anti-Americanism and favorability of al-Qaeda. For example, in Egypt and Turkey, only the dislike of "American customs" increases positive feelings toward al-Qaeda whereas in Jordan, cultural anti-Americanism does not make a difference. In Tunisia, we detect a negative relationship between both cultural (customs and movies/music) and policy anti-Americanism (war on terror) and favorability of al-Qaeda. Evidence for a positive association between a literalist outlook and favorability of al-Qaeda in Turkey and Jordan remains strong, but the analysis remains inconclusive for Tunisia and Egypt. The results of these estimations and several other specifications are presented in the supplemental material.

In additional models, we used single equation estimations by including an interactive term of "anti-Americanism" and "literalist outlook." However, this approach proved to be less fruitful due to lack of significant effects. We also ran multilevel ordered probit models combining the 2012 and 2013 Pew Global Attitudes surveys with thirteen countries. These samples are limited to the extent that they do not include nuanced measures of anti-Americanism, religious outlook indicators, and some other control variables. In these estimations, we find that anti-Americanism (index of attitudes toward the United States and Americans) decreases favorable views of al-Qaeda. The multilevel model estimations also include the polity score that is negatively related to the favorability of al-Qaeda. Overall, the results from these additional models do not change our substantive conclusions. The additional analyses are available from the authors upon request.

Conclusion

The analysis in this paper focused on four countries in the MENA region (Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, and Tunisia) to explain the determinants of sympathy toward al-Qaeda. However, we believe that the findings of this study provide important insights for understanding support for similar terrorist groups in other Muslim majority countries. The results show that one cannot always assume a positive relationship between anti-American sentiment and support for terrorist organizations. More important, this study demonstrates that various types of anti-American sentiment are related to favorability of al-Qaeda in highly nuanced ways and that significant cross-national variation exists in this association (Jamal 2012). For example, unfavorable views of "Americans," "the United States," and "American technology" reduce favorability of al-Qaeda while attitudes about "American business practices" and "American democracy" do not exert any effect in our models. Interestingly, the proposed positive relationship between anti-Americanism and favorability of al-Qaeda does not necessarily originate from policy anti-Americanism (i.e., support for American war on terror), but rather through cultural anti-Americanism related to the dislike of "American customs" and "American movies/music." Thus, beyond policy anti-Americanism (Tessler and Robbins 2007), resentment toward some aspects of American culture may breed positive leanings toward militant groups. Subsequently, this study joins the emerging scholarship about the unconventional effects of anti-Americanism on political attitudes (Berger 2014; Bush and Jamal 2015; Ciftci and Tezcür 2016; Jamal 2012).

Our research corroborates the importance of specific religious outlooks in explaining sympathy toward radical groups. Individuals who desire implementation of Islamic law based on a narrow literal interpretation of religious texts lean more favorably toward al-Qaeda compared with those who favor a flexible interpretation of Islamic sources. We suspect that this robust relationship, as demonstrated by others (Fair, Goldstein, and Hamza 2016; Wiktorowicz 2005b), is due to the appeal of al-Qaeda's ideology for individuals who lack a deep knowledge of Islam. Some ordinary Muslims may be more conducive to accepting al-Qaeda's rulings to compensate for this knowledge gap. We also find that personal religiosity decreases favorability of al-Qaeda (Tessler and Robbins 2007). Overall, the findings imply that we need to draw careful distinctions between politicized preferences of Muslims and personal religiosity as well as the different types of anti-American sentiment in understanding Muslim political attitudes about terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda and ISIS.

Certainly, this study has numerous limitations that can be addressed in future research. Some limitations include social desirability bias, issues surrounding survey methodology in nondemocratic societies (Kuriakose and Robbins 2016), and lack of appropriate questions to test the implications of our theory. Our measure of support for violent organizations and attitudinal indicators of religious outlooks are far from perfect. In the future, scholars may use a detailed set of questions to gauge support for violent organizations and politicized religious outlooks for a stronger empirical test. While we test the effects of some possible causes (anti-Americanism, religiosity, and scriptural literalism) on favorable views of terrorist organizations, our analysis does not allow us to make a causal claim. Students of global public opinion and transnational violence could conduct experimental studies to provide causal assessments linking these factors to the perceptions of terrorist groups.

Overall, and from a policy perspective, we can argue that the wholesale depiction of ordinary Muslim men and women as supporters of violent extremism is well misplaced. It would be wise to scrutinize the arguments linking Islamic beliefs to support for terrorist acts before developing informed public policy. A similar note is in order for assessing the relationship of anti-Americanism and favorability of terrorist groups. The assumption that anti-Americanism and discontent about the U.S. policy in the Middle East is the only reason generating sympathy toward groups such as al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, or ISIS is simply wrong. Policy makers should recognize that there are significant nuances in relation to various types of anti-American feelings that may or may not generate positive attitudes toward groups such as al-Qaeda and ISIS and that there may be significant cross-national variation in this relationship in Muslim majority societies.

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Notes

1. Some of these polls include Pew Global Attitudes Project Survey (2012), Program on International Policy Attitudes survey (PIPA; 2009), and Gallup polls (Esposito and Mogahed 2007).
2. See Berger (2014) for a review.
3. Salafis believe that they can purify religion by emulating the example of the prophet and his companions who lived according to the true message of Islam. Most Salafi groups condemn violence and engage in nonpolitical, peaceful preaching activities (al-Anani and Malik 2013; Wiktorowicz 2005a).
4. Bin Laden was inspired by Abdullah Azzam who has written a religious manifesto to appeal to ordinary Muslims in joining a fight for the cause of Islam and for defensive jihad against "infidels" (Euben and Zaman 2009, 425–35).
5. While we focus on the religious foundations explaining public favorability of al-Qaeda, we do not discount the fact that al-Qaeda's actions may also appeal to secular and leftist groups with anti-imperialist outlooks (see Dalia Mogahed's account for this approach at http://www.wnd.com/2011/04/289205/).
6. We thank one of the anonymous reviewers for suggesting this argument.
7. See Berger (2014) for a detailed account of survey items used in these studies.
8. We searched all surveys conducted between 2008 and 2013 in Muslim majority countries for additional data. Unfortunately, most items that are necessary for testing the implications of our theory were not asked concurrently in these surveys. The surveys either lack questions about al-Qaeda and anti-Americanism or those related to religious outlook variables in Muslim majority societies. While items tapping respondents' views about Americans and the United States are available as a trend, more nuanced measures of anti-Americanism are not asked in these surveys. We exclude Lebanon from our analysis due to the very small number of positive cases in our dependent variable that made the estimation problematic. Because our analysis focuses on four Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries, we also drop Pakistan from the estimations.
9. For consistency, the first two variables were recoded from a 4-point scale to a dichotomous measure before the index construction. Factor analysis confirms that all items load on a single dimension (alpha coefficient is larger than .70) with the exception of Q59 (war on terror). Thus, we do not include Q59 in the index.
10. The implicit assumption in operationalization of this variable is that individuals who prefer the implementation of shari'a based on strict implementation of religious texts are more likely to take their religious cues from al-Qaeda and, hence, lean favorably toward this organization (Wiktorowicz 2005b).
11. As discussed above, scholars came to conflicting findings about piety and support for militancy. Analytical research does not find a positive correlation between these attitudes (Tessler and Robbins 2007). Where a positive association is found, piety is usually operationalized to measure a specific understanding of Islam (Fair, Malhotra, and Shapiro 2012).
12. Because the selection model requires at least one covariate that is different from the regressors in the main equation, we include a question asking about the self-reported Internet use in the selection model. The results are robust to alternative specifications of the selection model. We use different specifications in the selection model for country estimations based on the significant correlation coefficients between the selection variable and the other variables in the model. These results and the accompanying statistical code are available from the authors upon request.
13. Hanafi school is one of the four main schools of Islamic jurisprudence and is formed by the eighth-century scholar Abu Hanifa. It is commonly followed in Turkey, parts of the Middle East, Central and South Asia.

Supplemental Material

Replication data for this article is available with the manuscript on the PRQ website.

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Self-expression values, loyalty generation, and support for authoritarianism: evidence from the Arab world

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Self-expression values, loyalty generation, and support for authoritarianism: evidence from the Arab world

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ABSTRACT

This study examines the micro foundations of political support in Arab polities. Most Arab states rank highly in aggregate human development or economic wealth, but they lag behind in democracy defying the predictions of modernization theory. Modernization and human development perspective implies that increased resources and self-expression values will induce critical political outlooks toward the regime. This study questions the applicability of this theory to the Arab region and proposes that colonial state formation history, international patron–client relations, and the domestic patronage networks have more leverage in explaining regime support in the Arab region. A series of multilevel and fixed effects regression estimations utilizing the Arab Democracy Barometer reveal that modernization perspective has some relevance. However, world system theory inspired patron–client perspective and loyalty generation through domestic distributive mechanisms play a greater role in shaping political attitudes. The results provide important insights about micro foundations of Arab authoritarianism and the differential utility of emancipative values formed in the context of hierarchical world order.

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KEYWORDS Authoritarianism; regime support; Arab World; self-expression values; modernization; clientelism; world systems theory; Patron-Client Model; Dependency

Introduction

A vast body of scholarship has examined the causes of Arab authoritarianism.[1] Comparative institutional scholarship has focused on the power of coercive apparatus,[2] the ruling party strength,[3] managed electoral participation and distributive mechanisms,[4] oil wealth, and hereditary rule.[5] In a different vein, dependency and world systems theories explain Middle Eastern authoritarianism as a symptom of hierarchical world-order built on a specific division of labour in economic production that subjugates these regimes within a patron-client framework.[6] Furthermore, scholars increasingly appreciate the importance of public opinion in survival of these regimes.[7] Although political support is an important reference point in the vast scholarship on Arab authoritarianism, the paucity of empirical studies investigating why citizens support these regimes is quite surprising. Quantitative Arab public opinion research

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has mainly concentrated on the individual determinants of support for democracy, focusing on religiosity and Islamic values,[8] evaluations of government performance,[9] modernization,[10] and social capital.[11] This study investigates the micro foundations of political support towards Arab authoritarianism and first asks the following question: What explains citizen support for the authoritarian Arab regimes?

Scholars argue that Arab uprisings represent a new phase of political development marking a shift towards a strong desire for democratic legitimacy.[12] With few exceptions, however, most authoritarian regimes remained resilient and have survived the waves of popular protests.[13] Such authoritarian stability has historical roots going back to the colonial intervention and early state-formation experiences that established the influence of Western powers in the region.[14] The current juncture, where Western influence and significant regime discontent exist alongside mass political support provides a fertile ground for examining political attitudes, especially in the context of weak states,[15] dependent periphery regimes,[16] foreign intervention and conflict,[17] and, against all odds, improved human development.[18] This background leads to this study's second research question: How do these contextual factors affect the micro foundations of regime support?

This study starts to build an explanation about regime support in the Arab world by discussing the implications of modernization and human development theory.[19] Modernization and human development is expected to increase resources and generate self-expression values that induce sceptical views about the political status quo. This study questions the unconditional applicability of this logic to the Arab region by utilizing insights from the world systems theory and the scholarship on domestic patronage networks.[20] Critical political attitudes may emanate from lack of legitimacy in those states ruled by elites serving as clients of hegemon(s) at the expense of their citizens' interests.[21] It is proposed that a political system's capacity in generating winners who are wealthier, satisfied with their life conditions, and are beneficiaries of domestic patronage networks should increase the favourability of the regime among these individuals.

These hypotheses are tested using a series of multilevel and fixed effects regression models utilizing the third wave of the Arab Democracy Barometer (ADB). The results lend some support to the modernization perspective by revealing that only certain self-expression values decrease political support in non-democratic Arab regimes. At the same time, increased resources and self-expression values like trust, individual wealth, and citizen satisfaction with life serve as loyalty generating mechanisms and increase regime favourability. Presumably, such loyalty generating mechanisms are shaped by contextual factors like international and domestic patron-client networks. Split sample estimations lend further credence to the importance of context where government quality, system, performance, and especially hierarchical world order jointly inform Arab political attitudes towards the regime. Consequently, this study makes an important empirical contribution to distinct research literatures on Arab authoritarianism and Middle Eastern public opinion research by accounting for the international determinants of political attitudes in conjunction with the domestic and individual factors.

System output, international order, and authoritarian regime support

Easton's[22] conceptual framework provides a good foundation for the study of regime support. He differentiates between general evaluations representing the long-term

attachments to political objects (that is, diffuse support) and short-term evaluations related to the system output (that is, specific support).[23] Within this framework, "regime support" is defined as a set of favourable attitudes about the immediate performance of the government institutions.

We can start to think about authoritarian regime support by first looking at the effects of government capacity (system input) and performance (system output). Research in established democracies corroborates the implications of Easton's model linking improved government capacity and performance to political support.[24] These studies use quality of government (QoG) and human development index (HDI) as indicators of capacity and performance respectively. The World Bank's government effectiveness index is widely used as a reliable indicator of QoG, capturing quality of public services, efficient policy implementation, and credibility of state institutions.[25] HDI, a proxy for measuring government performance, combines national statistics about health (life expectancy), knowledge (education), and standard of living (average national income).[26]

Most Arab states rank highly in HDI, but some fare better than the others in QoG. While important, assuming a linear relationship between these macro factors and regime support may be problematic in the Arab region. Located at the bottom of QoG and HDI, Sudan, Yemen, and Iraq are major scenes of foreign intervention and conflict. At the higher end, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, and Tunisia, are the largest recipients of the international aid and economically globalized nations.[27]

The proposed link between government performance and regime support is also complicated by colonial/modern state formation history. Middle Eastern states are not "Westphalian" states that came into existence by independent social forces.[28] These states were carved out of the Ottoman territory with artificial borders and by imposition of minority rule over majorities.[29] It is reasonable to expect that this history will have significant implications for both government performance and its effect on regime support in the Arab region.

For example, the role of the Arab states in international order may be one factor explaining the variation in QoG and HDI in these polities. According to the world systems theory,[30] the world is divided into three regions including core, periphery, and semi-periphery. Within this order, the capitalist logic necessitates a division of labour and dependency on a global scale resulting in a hierarchical order in international relations. The elites in the *periphery* act as clients of the *centre* and serve the world hegemon's economic interests, risking antagonistic relations with their own citizens.[31] From the beginning, such patron-client relation has dominated the Middle Eastern state system. Once military domination was established, colonial powers implemented certain modes of production, transforming the Middle Eastern states into providers of raw materials, surplus labour, or as transmission belts ensuring the flight of capital from the *periphery* to the *centre*.[32] This system has created a highly fragmented regional order with weak states that are accountable to the hegemon (that is, patron), ensuring Western economic and political dominance in the region until today.[33] Since the 1950s, the new hegemon of the world order, the US, has continued the same patron-client structures to guarantee hydrocarbon security and extraction of resources from the Middle East.

The patron-client relation is feasible to the extent that the *centre* supports the ruling elites in the *periphery*[34] to help them control and "demobilise" the society.[35] Since the ruling elites serve the interests of the hegemon at the expense of their own citizens, this

creates contention and presumably a legitimacy deficit. Problems exacerbated with the policies of the latest neoliberal turn (for example, inequality, poverty, and so on), while deepening dependency, continue to breed resistance in these societies as seen in the Arab uprisings.[36] The states that became the sites of resistance like Iran and Libya have been punished by the hegemon through economic and military intervention, whereas the client states enjoyed international rents and the hegemon's support to contain the domestic opposition.

This discussion provides important insights about the contextual determinants of regime support in the Arab region. Whether a regime is a client of the hegemon receiving international or military aid, or a "rogue" state that is punished or forced into obedience by the hegemon may affect its capacity (QoG), and performance (HDI). These factors, in turn, may inform attitudes towards political system in the Arab world.

Table 1 reveals a positive correlation between macro indicators of government performance (QoG and HDI) and client status. Tunisia, Jordan, Kuwait and Lebanon consistently rank high in measures of government performance, international aid, and their integration in the global economic order. The sites of continual conflict, Yemen, Sudan, and Iraq, along with Egypt and Libya are ranked low in QoG. Iraq is particularly an interesting case given the likely negative effects of continuing occupation on government performance despite the large amounts of international aid it receives. Furthermore, the relatively safe and prospering zone of the Kurdish region is set to create sub-national differences in government performance.[37] Sudan and Libya, classified as sites of rebellion against the hierarchical world order, rank consistently lower in both QoG and HDI. It should be noted that these countries, along with Iraq and Yemen, have long-lasting conflict situations and are subjected to foreign intervention. Finally, significant variation exists in the presence of United States (US) troops, taken as an indicator of the world hegemon's influence, with a large number of troops in Iraq

Table 1. The distribution of Arab regimes according to system output and patron-client relations.

	Government Effectiveness Index	Human Development Index	US Aid	EU Aid	Economic Globalization	US Troops
Top Scores						
MOST	Tunisia	Tunisia	Iraq	Palestine	Lebanon	Iraq
	Jordan	Kuwait	Egypt	Morocco	Jordan	Kuwait
	Kuwait	Libya	Jordan	Egypt	Kuwait	Egypt
	Morocco	Lebanon	Palestine	Tunisia	Tunisia	Jordan
LEAST	Lebanon	Jordan	Lebanon	Sudan		Tunisia
		Algeria	Morocco	Jordan		Morocco
Bottom Scores						
MOST	Egypt	Palestine	Yemen	Lebanon	Yemen	Yemen
	Algeria	Egypt	Libya	Algeria	Libya	Algeria
	Yemen	Iraq	Sudan	Iraq	Morocco	Lebanon
	Libya	Morocco	Tunisia	Yemen	Egypt	Sudan
	Sudan	Yemen	Algeria	Libya	Algeria	Palestine[a]
LEAST	Iraq	Sudan	Kuwait	Kuwait	Sudan	Libya[a]

[a]No US troop presence.

Note: Government effectiveness index (−2.5 to 2.5) is available through Worldwide Governance Indicators (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, *Governance Matters*), website at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home. Human Development Index (HDI) data are obtained from the UNDP and are available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi. US Aid is the ten-year average of the total amount of US aid in constant dollars and is obtained from USaid.gov. EU Aid is the five-year average of total net EU aid in dollars and is obtained from OECD aid data. Economic globalization is the nine-year average of the KOF index of economic globalization. US Troops is the five-year average of the number of troops as reported in Allen, Flynn, and VanDusky-Allen (2017).

and Kuwait and zero troops in Palestine and Libya.[38] It is argued that this rich contextual variation will inform attitudes towards non-democratic Arab regimes. The next section elaborates on explanatory mechanisms and generates testable hypotheses.

Hypotheses

Classic modernization theory proposes that a linear process of economic growth, industrialization, and urbanization should eventually culminate in increased wealth and rising levels of education.[39] Later incarnations of modernization theory have incorporated various aspects of human growth and cultural change into this linear process. *Human development sequence* starts from increased resources, continues with human empowerment, and eventually ends with mass value change and citizen emancipation.[40] In this process, traditional-survival values like respect for authority, obedience, and religiosity are replaced with self-expression values including liberty aspirations, critical political orientations, trust, propensity to protest, tolerance, and less religiousness.[41]

According to the proponents of this perspective, one natural outcome of modernization will be citizens' rising expectations. When governments fail to meet these expectations, citizens will grow dissatisfied with the political system.[42] Especially, individuals with increased socioeconomic resources who hold self-expression values will demonstrate a greater propensity to voice their criticism of the government. "Arab uprisings" is an interesting test case for these propositions. Although the lion's share of explanatory power can be attributed to the revolutionary factors including inequality, middle-class politics, and poverty,[43] this emancipative process is employed to explain the large-scale protests in Arab societies.[44]

Pippa Norris[45] advances the notion of critical citizens to explain the emancipative mechanism in democratic societies. Critical citizens are individuals "who adhere strongly to democratic values but who find the existing structures of representative government, invented in the 18th and 19th centuries, to be wanting as we approach the end of the millennium." A linear application of modernization theory to Arab societies would foresee the emergence of a group of citizens who are akin to "critical citizens" of democratic settings in their political orientations. As succinctly put, "if growing individual resources give rise to emancipative orientations within an autocracy, people will consider authoritarian rule as an unlegitimized restriction of their rights."[46] An observable implication of modernization theory is that individuals with increased resources (education and income) will be less supportive of authoritarian regimes. A second implication is that individuals holding self-expression values like tolerance of others, social trust, inclination to civic protest, liberty aspirations, and weak religiousness[47] should have a greater propensity to hold critical views about the existing regime.

Hypothesis 1: Individuals with increased resources (income and education) should be less supportive of political regimes than individuals with fewer resources.

Hypothesis 2: Individuals holding self-expression values (tolerance of others, social trust, inclination to civic protest, liberty aspirations) will be less supportive of political regimes than those with traditional values.

Can we explain regime support in resilient Arab autocracies with the insights derived from modernization and the human development perspective? Classic modernization theory has been criticized due to its ethnocentric and teleological character that neglects "multiple modernities" in non-Western societies,[48] and for its lack of attention to

human capabilities and choice.[49] The history of the Middle Eastern state system and international patron-client relations further complicates the modernization process and hence is likely to have implications for the micro foundations of political support in these societies.

Once established, a client state becomes dependent on the rent it receives from the hegemon to survive. This arrangement also has implications for system performance, legitimacy, and political support. Since most Middle Eastern states were artificially created with little regard to social dynamics and native ideologies and hence lack legitimacy, this external support is crucial for *clientelizing* the society and containing the opposition.[50] The domestic patronage networks throughout the Arab state system are crucial in this scenario and they help these regimes to earn political support from certain citizens.[51] In this context, some individuals disproportionally benefit from domestic patronage networks and opportunities like university education and public sector employment, and consequently become the winners of the system. For example, university education continues to be the most efficient route to upward mobility in the Middle East and North Africa.[52] An observable implication of this discussion is that increased resources (education and wealth) will engender regime support in these societies.

However, increased resources may be instruments for creating a loyal base rather than leading to emancipation. In oil rich monarchies, regimes can buy citizen loyalty by implementing generous welfare packages,[53] whereas in resource poor societies (for example, Jordan), an international patron may provide the necessary rent to enable patronage networks. Comparative institutional research finds that such loyalty generation becomes possible through manipulation of elections and selective distribution of resources.[54] Thus, increased resources may be more conducive to authoritarian regime support in Arab polities.

Hypothesis 3: Individuals with increased material resources will be more supportive of political regime than individuals with fewer resources.

The proposed link between self-expression values and pro-democratic critical political orientations is also not straightforward. Some indicators of self-expression (satisfaction with life conditions, social trust, and religiosity) may work differently in non-democratic countries. For example, life satisfaction and positive outlooks about economic conditions may be indicative of citizen satisfaction with government's economic performance. In authoritarian regimes of the Arab world, these citizens are likely to be beneficiaries of domestic patronage networks. Research suggests that citizens holding positive orientations about their economic conditions are more likely to turn out to show their support for the regime.[55] It is also known that positive views about government performance will generate sceptical views of democracy and increase regime support.[56]

Hypotheses 4: Individuals with higher life satisfaction will be more supportive of the regime than those who are not.

The human development perspective defines religiousness as a typical survival value that negatively correlates with self-expression values. One implication of this approach is that religious individuals will have a greater propensity to respect authority and favour non-democracy.[57] Arab public opinion research, however, has shown that support for democracy is compatible with Muslim religiosity.[58] Two competing hypotheses follow this discussion:

Hypothesis 5a: Religious individuals will be more likely to support the regime than non-religious.

Hypothesis 5b: Religious individuals will be less likely to support the regime than non-religious.

As a self-expression value, social trust should generate support for democratic principles with a healthy dose of regime criticism in democracies.[59] Jamal[60] challenges this view and argues that in authoritarian Arab polities, social trust is more conducive to regime support. In regimes with centralized state clientelism, individuals will tend to engage in state-sponsored associations that hold an advantage in accessing government benefits. In authoritarian and less-democratic regimes of the Middle East, most individuals will be less trusting of others. Those who are involved in state-controlled civic associations with access to resources will be inclined to trust others, but this will engender support for the existing regime since these same individuals also benefit from these arrangements.[61]

Hypothesis 6: Higher levels of social trust will increase regime support.

This study also tests the relationship between perceptions of patronage networks, especially *wasta*, and regime support. *Wasta* is an Arabic word that can be translated as "connections." It originates from *waseet* which refers to "a person (or person's action) who intercedes using influence to garner favour, often unmerited, for another person".[62] The prevalence of *wasta* in Arab societies may be a sign of state weakness since it is indicative of state failure to efficiently deliver services to its citizens.[63] Prevalence of *wasta* may also be facilitated by the international patron-client order that necessitates that periphery elites become domestic patrons and oversee large clientelist machines to control social forces and contain opposition. Most Arab citizens will utilize *wasta* simply because no credible institutional structure exists to obtain material benefits. In a recent study, Buehler[64] finds that belief in prevalence of informal influence (that is, *wasta*) lowers trust in the authoritarian regime's courts as well as political institutions in Morocco. An observable implication of this argument is that belief in prevalence of *wasta* may be less conducive to regime support. This discussion leads to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 7: Individuals who believe in the prevalence of *wasta* will be less supportive of regime than those who do not.

Data and measurement

The third wave of the ADB was fielded in 2012–2014 and includes many questions suitable for testing the hypotheses of this study.[65] The dependent variable, *regime support*, is an index of survey questions capturing citizens' evaluation of performance of certain branches of government. The following nine questions were standardized into a 0–1 scale and the mean score of these items is calculated to obtain an index of regime support for each individual.[66]

Q203. Generally speaking, how would you evaluate the performance of … in carrying out its tasks and duties? (1 = very bad to 5 = very good)):

The government

Parliament

Table 2. Independent variables and measurement strategies.

Variable	Tested mechanism	Description
Income	Modernization, patron-client perspective & authoritarian loyalty generation	Q1016: Self-reported household income (1 = income does not cover expenses, 4 = income covers expense)
Education	Modernization	Harmonized measure of educational attainment (1 = no education, 7 = graduate degree)
Critical political outlook	Self-expression values	Q216: Citizens must support the government's decisions even if they disagree with them (1 = strongly agree, 4 = strongly disagree)
Liberty aspiration	Self-expression values	Q523: Lack of respect for human rights is justified in order to maintain security in your country? (1 = justified to a great extent, 4 = not justified at all)
Tolerance of rel. minorities	Self-expression values	Q6072: In a Muslim country, non-Muslims should enjoy less political rights than Muslims (1 = strongly agree, 4 = strongly disagree,)
Protest participation	Self-expression values & patron-client perspective	Q502.2: Protest participation (1 = never, 2 = once, 3 = more than once)
Less religiousness	Self-expression values & Islam and democracy	Index of daily prayer frequency (Q6101) and frequency of Qur'an readership (Q6106) (2 = most religious, 10 = least religious)
Life satisfaction	Self-expression values, patron-client perspective & authoritarian loyalty generation	Q102a: Generally speaking, how would you compare your living conditions with the rest of your fellow citizens? (1 = much worse, 5 = much better)
Social trust	Self-expression values & authoritarian loyalty generation	Q103: Generally speaking, do you think most people are trustworthy or not? (1 = No, 2 = Yes (28%)
Perceptions of wasta	Authoritarian loyalty generation & patron-client perspective	Q213: Impossible to obtain a job without connections (1 = No relevant experience, 4 = extremely widespread)
Political interest	Control	In general, to what extent are you interested in politics? (1 = Not interested, 4 = very interested)
Age	Control	Self-reported age
Sex	Control	Gender of the respondent (1 = female)
HDI	Government performance	UNDP index (health, education, life conditions), ten-year average
QoG	Government capacity	World Bank Government Effectiveness Index, ten-year average
US Aid	Patron-client perspective	Total amount of US aid in dollars, USaid.gov, ten-year average
EU Aid	Patron-client perspective	Total net EU aid in dollars, OECD aid data, five-year average
Economic globalization	Patron-client perspective	Economic globalization, KOF index of globalization, nine-year average
US troops	Patron-client perspective	Number of US troops, five-year average, Flynn (2017)

Judiciary

The police (public security)

Q204. I am going to ask a number of questions related to the current government's performance. How would you evaluate the current government's performance on … ? (1 = very bad, 4 = very good)).

Creating employment opportunities.

Narrowing the gap between rich and poor.

Improving basic health services.

Managing the democratic transition process.

Q513. Suppose that there was a scale from 0–10 to measure the extent of your satisfaction with the government, in which 1 means that you were absolutely unsatisfied with its performance and 10 means that you were very satisfied. To what extent are you satisfied with the government's performance?

Independent variables: Self-reported household income (four-point scale) and educational attainment are used to measure socioeconomic resources. Unfortunately, ADB does not include the same indicators of self-expression index used by Welzel et al.[67] The factor analysis of eight available survey questions (trust, critical political outlooks, satisfaction with life conditions, less religiousness, tolerance of religious minorities, liberty aspiration, and protest participation) ends with very low factor loadings (alpha coefficient = 0.22). Therefore, these items were used separately in the statistical estimations. Some of these indicators are used to also test the individual-level implications of world systems theory and loyalty generation framework perspective as reported below. A question asking about the influence of *wasta* in gaining employment is used to test the effect of belief in clientelist networks on regime support. Additional control variables are self-reported political interest, respondents' age, sex (1 = female), macro indicators of government performance, international aid, US troop presence, and economic globalization. Table 2 introduces these variables and corresponding theoretical mechanisms. Detailed descriptive statistics can be found in the supplemental file.

Multivariate analysis

A combination of multilevel and fixed effects regression models are used for statistical estimation. In full sample estimation, multilevel regression is preferred, because it takes the nested structure of the data into account and controls for country-level variance.[68] For split sample analysis, fixed effects estimations are preferred due to the small number of cases at the country level.[69] Table 3 reports the multilevel regression estimations for the pooled sample analysis.

The results lend only partial support to the implications of modernization/human development theory while providing strong evidence for the individual-level implications of both the international patron-client perspective and authoritarian loyalty generation framework. Contrary to the predictions of the modernization perspective, individual wealth is positively related to regime support and educational attainment has no statistically significant effect. Thus, the expectation that increased resources that come with modernization will lead to less support for the political status quo simply does not hold (Hypothesis 1). Of self-expression values, the coefficients for critical political outlooks, liberty aspirations, tolerance of others, and less religiousness, are consistently negative and statistically significant in all models, supporting the second hypothesis (H2 proposes a negative association between self-expression values and regime support).[70] This effect, however, does not hold for all self-expression values as predicted by Inglehart and Welzel's theory. For example, "propensity to protest" is negative and statistically significant in Models 1–3 and 5, but it has no effect on regime support when controls are added for economic globalization, European Union (EU) aid, and US troop presence. The lack of evidence for the emancipative

Table 3. Determinants of regime support in Arab polities (multilevel regression, pooled sample).

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Education	−0.0012	−0.0012	−0.0012	−0.0014	−0.0012	−0.0026	−0.00073
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Income	0.017**	0.017**	0.017**	0.020**	0.017**	0.016**	0.018**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Critical outlook	−0.053**	−0.053**	−0.053**	−0.052**	−0.053**	−0.053**	−0.053**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Liberty aspiration	−0.015**	−0.015**	−0.015**	−0.013**	−0.015**	−0.016**	−0.015**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Tolerance of others	−0.0078**	−0.0078**	−0.0078**	−0.0091**	−0.0078**	−0.010**	−0.0095**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Protest participation	−0.0064*	−0.0064*	−0.0064*	−0.0047	−0.0064*	0.0012	−0.0052
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Less religious	−0.0059**	−0.0059**	−0.0059**	−0.0069**	−0.0059**	−0.0054**	−0.0072**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Trust	0.051**	0.051**	0.051**	0.053**	0.051**	0.052**	0.057**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Personal expectations	0.017**	0.017**	0.017**	0.017**	0.017**	0.016**	0.021**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Wasta	−0.043**	−0.043**	−0.043**	−0.045**	−0.043**	−0.043**	−0.046**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Political interest	0.0013	0.0013	0.0013	−0.00026	0.0013	0.00038	0.0015
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Female	0.013**	0.013**	0.013**	0.0097*	0.013**	0.015**	0.011**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Age	−0.00027	−0.00027	−0.00027	−0.00026	−0.00027	−0.00028	−0.00016
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)

Human Development Index		0.13					
		(0.24)					
Government Effectiveness			0.030				
			(0.04)				
Economic globalization (Log)				0.11			
				(0.16)			
US Aid (Log)					−0.013		
					(0.01)		
EU Aid (Log)						0.0098	
						(0.02)	
US troops (Log)							0.0081
							(0.01)
Constant	0.67**	0.59**	0.69**	0.24	0.90**	0.63**	0.65**
	(0.03)	(0.17)	(0.04)	(0.63)	(0.18)	(0.11)	(0.04)
Variance components							
Constant	−2.45**	−2.46**	−2.47**	−2.41**	−2.51**	−2.61**	−2.50**
	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.22)
lnsig_e	−1.89**	−1.89**	−1.89**	−1.90**	−1.89**	−1.88**	−1.90**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Intra-Class Correlation	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.27	0.22	0.19	0.23
Observations	11403	11403	11403	9381	11403	10507	9388

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.001$.

values-critical political outlook nexus in client states, thus, is an important finding, showing the limitations of modernization theory and the relevance of the patron-client perspective for explaining regime support in the Arab region. Furthermore, increased life satisfaction and social trust are more conducive to regime support, a finding that supports hypotheses 4 and 6 regarding the positive effect of life satisfaction and social trust on regime support, respectively. Overall, the results in Table 1 imply that regimes' loyalty generation capacity, presumably enhanced by the international rents and domestic patronage networks, have more leverage in explaining regime support than certain emancipative values.[71]

The negative and statistically significant coefficient for "perceptions about the role of *wasta*" lends additional support to this conclusion. As individuals' belief about the prevalence of *wasta* in gaining employment increases, citizens may perceive the need to use the middleman to obtain government services as a state weakness. Consequently, they may grow critical of the system, lose trust in political institutions, and become less supportive of the regime.[72] Finally, there appears to be a gender gap in regime support. Such gender differences are hardly unique to the Arab region. Scholars have documented a gender gap in political orientations and political participation on a global scale.[73] More specifically, evidence from regional barometers conducted in Latin America[74] and Africa[75] confirms a gender gap, with women being less supportive of democracy than men. The results add to this literature by showing an inverse gender gap where women are more conducive to authoritarian regime support in Arab societies.[76]

This study also attempts to explain the effects of context (government performance and client status of the state) on political attitudes. To that end, four split-sample fixed effects ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models were estimated. The first sample includes countries with high scores on QoG and HDI that also happen to be the most globalized nations with a prominent international patron (Kuwait, Jordan, Lebanon, Tunisia). The second sample includes low-QoG and low-HDI countries that are sites of enduring conflict and foreign intervention (Iraq, Sudan, Yemen).[77] Two other samples were formed based on the status of countries according to the international aid they receive and the number/presence of US troops. Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Palestine are the largest recipients of US and EU aid, whereas, on the low end of international aid are Algeria, Libya, and Yemen. Iraq and Kuwait have the largest number of US troops whereas Palestine has no US troop presence despite holding sizeable numbers of UN peacekeepers. Interestingly, at the same time, both Iraq and Palestine are among the largest recipients of foreign aid. These samples, therefore, classify countries with different criteria related to their place in the international order and provide unique opportunities for testing the contextual effect of patron-client relations on political attitudes. Figure 1 shows the marginal effects from selected split-sample estimations and reports the average rate of change in regime support created by a one unit increase in each variable.[78]

Figure 1 displays interesting nuances about the attitude formation effects of context on political attitudes. Confirming the predictions of loyalty generation mechanisms and the patron-client framework, increased wealth consistently informs favourable views of the regime across all sub-samples. This effect is largest in countries with low government capacity and performance and is smallest in non-client states. The impact of education varies by context as it decreases regime support in client states and also in low QoG-low HDI countries. These results show that contextual factors defining the



Figure 1. Contextual and attitudinal foundations of regime support (marginal effects, split-sample estimations). Note: Marginal effects represent the rate of change in regime support generated by one unit increase in each independent variable. The horizontal lines represent the 95% confidence interval.

Arab region may inform political attitudes in a way that limits the unconditional applicability of modernization theory.

Modernization-induced self-expression values, however, still have some relevance. Hypothesis 2 proposes a negative association between self-expression values and political support. Figure 1 confirms this expectation, irrespective of government performance and client status, for "critical government outlooks, liberty aspirations, tolerance, and less religiousness". Interesting nuances, however, can be observed with respect to the magnitude of proposed relationships. For example, "critical political outlook" has the largest effect in high QoG-high HDI countries (Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, and Tunisia) and the smallest effect in non-client states (Algeria, Libya, and Yemen). "Liberty aspirations" decrease regime support *the most* in client states (Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Palestine) and *the least* in high QoG-high HDI nations that also happen to rank high in foreign assistance. For this variable, there is no effect discernable from zero in non-client states. This finding implies that while client status matters in generating authoritarian loyalty, it is not a sufficient condition. Regime support is likely to emerge when client status is accompanied by high performance in government quality and aggregate human development.

Across different contexts, a second group of self-expression indicators lend support to loyalty generation mechanisms and indirectly to patron-client perspectives. The results confirm a positive association between life satisfaction (Hypothesis 4) and trust (Hypothesis 6) and regime support.[79] These effects are larger in diametrically opposed cases of non-client states and high QoG-high HDI countries and smaller in states receiving large amounts of foreign aid as well as in low QoG-low HDI nations (also major scenes of conflict). An important implication of this finding is that the value of loyalty generation mechanisms is more pronounced when either a regime

does not rely on an external patron or when a client state performs highly in government capacity and performance. The finding that trust and life satisfaction have a lesser impact in engendering regime support in client states shows how international involvement in Arab regimes may suppress the emancipative potential of human development. More interestingly, "propensity to protest" decreases regime support only in low QoG-low HDI countries and it has no statistically significant effect in client states. This finding somehow corroborates the arguments explaining Arab uprisings with factors like inefficient governance and increased corruption.[80] What lessons can we learn from these findings? The conclusion discusses the scholarly and policy implications of the statistical analysis.

Discussion and conclusion

This study examined the micro foundations and contextual determinants of political support for Arab authoritarianism. The theoretical framework builds on a critical assessment of modernization and the human development perspective to explore the attitudinal effects of an international patron-client framework on regime support. The statistical analysis tests the individual determinants of regime support under diverse contextual factors including government performance, patron-client status of Middle Eastern states within the hierarchical world order, and domestic distributive mechanisms.

Confirming the predictions of the modernization perspective, the results show that Arab citizens holding critical political outlooks and liberty aspirations, and those who are less religious and more tolerant towards religious minorities are less likely to support the regime.[81] At the same time, the results also reveal the limited applicability of this perspective in the Arab world. Due to the colonial underpinnings of the Middle Eastern state system and the international client (or rebellious) status of the states in the region, increased resources and certain self-expression values may engender favourable views of the political status quo (that is, support for authoritarian regime). This article argues that this result is best explained by loyalty generating mechanisms that work through domestic patronage networks supported by the *centre* elites of the world system. Such loyalty generation may be possible to the extent that these regimes can create winners who are wealthier and highly satisfied with their life conditions.[82] Keeping authoritarian support is costly and is possible either through hydrocarbon rents or the international rents/support provided by a global hegemon.[83]

Consequently, this study makes an important contribution to distinct research literatures on Arab authoritarianism, public opinion, and the international patron-client perspective. The analysis reveals that colonial state formation experiences and the client status of the Arab regimes are quite important in engendering regime support. Since most Middle Eastern states are dependent states according to the world systems theory,[84] the *centre* elites provide support to the authoritarian elites to help them demobilize the society and contain opposition. The hegemon's support gives the *periphery* elites the necessary resources (military and financial) to maintain a domestic clientelistic network that generates loyal citizens who are presumably the beneficiaries of such arrangements. Therefore, in addition to the domestic roots of Arab authoritarianism, the hierarchical world order helps the resiliency of these regimes by sustaining mechanisms that generate a supportive citizenry.

The modernization perspective, nonetheless, remains relevant. Education and some self-expression values (liberty aspirations, critical political outlook, and tolerance) decrease political support regardless of the contextual factors. At the same time, increased resources and emancipation may have pronounced effects on political attitudes by decreasing regime support in client states with high government performance and in some non-client states. Therefore, while support from a world hegemon may help maintain loyalty generating distributive mechanisms, improved government capacity and performance or exclusion of rebellious states from international patron-client networks may inadvertently create a critical citizenry in authoritarian regimes of the Arab region.

Public opinion research rarely tests the individual-level implications of world systems theory with respect to attitude formation dynamics linking state capacity to political support in non-democratic regimes. Future studies are needed in this important research area. The ADB survey is a valuable tool for testing the implications of the modernization perspective as they relate to regime support. However, like most other surveys, it has limitations and does not include questions evaluating citizens' perceptions about international patron-client relations. Recently, Jamal attempted to provide an empirical test of this perspective in order to explain anti-Americanism and democratic orientations in the Arab world.[85] With collection of additional survey data, public opinion scholars could follow suit and gain leverage in explaining a variety of political attitudes formed in the context of the hierarchical world order.

Notes

1. Gause, "Why Middle East Studies Missed the Arab Spring."
2. Bellin, "The Robustness of Authoritarianism."
3. Brownlee, *Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization*.
4. Lust-Okar, "Competitive Clientelism"; Blaydes, *Elections and Distributive Politics*.
5. Anderson, "The State in the Middle East"; Herb, "No Representation without Taxation?"; Heydemann, *Networks of Privilege*; Yom and Gause, "Resilient Royals"; and Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds, *The Arab Spring*.
6. Wallerstein, "The Capitalist World Economy"; Hinnebusch, "The Middle East in the World Hierarchy."
7. Telhami, "Arab Public Opinion"; Tessler et al., "New Findings on Arabs."
8. Tessler, "Do Islamic Orientations Influence"; Ciftci, "Secular-Islamist Cleavage."
9. Benstead, "Why Do Some Arab Citizens."
10. Jamal, "Reassessing Support for Islam"; Ciftci, "Modernization, Islam, or Social Capital."
11. Jamal, *The Other Side*.
12. Jamal and Robbins, "Social Justice"; Filali-Ansary, "The Languages of the Arab Revolutions"; Korany, "Redefining Development."
13. Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds, *The Arab Spring*.
14. Anderson, "The State in the Middle East"; Fromkin, "A Peace to End All Peace."
15. Migdal, "Strong Societies."
16. Hinnebusch, "The Middle East in the World Hierarchy"; Tagma, Kalaycioglu, and Akcali, "'Taming' Arab Social Movements."
17. Lustick, "The Absence of Middle Eastern Great Powers."
18. UNDP, *Arab Human Development Report*.
19. Inglehart and Norris, *Rising Tide*; Inglehart and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change*.
20. Wallerstein, "The Capitalist World Economy"; Hinnebusch, "The Middle East in the World Hierarchy"; Gause, "Why Middle East Studies Missed the Arab Spring."
21. Eisenstadt, "Multiple Modernities"; Cox and Sinclair, "Approaches to World Order"; Hinnebusch, "The Middle East in the World Hierarchy"; Tagma, Kalaycioglu, and Akcali, "Taming Arab Social Movements."

22. Easton, "A Re-assessment of the Concept."
23. Ibid.
24. Norris, *Making Democratic Governance*; Dahlberg and Holmberg, "Democracy and Bureaucracy"; for an exception see, Shin "Cultural Hybridization."
25. Various dimensions of quality of government as reported by the World Banks's worldwide governance indicators data can be accessed at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home
26. See http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi for a detailed account of measurement of HDI. In statistical estimation, ten-year average of HDI is used.
27. Henry and Springborg, *Globalization and the Politics of Development*.
28. The author thanks one of the reviewers for suggesting this very important discussion.
29. Anderson, "The State in the Middle East"; Fromkin, "A Peace to End All Peace."
30. Wallerstein, "The Capitalist World Economy."
31. Ibid.; Hinnebusch, "The Middle East in the World Hierarchy."
32. Hinnebusch, "The Middle East in the World Hierarchy."
33. Halliday, *The Middle East*.
34. Hinnebusch, "The Middle East in the World Hierarchy."
35. In the latest incarnations of this hegemonic relation, the implementation of global neoliberal policies requires reproduction of patron-client arrangements targeting social movements and neoliberal governmentality (Tagma et al., "Taming Arab Social Movements"; Plehwe, Walpen, and Neunhöffer , *Neoliberal Hegemony*).
36. Hinnebusch, "The Middle East in the World Hierarchy"; Tagma et al., "Taming Arab Social Movements."
37. The author thanks one of the reviewers for this important insight.
38. It should be noted that foreign troops and some peacekeepers exist in these countries and several other nations in the sample. The analysis is focused on the US troops to gain leverage in the contextual effects associated with the world hegemon's involvement in the periphery.
39. Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society*; Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy."
40. Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization*; Inglehart and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change*; Inkeles, *Exploring Individual Modernity*; Welzel, Inglehart, and Klingemann, "Human Development as a Theory."
41. Welzel, Inglehart, and Klingemann, "Human Development as a Theory"; Welzel, *Freedom Rising*.
42. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*.
43. Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*.
44. Campante and Chor, "Why Was the Arab World Poised for Revolution?"; Jamal and Robbins, "Social Justice"; Harris, "Did Inequality Breed the Arab Uprisings?"; Kuhn, "On the Role of Human Development."
45. Norris, *Critical Citizens*.
46. Welzel, Inglehart, and Klingemann, "Human Development as a Theory."
47. Inglehart and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy*.
48. Eisenstadt, "Multiple Modernities."
49. Sen, "Capability and Well-Being."
50. Hinnebusch, "The Middle East in the World Hierarchy"; Halliday, *The Middle East*.
51. Sometimes, the centre elites may choose to target certain civil society sectors to improve neoliberal *governmentality* as proposed by Tagma et al., "Taming Arab Social Movements."
52. Harris, "Did Inequality Breed the Arab Uprisings?"
53. Beblawi, "The Rentier State in the Arab World"; Yom and Gause, "Resilient Royals."
54. Lust, "Competitive Clientelism in the Middle East"; Blaydes, *Elections and Distributive Politics*; De Miguel, Jamal, and Tessler, "Elections in the Arab World"; Corstange, *The Price of a Vote*.
55. De Miguel, Jamal, and Tessler, "Elections in the Arab World."
56. Benstead, "Why Do Some Arab Citizens."
57. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations"; Kedourie, *Democracy and Arab Political Culture*.
58. Tessler, "Do Islamic Orientations Influence"; Jamal and Tessler, "Attitudes in the Arab World; Tessler et al., "New Findings on Arabs"; Ciftci, "Secular-Islamist Cleavage."
59. Inglehart and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy*.
60. Jamal, *The Other Side*.

61. Ibid., 77; Ciftci and Bernick, "Utilitarian and Modern."
62. Gold and Naufal, "Wasta: The Other Invisible."
63. Anderson, "The State in the Middle East."
64. Buehler, "Do You Have 'Connections' at the Courthouse?"
65. ADB is an award-winning dataset that meets scientific standards in survey data collection in non-democratic settings. On its website, the main objective of the ADB is described as being "to produce scientifically reliable data on the politically-relevant attitudes of ordinary citizens."
66. These questions are selected based on factor analysis. The results of the multivariate analysis (presented below) remain robust when alternative indices of regime support are used. These alternative indices measure institutional and policy performance and political trust. These results are available from the author upon request.
67. Welzel, Inglehart, and Klingemann, "The Theory of Human Development."
68. Gelman and Hill, *Data Analysis Using Regression*; Rabe-Hesketh, Skrondal, and Pickles, "Maximum Likelihood Estimation."
69. Intra-class correlation is <0.20 in most models indicating that there is substantial variation to be explained at the country level. The results remain unchanged in fixed and random effects regressions. Hausman test results confirm that fixed effects are preferable to random effects estimations. These results are available upon request.
70. Welzel, Inglehart, and Klingemann, "The Theory of Human Development"; Inglehart and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change*; Welzel, *Freedom Rising*.
71. Lust-Okar, "Legislative Elections in Hegemonic Authoritarian Regimes"; Jamal, *The Other Side*; Blaydes, *Elections and Distributive Politics*; De Miguel, Jamal, and Tessler, "Elections in the Arab World"; Corstange, *The Price of a Vote*; Jamal, *The Other Side*; Inglehart and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change*; Welzel, *Freedom Rising*.
72. Buehler, "Do You Have 'Connections' at the Courthouse?"
73. Inglehart and Norris, "The True Clash of."
74. Walker and Kehoe, "Regime Transition and Attitude."
75. Logan and Bratton, "The Political Gender Gap."
76. Tessler, "Islam and Democracy"; Ciftci and Bernick, "Utilitarian and Modern"; Ross, "Oil, Islam, and Women."
77. It should be noted that Iraq is also among the top recipients of foreign aid. In addition, Kurdish regions are relatively safe zones and presumably are ranked higher in government performance. Given this disparity, pooled analysis and a split-sample model for low QoG-low HDI is estimated by (i) dropping observations from the Kurdish provinces and (ii) excluding all observations from Iraq. The results remain very similar with only very small differences. These additional estimations are available upon request.
78. Full results of these models are presented in Appendix A. Additional split-sample analysis based on the distribution of countries in Table 1 is available upon request.
79. Jamal, *The Other Side*.
80. Korany, "Redefining Development"; Jamal and Robbins, "Social Justice."
81. Inglehart and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy*; Welzel, *Freedom Rising*.
82. Lust-Okar, "Legislative Elections in Hegemonic Authoritarian Regimes"; Jamal, *The Other Side*; Jamal, *Of Empires and Citizens*; Blaydes, *Elections and Distributive Politics*; Ciftci and Bernick, "Utilitarian and Modern"; De Miguel, Jamal, and Tessler, "Elections in the Arab World"; Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds, *The Arab Spring*.
83. Hinnebusch, "The Middle East in the World Hierarchy"; Tagma et al., "Taming Arab Social Movements."
84. Wallerstein, "The Capitalist World Economy"; Hinnebusch, "The Middle East in the World Hierarchy."
85. Jamal, "Of Empires and Citizens."

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Appendix A. Determinants of regime support (fixed effects, split sample estimations).

	Model 1 Low QoG-Low HDI	Model 2 High QoG-High HDI	Model 3 High International Aid	Model 4 Low International Aid
Education	0.0015	−0.0041	−0.0033	0.00014
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Income	0.017**	0.022**	0.017**	0.013**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Critical outlook	−0.059**	−0.051**	−0.057**	−0.044**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Tolerance of others	0.0011	−0.0089**	−0.011**	−0.0076
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Liberty aspiration	−0.010**	−0.015**	−0.024**	0.0022
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Protest participation	0.0033	−0.019**	−0.0058	0.0047
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Less religious	−0.0074**	−0.0074**	−0.0043	−0.0051
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Trust	0.060**	0.045**	0.038**	0.071**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Personal expectations	0.022**	0.013**	0.011**	0.021**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Wasta (connections)	−0.047**	−0.046**	−0.035**	−0.036**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Political interest	0.0094*	−0.0018	−0.0025	0.0057
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Female	0.016*	0.015*	0.021**	0.0051
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Age	0.00046	−0.00068**	−0.00060*	0.00022
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	0.58**	0.77**	0.76**	0.49**
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Observations	2743	4438	4232	2422

Note: *$p < 0.01$; **$p < 0.001$. Source: Arab Democracy Barometer, Wave III.

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Islam, Social Justice, and Democracy*

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Abstract: Egalitarian preferences and benevolence are significant elements of Islamic social justice, which is one of the main pillars of Islam's ethico-political system. Surprisingly, empirical investigations about attitudinal implications of Islamic social justice values are rare. This is one of the first studies examining the correlations between Islam, social justice values, and regime preferences. It proposes that benevolence and egalitarian distributive preferences will induce democratic support and mediate the effect of religiosity on democratic orientations. Seemingly unrelated regression estimations using a Muslim-only sample from the sixth wave of the World Values Surveys support these hypotheses. The effects of social justice values are exclusive to support for democracy and not to support for authoritarian systems. Furthermore, religiosity increases support for democracy through intermediate mechanism of social justice values. These results imply that, next to principles of *ijtihad*, *ijma*, and *shura*, Islamic social justice values can induce pluralistic ideas in Muslim majority societies.

INTRODUCTION

Early macro-level research on Islam and democracy favored a *cultural incompatibility thesis* that puts Muslim faith at odds with democratic governance (Gellner 1991; Huntington 1993; Kedourie 1994; Lewis 2010). Scholars of Islam have refuted this essentialist approach by searching for pluralistic ideas in conceptions of Islamic legal methodology such as *ijma* (consensus of scholars) and *ijtihad* (independent legal reasoning) or

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in the principle of *shura* (consultation) (Esposito and Voll 1996; Sachedina 2001; Kemal 2002; El Fadl 2004; Ramadan 2004). The burgeoning quantitative public opinion literature has also challenged this essentialist line of theorizing (Tessler 2002; Bratton 2003; Jamal 2006; Meyer, Rizzo, and Ali 2007; Rizzo, Abdel-Latif, and Meyer 2007; Ciftci 2010; Fish 2011; Tessler, Jamal, and Robbins 2012). The net contribution of this scholarship to this important debate on Islam and democracy can be summarized in a single statement: Muslim religiosity is not necessarily at odds with democratic orientations. However, after more than a decade of research, much ambivalence remains about the precise mechanisms linking religiosity to support for democracy in Muslim-majority societies.

Following in the footsteps of these latter studies, this paper attempts to shed some light on the ambivalence surrounding the "religiosity-democratic support nexus" by approaching the puzzle from a different perspective: Can religiously inspired social justice values lead to pluralistic ideals and inform democratic orientations among the world's Muslims? Do such values mediate the effect of religiosity on support for democracy?

Some studies have already tested the effects of certain values on democratic orientations including those related to tolerance (Spierings 2014a), secular-Islamist cleavage (Ciftci 2013), gender views (Tessler 2015), and social inequalities (Fish 2011). These studies, however, do not test the intermediate mechanisms linking religiosity to democratic support, such as benevolence and economic egalitarianism that are among the constitutive elements of various Islamic social justice conceptions. This paper examines the direct and mediated effects of religiosity through social justice values on support for democracy. This inquiry is important because Muslim-majority societies demonstrate high levels of religiosity and at the same time "social justice" has historically been a pillar of legitimate governance in the Muslim world (Abdelkader 2000; Sachedina 2001; Feldman 2007; el-Affendi 2008; Yenigun 2017).

I propose that social justice values will inform democratic orientations and mediate religion's effect on regime preferences through two distinct mechanisms. First, there is strong emphasis on charity, *zakat* (almsgiving), and helping the poor in Islamic orthodoxy (Davis and Robinson 2006). Since democratic institutions are more conducive to distributive justice policies through taxation of wealthy individuals than other governance systems (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006), all else equal, individual preferences favoring charity and distributive schemes should be compatible with support for democracy.

A second mechanism is inspired by the Islamic legal theory. In this theory, social benevolence (*ihsan*) is instrumental for attainment of the

end goal of Islamic law, that is, public interest (*maslahah*) (Abdelkader 2000). It is argued that religiously inspired benevolent act is widely promoted by Islamic moral authority and it may serve as a consensus forming ideal among the devout Muslims toward establishing a just order (i.e., *maslahah*). This is akin to obtaining a majority agreeing on the parameters of public interest by virtue of non-separable preferences and deliberation in democratic systems (Sen 1977; 1999; Oppenheimer and Frohlich 2007). Subsequently, I argue that social benevolence, as a virtue of Islamic justice should generate support for democracy through democracy's capacity of generating public interest through deliberative means. Finally, since scripture and prophetic tradition places strong emphasis on zakat, charitable act, and egalitarian distribution (Singer 2008), one can argue that such social justice values are likely to act as mediators in the "religion-support for democracy" nexus.

I use the sixth wave of the World Values Surveys to test these hypotheses in 18 Muslim-majority countries. A series of seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) estimations accounting for multiple mediation mechanisms show that both social justice preferences, *economic egalitarianism* and *benevolence*, engender democratic orientations directly and through the indirect effect of religiosity. Using mediation analysis and by confirming statistically non-significant alternative paths, the results reveal a very robust direct effect of social justice values on democratic orientations. Benevolence and egalitarian distributive preferences engender support for different types of democratic systems, but they have no impact on support for authoritarianism. Religiosity increases the propensity of holding both benevolent attitudes and egalitarian distributive preferences and being religious indirectly increases favorability of democracy through these mediators.

This paper expands our understanding of regime preferences among the world's Muslims by showing that religion plays an indirect role in shaping political attitudes through mediating effect of such values as benevolence (*ihsan*) and egalitarian distributive preferences. These intermediate mechanisms may explain some of the ambivalence surrounding the "Islam-democratic orientations" nexus. Therefore, next to the conceptions of legal methodologies (*ijtihad*-independent legal reasoning and *ijma*-consensus of scholars) and scriptural principles like *shura* (consultation) (Esposito and Voll 1996; El Fadl 2004; Ramadan 2004), benevolence and egalitarian values may be among the constitutive elements of pluralist ideas in Islam. This study contributes to our understanding of the pluralistic roots of Islamic religiosity, Muslim democratization, and the relationship between religious-economic preferences and democratic governance.

RELIGION AND SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY

According to the global opinion surveys, citizens in Muslim-majority countries are highly supportive of democracy (Bratton 2003; Esposito and Mogahed 2007; Jamal and Tessler 2008; Hassan 2008; Fish 2011). Similarly, quantitative public opinion literature on this subject finds that Muslim piety is not necessarily incompatible with democratic values and when a negative effect is found, it is either inconsistent or negligible (Rose 2002; Tessler 2002). Collins and Owen (2012) find that devout individuals are supportive of Islamic democracy and the caliphate but are less enthusiastic about secular democracy in Central Asia. The pooled analysis of survey data from the Muslim world, however, does not reveal a clear picture regarding the religiosity variable (Ciftci 2010). Overall, despite vigorous research spanning more than a decade, much ambivalence remains about the association between religiosity and support for democracy in the Muslim world.

In addressing this ambivalence, some scholars argue that context is an important determinant of preferences about secularism (Karakoc and Baskan 2012), *shari'a*, and democracy (Ciftci 2013; Driessen 2018). Others (Fish 2011; Spierings 2014a) look at religiously informed values such as trust and tolerance to explain democratic orientations in the Muslim world. Spierings (2014a, 2014b), however, finds that personal religiosity neither informs support for democracy nor for tolerance of other groups in the Arab region. Ciftci's (2013) study looking into values related to the secular-Islamist cleavage as determinants of political attitudes finds contrasting effects about the relationship of religiosity and support for democracy and *shari'a*. Overall, while there have been attempts to resolve the ambivalence about the relationship of Muslim faith and democracy, research generally neglected the direct and mediated mechanisms linking religion to democratic attitudes.[1] This paper looks into the explanatory power of social justice values as determinants and mediators of religion's effect on support for democracy among the world's Muslims.

THE TWO AXES OF SOCIAL JUSTICE AND REGIME PREFERENCES

Social justice is an important virtue in Islamic ethico-political system and it is regarded as one of the main pillars of legitimate governance in Islam (Hasan 1971; Shariati 1979; Qutb 2000; Abdelkader 2000). Feldman

(2007, 113) argues that modern Islamist thinking has been dominated with different conceptions of "justice" and that this term serves as the "leitmotif" for the social and political incarnations of Islamist worldviews. According to Fish (2011, 222), "justice occupies pride of place in Muslim moral thinking. In broadest general terms, it is the essence of the Muslim ideal and message, much as the essence of the Christian ideal and message is love."

Despite its salience in Islam, there have been no empirical studies examining the formative effects of Islamic social justice values on political preferences. Theoretical scholarship finds justification for democratic governance in conceptions of Islamic legal methodology such as *ijma* and *ijtihad* or from the scriptural principles like *shura* (consultation) (Esposito and Voll 1996; Kemal 2002; Ramadan 2004). Can social justice values validate democratic governance in the cognition of ordinary Muslims just as historical significance of tolerance in Muslim civilization is thought to justify pluralism? Do religious individuals take cues from Islamic social justice principles to inform their regime preferences?

Social justice has been a central concept of political debates not only in the Muslim world but also in the West. In his seminal work, Rawls (1971) conceptualizes justice as a notion encompassing both procedural and distributive mechanisms. Recent scholarship has focused on the roots of distributive justice (Aalberg 2003; Reisch 2014) and the psychological origins of justice as a primitive motive generating feelings of benevolence (Sabbagh and Schmitt 2016). Although one can expect to observe cross-cultural differences about the conceptions of justice, these two dimensions are especially prominent in the Islamic justice discourses.

The first axis of Islamic social justice concerns the egalitarian distributive preferences. While social justice has political, economic, and legal meanings, distributive aspects involving charity, almsgiving, and social welfare occupy a central position in Islamic conceptions (Hasan 1971; Abdelkader 2000). For example, Qutb (2000) criticizes Western materialism for its consumption habits and proposes an economic model imposing limits on the use of wealth to ensure distribution from the wealthy to the most disadvantaged. In a similar vein, Shariati (1979) believes that prosperity does not come from accumulation of wealth, but rather it can be achieved by removing class differences and inequalities through charity and benevolence.

Islamic scripture, too, places strong emphasis on charity and redistribution. Wealthy individuals are expected to pay a certain portion of their income (generally 2.5%) as *Zakat* (obligatory almsgiving) to those in

need: "The good that you give should be to the parents, the close ones, the orphans, the needy and the homeless, and any good that you do, God is knowledgeable thereof" (Qur'an 2:215). There are numerous reports encouraging *zakat*, charity, and redistribution in the *Hadith* collections that report the sayings of Mohammad. For example, Al-Bukhari reports that Prophet is heard saying: "Allah has made it obligatory for them to pay zakat from their property; it is to be taken from the wealthy among them and given to the poor" (Al-Bukhari n.d., 2:24:537). Adi bin Hatim reported that he heard the Prophet saying, "Save yourself from Hell-fire even by giving half a date-fruit in charity" (Al-Bukhari n.d., 2:24:498). This strong emphasis on charity has given way to the collection and redistribution of zakat by the state during the early and modern periods of Islam (Davis and Robinson 2006).[2]

Davis and Robinson (2006, 167) argue that religiously orthodox "are disposed toward economic communitarianism, whereby the state should provide for the poor, reduce inequality, and meet the community needs via economic intervention." They find support confirming the primacy of egalitarian distribution among Muslims. Exploiting this doctrinal tendency about distributive justice, many Islamist movements and parties including Muslims Brothers and Hezbollah have capitalized on the appeal of Islam's orthodox principles to provide social services to widen their support base (Clark 1995; Wickham 2002; Cammettt and Issar 2010). The most commonly used word in the names of Islamist parties, justice (*adala*), further signifies the prevalence of this notion in the political scene.[3]

Do egalitarian social justice values mediate religion's formative effect on democratic orientations? Recent advances in democratization literature provide some insights about the direct and intermediate mechanisms linking distributive preferences to democratic orientations. According to one view, democracy emerges as a result of the struggle between wealthy elites and impoverished masses over redistribution of a nation's wealth (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). The masses want democracy, because the universal suffrage allows them to have some influence on policies ensuring a higher tax rate to be imposed on wealthy individuals, which is assumed to favor egalitarian redistribution of the national wealth (Boix 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). An observable implication of this theory is that those favoring equitable redistribution and progressive tax policies are more likely to support democracy.[4]

If pious Muslims are more likely to hold egalitarian distributive preferences, do they utilize these to inform their regime preferences? According

to the logic of "democracy and redistribution" (Davis and Robinson 2006) the answer is "yes" whereas Pepinsky and Welborne (2011) find no clear relationship between piety and redistributive preferences. However, in their statistical analysis of surveys in Muslim majority countries, the latter find that religious Muslims somehow support government's intervention to reduce poverty. Fish (2011), also, finds some empirical evidence conforming that Muslims are distinctive in their preferences for egalitarian distribution and that income inequality is lower in Muslim majority countries.

All else equal, religious Muslims should prefer political arrangements that serve the ultimate social justice goal of economic egalitarianism, and hence be supportive of democratic governance. This is because, in democracies where free and fair elections are the norm, policy implementation in accordance with the distributive preferences of the masses is more likely. At a minimum, we can reasonably expect that, regardless of democracies ameliorative effect on inequality, religious individuals are likely to favor democratic institutions thanks to their expectations about democracy's redistributive capacity.

Hypothesis 1a: *Religious individuals will be more likely to hold egalitarian distributive preferences than non-religious.*

Hypothesis 1b: *Individuals holding favorable views toward distributive justice will be more supportive of democracy.*

Hypothesis 1c: *The effect of religiosity on support for democracy will be mediated by distributive justice preferences in the positive direction.*

The second axis of Islamist social justice conception is benevolence (*ihsan*). Benevolence toward others may be essential in attainment of egalitarian social justice, an outcome that can be justified in the name of public interest (*maslahah*). One of the best-known *hadiths* that came to be a maxim of *siyasa shar'iyya* (i.e., governance according to Islamic law)[5] shows the importance of benevolence and kindness toward others: "There should be neither harming [darar] nor reciprocating harm [dirar] (*La Darar Wa La Dirar*)" (Imam Nawawi n.d., 32). Similar to the emphasis placed on charity and redistributive schemes, one can find ample references to benevolence and altruism in the Islamic scripture. For example, the following verse is cited during Friday sermons in many parts of the Muslim world:

> Verily, Allah commands "Adl (fairness, equity, justice) Ihsan (excellence in servitude to Allah, benevolence towards people, graciousness in dealings) and giving to those close to you, while He forbids fahshaa (lewdness, indecency, licentiousness, immorality), munkar (bad actions, undesirable activities, generally unaccepted behavior, not fulfilling one's obligations), and baghy (rebellion, transgressing limits, exploiting or violating others' rights, abuse of authority or freedom)." He admonishes you so that you heed the advice (Quran, 16:90).[6]

A central concept in Islamic law, *maslahah*, plays an important role in reaching social justice goals. *Maslahah* can be translated as "public good", "utility", or "public interest". Ghazâlî (1998) defines this term as "the preservation of the religion, life, mind, offspring, and wealth," and broadens its scope to include the necessity of benevolence toward the others. In this regard, benevolence justifies the policies that benefit the larger public such as economic policies that increase egalitarianism. Given its doctrinal significance as an Islamic value, what are the implications of benevolence and the related maxim of *maslahah* for understanding devout Muslims' political preferences? I argue that the relationship between social justice values like benevolence and support for democracy is related to the ideal of the "achievement of the common good" in an Islamic society, an end result that is bigger than each individual's own interest. I elaborate on this statement below.

In democracies, certain institutional mechanisms empower citizens to choose according to their interests and general welfare (Frohlich 2007, 256). However, it is necessary to consider the needs of others and avoid the free rider problem for translating preferences about distributive justice into maximal general welfare (Frohlich 2007, 257). Free and fair elections and executive accountability, two institutional pillars of democratic regimes, are instrumental in attainment of public interest. This, however, is no easy task, because according to Arrow's (1963) "general possibility theorem", no "rank-order decision-making rule" will satisfy two conditions of fairness: efficiency and need. Given this constraint, *non-separable preferences* that tie individual interest to the relative gains of the others increase the likelihood of transition from self-interest to public interest, especially, in democracies where deliberation is likely to facilitate the achievement of common good through formation of a "majority consensus" (Sen 1977; 1999; Oppenheimer and Frohlich 2007). As Frohlich (2007, 257) states:

> People seem to care not only about what they get in any situation but how their payoffs relate to what others get, and to the relative merit and/or need of the others. This bespeaks some non-separable preferences: preferences that depend not only on the individual's payoff, but also on the pattern of payoffs and the particular agency whereby that pattern is achieved.

However, even in the existence of strong non-separable preferences, it will be necessary to agree on what constitutes social justice so that at least the majority's preference represents something akin to the *common good*. This is not a trivial problem to the extent that any dimension of social justice as it relates to the choice of political procedures necessitates a consensus about what is "good" for the individual and the society. In Muslim communities, such consensus may be achieved by religious values such as the scripturally justified benevolence and the related legal maxim of *maslahah*. Thanks to religious moral authority it enjoys, values emanating from this second axis of social justice will be crucial for ensuring altruistic behavior.

Two observable implications will follow the discussion up to this point. First, benevolent individuals will lean favorably toward charity and egalitarian redistributive policies, because such values are encouraged by Islamic religious authority. That is, benevolent attitudes should be more likely among the devout than the less religious. Second, given the deliberative nature of democratic governance and the representative logic of free and fair elections, it is more likely that public interest, —or at least a perceptional consensus about what constitutes it—, can be realistically achieved in democracies than other regimes. Subsequently, such attitudes should engender a bias toward democratic support rather than for authoritarian governance models among the religious.

One can find ample evidence in the scripture and the Islamist intellectual tradition about these proposed mechanisms. Many students of Islam and democracy focus on the linkages between benevolence, altruism, and public interest. For example, some students of Islam have defined benevolence and its collective outcome *maslahah* as a significant principle of democratic governance complementing such principles of *shura* and *ijma* (Sachedina 2001; Browers 2006). Abdelkader (2000) found evidence supporting the link between the maxim of *maslahah* and the increased Islamic social activism in the 1990s. Ramadan (2004) has employed *maslahah* in conjunction with ijtihad as a foundational principle in establishing democratic ideals for Muslims in the West and elsewhere.

Benevolence emerges as a central idea in attainment of social justice also in the works of early (e.g., Namik Kemal of Turkey) and late

(Qutb and Shariati) Islamists of modern age. For example, a common theme in Shariati's (1979) lectures is the importance of *ithar* (love, benevolence) as a founding principle of Islamic just society. For Qutb (2000, 99), on the other hand, charitable act matters a great deal, because "it is the outward sign of charity and brotherly feeling, to both of which Islam attaches a supreme importance; it is an attempt to establish the mutual ties of mankind and social solidarity by means of an individual perception of what is necessary and a personal concept of charity." Since human nature is inclined toward selfishness and love of money, the charitable act works its way toward purification of human consciousness by helping the man to give up what is dearly to him and that what has a powerful grip on him (Qutb 2000).

This emphasis on benevolence and *maslahah* also helps the religious justification of political innovations. For example, political reform ((e.g., pluralistic institutions) can be justified in the name of *maslahah* (Ramadan 2004) or social solidarity (Qutb 2000). Thus, a general sense of justice and benevolence geared toward public interest would be compatible with democratic orientations to the extent that democracy is *perceived*, as a regime that has a comparative advantage in implementing distributive justice. This study also argues that *maslahah* is more likely to be attained through deliberation, fair elections, and in regimes with institutional guarantees for protection of rights. As such, democracy will be perceived as a desirable alternative for individuals holding benevolent attitudes relative to less democratic regimes. This effect should be especially prevalent for religious individuals insofar as Islamic orthodoxy and Islamist ideology encourage benevolence. Based on this discussion, I propose the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 2a: *Religious individuals will be more likely to hold benevolent attitudes than less religious.*

Hypothesis 2b: *Individuals holding benevolent attitudes will be more supportive of distributive justice than those who do not.*

Hypothesis 2c: *Individuals holding benevolent attitudes will be more supportive of democracy than those who do not.*

Hypothesis 2d: *The effect of religiosity on support for democracy will be mediated by benevolent attitudes in the positive direction.*



FIGURE 1. Direct and mediated effects of religiosity and social justice values.

Figure 1 shows the paths for the direct and mediating effects of social justice values on support for democracy. The dashed lines represent the expected net effect of the mediated mechanisms.

ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS

The crux of my argument is that religious individuals will lean favorably toward democratic governance thanks to its perceived likelihood of redistributive policy. An essential component of this relationship is religion's proposed role in generating pro-distribution preferences thanks to Islam's focus on charity and *zakat*. However, there are alternative accounts of the link between piety and distributive preferences. While religion is likely to increase charitable behavior, religious individuals may prefer a lesser role for government in redistributive policies. This is because religious belief and participation (in form of charitable behavior) act as insurance in times of hardships reducing the need for state-led distributive policies (Iannaccone 1992; Chen and Lind 2005; Pepinsky and Welborne 2011). By extension, the devout might be less inclined than less religious in favoring redistributive egalitarian policies, and subsequently the proposed mediating effect of religiously informed social justice values may be null.

A second theoretical mechanism predicts that religious individuals will be favorably inclined toward democracy, because they hold benevolent

attitudes. This mechanism operates through the central role of benevolence in achievement of *maslahah* (public interest) and the comparative advantage of democracy in realizing "benevolence-public interest connection" vis-à-vis its non-democratic alternatives. The applicability of this argument to the modern Muslim-majority societies can be challenged from two fronts. First, one can argue that shari'a principles no longer apply and that the encroachment of modern law might have rendered the underlying ethical values of shari'a futile by limiting its applicability to the matters of family and criminal punishment (Hallaq 2005). This alternative theory will predict no significant paths from religiosity to benevolence and then to support for democracy. However, there is some research that challenges this view and finds that ethical principles that used to be part of *shari'a* continue to inform Muslim political attitudes and behavior in the realm of Islamic activism (Abdelkader 2000; Yenigun 2017).

A third criticism may be brought against the "benevolence-democracy nexus" due to the "double-edged sword" quality of benevolent attitudes. Insofar as any regime guarantees the achievement of public interest, its democratic or autocratic qualities might be of secondary importance for the pious. Religiously informed benevolence, thus, may engender support for a "benevolent dictator" to the extent that an authoritarian regime manages to deliver public interest.

RESEARCH DESIGN

I use the Muslim-only sample from the sixth wave of the World Values Survey (WWS) including Algeria, Azerbaijan, Iraq, Egypt, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Qatar, Tunisia, Turkey, Uzbekistan, and Yemen.[7] This wave includes questions that allow testing of the direct and mediated effects hypotheses presented above. I use SUR models while also incorporating the mediation mechanisms into the estimations to account for the possible endogeneity problem. This estimation technique runs several regression models with correlated error terms to account for dependency between equations. I use the following three models in statistical estimations:[8]

$$\text{Benevolent Attitudes} = \alpha + \beta_1 \,\text{Religiosity} + \beta_2 \,\text{Fixed Effects} + \varepsilon_1 \quad (1)$$

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Distributive Preferences} = {} & \alpha + \beta_1\,\text{Religiosity} + \beta_2\,\text{Benevolent Attitudes} \\ & + \beta_3\,(\text{Control Variables 1}) \\ & + \beta_4\,\text{Fixed Effects} + \varepsilon_2 \qquad (2)\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Support or Democracy} = {} & \alpha + \beta_1\,\text{Religiosity} + \beta_2\,\text{Benevolent Attitudes} \\ & + \beta_3\,\text{Distributive Preferences} \\ & + \beta_4\,(\text{Control variables 2}) \\ & + \beta_5\,\text{Fixed Effects} + \varepsilon_3 \qquad (3)\end{aligned}$$

I use three measures of support for democracy to capture different dimensions of democratic attitudes. *Intrinsic support* (or overt support) is an index measuring individual preferences that range from solid support to non-commitment to democracy (Klingemann 1999; Inglehart and Welzel 2003). One question asks the respondents whether having a democratic political system is good or bad (four-point scale). In the sample, 89% of the respondents report that having a democratic system is fairly or very good. With little variation in the responses, this question alone is not sufficient for separating the ardent supporters of democracy from those who just hold a positive opinion about democracy. To account for this, I take the difference between this question and another question asking the respondents whether it is good or bad to have a strong leader who does not have to bother with the parliament or elections (four-point scale). The resulting subtractive index is recoded to range from 1 (low support) to 7 (high support) and differentiates ardent supporters of democracy who dislike an authoritarian alternative from the weak and non-supporters. Looking at the distribution of responses for the highest and lowest values in this index, 30% of the respondents can be classified as most supportive and 4% as least supportive of democracy.

I use two additional measures to capture the preferences regarding the distributive performance and procedural aspects of democracy. The surveys include some questions asking the respondents to evaluate whether certain statements are essential characteristics of democracy or not (10-point scale). Three items were used to create an average index of support for distributive democracy: governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor, people receive state aid for unemployment, and the state makes people's income equal. All three items load strongly on a single

dimension according to the factor analysis and the alpha coefficient remains at moderate strength (0.56).

I used a third measure of support for democracy (procedural) that asks respondents whether "people choosing their leaders in free elections" is an essential characteristic of democracy (10) or not (1). Since free and fair elections are among the central elements of democratic systems, this measure should serve as a proxy for evaluating responses about procedural aspects of democracy. In the surveys, about 4% of the respondents believe it is not essential whereas 40% think free and fair elections are essential to democracy. Figure 2 presents the cross-national variation in these three measures of support for democracy. The figure shows the difference between intrinsic support and support for distributive democracy/support for procedural democracy with higher values (positive) showing preferences toward the latter. Both measures are standardized to a 0–1 index to allow comparison.

Since the bars show the average tendency toward one type of support over the other, negative values do not imply that publics in these nations are less supportive of democracy. Rather, they show the difference between their degree of support for distributive or procedural forms of democracy and the intrinsic support. No clear geographical or cultural pattern emerges across the sample. Strongest preferences toward distributive democracy can be observed in Morocco, Pakistan, and Azerbaijan whereas average intrinsic support is highest in Egypt, Kyrgyzstan, and Lebanon. When individuals are asked about the importance of elections (procedural democracy), on average, they lean more strongly in their support for this dimension of democracy compared to intrinsic support. Strongest preference toward procedural forms of democracy emerges in Yemen, Morocco, Algeria, Pakistan, and Iraq whereas publics have stronger tendencies to intrinsically support democracy in Egypt, Kyrgyzstan, and Lebanon. Overall, Figure 2 demonstrates that there is sufficient cross-national variation in the types of supportive attitudes to warrant analysis of three dependent variables.

World Values Surveys includes several questions about distributive preferences, altruistic behavior, charity, helping the others, and government involvement in provision of welfare. Based on the results of factor analysis,[9] two indices are created from four questions that return the highest factor loadings on two dimensions. First, the distributive justice dimension is measured by adding two items asking the respondents whether they agree with the statement that incomes should be made more equal and whether government (or people) should take more



FIGURE 2. Distribution of three measures of support for democracy. The bars represent the difference in country averages between support for distributive/procedural forms of democracy and intrinsic support. Negative values indicate higher preference for intrinsic support. Source: Inglehart et al. (2014).

responsibility to provide for people (each item is recoded to range between 0 and 1). Second, benevolent attitudes are measured with two items from the Schwartz index (2012). These items ask the respondents whether they identify with a person who would do something for the good of society and whether they identify with a person helping the people nearby (1, not at all like me and 6, very much like me).[10] While these measures are not perfect, they tap the underlying dimensions of distributive preferences and benevolent attitudes.

Religiosity is operationalized through an additive index of five items: religion is important in life (4-point scale), self-reported religiosity (3-point scale), importance of religiosity as a desirable quality in children (2-point scale), importance of god in life (1–10 scale), and the frequency of religious service attendance ranging from 1 (never) to more than once a week (7). These items were rescaled to range between 0 and 1 and then added to create an index of religious belief. Of the 19 countries in the sample, about a dozen have an average religiosity score greater than 0.80. Average religiosity score is lower in formerly communist central Asian republics, Turkey, and Lebanon, but it remains above the 0.50 threshold.

I also include controls for education (eight-point scale), income (ten-point scale), and age in models predicting distributive justice preferences and support for democracy. Personal trust and egalitarian gender attitudes are included only in the third regression model on support for democracy (Jamal 2006; Rizzo, Abdel-Latif, and Meyer 2007, Ciftci 2010; Spierings 2014a; 2014b; Tessler 2015). The former is measured with an item asking the respondents whether most people can be trusted. An additive index of three items is created to account for egalitarian gender beliefs: university education is more important for a boy than a girl, men make better political leaders, and when jobs are scarce men should have priority to employment. A list of survey questions used in the analysis, operationalization strategies for each index, and summary statistics are presented in the supplemental file.

RESULTS

The results corroborate my theoretical expectations. Table 1 presents the results from the first model predicting intrinsic support for democracy. As expected, religiosity is positively related to benevolent attitudes (H1a) and distributive justice preferences (H2a). Both justice values, in turn, increase intrinsic support for democracy (H1b, H2c). A third

Table 1. Seemingly unrelated regression estimations: intrinsic support for democracy

	Model 1: Intrinsic support for democracy		
	Equation (1) Benevolence	**Equation (2) Distributive justice**	**Equation (3) Intrinsic support**
Mediated effects			
Religiosity	0.988*** (0.000)	0.0801*** (0.000)	0.152** (0.003)
Benevolence		0.00770*** (0.001)	0.0302*** (0.000)
Distributive justice			0.117*** (0.000)
Control variables			
Female		−0.0167* (0.036)	0.0244 (0.216)
Age		0.0000286 (0.926)	0.00201** (0.006)
Education		−0.00834*** (0.000)	0.0170*** (0.000)
Income		−0.0302*** (0.000)	0.0165*** (0.001)
Personal trust			−0.0700** (0.004)
Egalitarian gender beliefs			0.103*** (0.000)
Constant	8.195*** (0.000)	1.131*** (0.000)	3.230*** (0.000)
Country dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	15,324	15,324	15,324
R^2	0.685	0.100	0.159

Standard errors are in parentheses. *$p < 0.05$, **$p < 0.01$, ***$p < 0.001$.
Country dummies are reported in the Supplementary file Table S1 and can be found at https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755048318000810.

mediation mechanism linking benevolence to distributive preferences is also significant and positive (equation (2), H2b).

All else equal, I find that benevolence engenders preferences toward egalitarian distributive mechanisms such as equalization of income or government taking responsibility in helping the people. The effects of benevolence and distributive preferences on intrinsic support for democracy remain robust after controlling for religiosity and its mediated effects (equation (3) in Table 1). Religiosity also has a positive effect on democratic orientations. Subsequently, controlling for the possible endogeneity issues through mediation mechanisms and simultaneous regressions, we can resolve some of the ambivalence about the effect of religiosity on support for democracy (Tessler 2002; Ciftci 2010), at least in this sample of vastly different 18 Muslim-majority countries.

As for the control variables, no consistent effects are detected for gender and personal trust in equations (2) and (3). However, in accordance with the findings of past studies, egalitarian gender beliefs consistently

increase support for democracy (Rizzo, Abdel-Latif, and Meyer 2007; Ciftci 2010; Spierings 2014b; Tessler 2015). Individuals with high levels of education and income are highly supportive of democracy, a finding echoing the main predictions of modernization theory (Inglehart and Welzel 2005), but they appear to be less likely to favor egalitarian distributive mechanisms.

Next, I provide additional tests of theoretical mechanisms by examining support for distributive and procedural forms of democracy. To reiterate, items that ask the respondents to evaluate democracy by its welfare provision performance are used to measure respondents' views about distributive democracy. Respondents' views about whether elections are essential or not for democracy (10-point scale) are used to measure support for procedural democracy. The results in Table 2 remain very similar to those in Table 1 with respect to the mediated effects of religiosity through social justice values and the direct effects of the latter on support for different forms of democracy.

Religiosity, however, does not appear to be a statistically significant predictor of favorability of distributive forms of democracy. The consistency of the results in models with different measures of support for democracy lend strong support to the hypotheses about the direct and mediating effects of social justice values (Hypotheses 1a–1c and 2a–2d). Figure 3 provides a visual summary for the mediated effects for the models presented in Tables 1 and 2.

According to Figure 3, the indirect effects associated with mediating mechanisms are statistically significant and their impact is larger on support for distributive democracy than on intrinsic support and support for procedural forms of democracy. Indirect effects constitute 21 and 78% of total effect of religiosity in the first and second model respectively. In the third model, total indirect effects are the smallest at 18%. The indirect effect of religion through benevolence on intrinsic support is 16% and on support for procedural democracy is 17% of the total effect of religiosity, whereas the same figure reaches to 57% in predicting support for distributive democracy.

In all models, the indirect effects through distributive justice values are somehow less pronounced (4.4, 19.4, and 1%) than the effects of benevolent attitudes, nonetheless they remain statistically significant. Given these results, can we establish a robust statistical association between the direct and mediating effects of social justice values and support for democracy? Is it possible to rule out alternative explanations that foresee a positive association between benevolence and support for authoritarian system or

Table 2. Seemingly unrelated regression estimations: Muslim support for distributive democracy and procedural democracy (elections)

	Model 2: Support for distributive democracy			Model 3: Support for procedural democracy (elections)		
	Equation (1) Benevolence	Equation (2) Distributive justice	Equation (3) Support for distributive democracy	Equation (1) Benevolence	Equation (2) Distributive justice	Equation (3) Support for procedural democracy
Mediated effects						
Religiosity	0.973*** (0.000)	0.0802*** (0.000)	0.0937 (0.267)	0.947*** (0.000)	0.0792*** (0.000)	0.851*** (0.000)
Benevolence		0.00639** (0.003)	0.108*** (0.000)		0.00732*** (0.001)	0.187*** (0.000)
Distributive justice			0.474*** (0.000)			0.120** (0.002)
Control variables						
Female		−0.00682 (0.362)	−0.0288 (0.371)		−0.00640 (0.394)	−0.0967* (0.013)
Age		−0.0000364 (0.899)	0.00281* (0.019)		−0.0000345 (0.905)	0.00178 (0.219)
Education		−0.00734*** (0.000)	−0.0196** (0.010)		−0.00706*** (0.000)	0.0365*** (0.000)
Income		−0.0315*** (0.000)	−0.0300*** (0.000)		−0.0320*** (0.000)	−0.0342*** (0.000)
Personal trust			−0.0563 (0.152)			−0.0279 (0.557)
Egalitarian gender beliefs			0.0680**(0.002)			−0.0165 (0.525)
Constant	8.330*** (0.000)	1.147*** (0.000)	4.989*** (0.000)	8.360*** (0.000)	1.139*** (0.000)	5.713*** (0.000)
Fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	17,398	17,398	17,398	17,198	17,198	17,198
R^2	0.689	0.107	0.122	0.692	0.108	0.110

Standard errors are in parentheses. *$p < 0.05$, **$p < 0.01$, ***$p < 0.001$.
Country dummies are reported in the Supplementary file Table S2 and can be found at https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755048318000810.



FIGURE 3. Mediated effects of religiosity (mediators: social justice values) *Source*: The chart shows average mediated effects and percentage of indirect effects explained. Source: Inglehart et al. (2016).

those that propose a negative relationship between egalitarian distributive preferences and support for democracy? The next section presents additional analyses to check the robustness of these initial results.

ROBUST ANALYSIS

Several additional models test the robustness of the results as presented below and in the supplemental file. The first robustness test aims to rule out the possibility of a positive correlation between benevolence and support for authoritarianism. The operationalization of intrinsic support indirectly accounts for attitudes toward authoritarian regimes by using a survey item that probes the respondents' views about desirability of a leader that does not have to bother with a parliament or elections. However, the statistical analysis does not provide a direct test of support for authoritarian political systems. As discussed above, religious individuals may prefer a benevolent dictator who can implement social justice policies to a democratic leader who is less pro-justice.

It is well known that in some Muslim-majority countries, authoritarian leaders use welfare generating distributive mechanisms to quell popular discontent and they make references to religion as they implement these policies (Yom and Gause 2012). Since authoritarian governments may target charity and economic redistribution benefiting the poor for boosting regime legitimacy, religiously inspired social justice values may lead to support for these governments if citizens perceive these benevolent policies with a positive outlook. Thus, it is imperative to carry this additional test to rule out any spurious relation concerning the statistical significance of direct and mediating effects of social justice values on support for democracy.

To that end, I created an additive index measuring support for non-democratic political systems using three questions that ask the respondents whether they believe it is very good or very bad (four-point scale) to have (i) a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections, (ii) military rule, and (iii) experts making decisions.[11] Table 3 reports the results of this SUR estimation using support for authoritarian systems as the dependent variable in the third equation (model 4).

The results for the first part of the mediation analysis linking religiosity to benevolence and distributive preferences (H1a, H2a) and for the third mediation between benevolence to distributive justice (H2b) remain unchanged. However, neither religiosity nor distributive justice orientations and benevolent attitudes exert any direct effect on support for authoritarianism. This result confirms the robustness of the correlation between these indicators and support for democracy by ruling out any formative effect of religiosity and social justice values on support for authoritarianism.

To further probe into the robustness of the results, I follow two strategies. First, assuming that mediation does not rule out endogeneity[12] between the two variables measuring social justice perceptions and possibly introduce bias in the direction of the statistical effects, I run two alternative specifications including only one indicator of social justice values in each model. In these specifications, the direct effects of religiosity and benevolence/distributive preferences as well as the indirect effects remain unchanged corroborating the effect of economic egalitarian values on regime preferences. Second, I added a fourth equation predicting support for authoritarianism to the original model estimations (Tables 1 and 2) to account for possible dependency between support for democracy and authoritarianism. The results remain robust to these alternative strategies and confirm that the direct effects of religion on both benevolence

Table 3. Seemingly unrelated regression estimations: Muslim support for authoritarianism and democracy

	Model 4: Support for authoritarianism			Model 5: Support for democracy (rights)		
	Equation (1)	Equation (2)	Equation (3)	Equation (1)	Equation (2)	Equation (3)
	Benevolence	Distributive justice	Support for authoritarianism	Benevolence	Distributive justice	Support for democracy (rights)
Mediated effects						
Religiosity	1.022*** (0.000)	0.0824*** (0.000)	−0.0814 (0.369)	0.970*** (0.000)	0.0823*** (0.000)	0.305*** (0.001)
Benevolence		0.00659** (0.003)	−0.0141 (0.141)		0.00672** (0.002)	0.147*** (0.000)
Distributive justice			0.0191 (0.579)			0.178*** (0.000)
Control variables						
Female		−0.0143 (0.067)	0.0137 (0.698)		−0.00625 (0.404)	0.237*** (0.000)
Age		0.00000926 (0.975)	−0.000824 (0.528)		−0.0000433 (0.881)	0.000296 (0.814)
Education		−0.00813*** (0.000)	0.000324 (0.969)		−0.00738*** (0.000)	0.0201* (0.012)
Income		−0.0308*** (0.000)	0.0541*** (0.000)		−0.0314*** (0.000)	−0.0113 (0.185)
Personal trust			0.0515 (0.231)			−0.0360 (0.383)
Egalitarian gender beliefs			0.233*** (0.000)			−0.299*** (0.000)
Constant	8.203*** (0.000)	1.141*** (0.000)	4.527*** (0.000)	8.334*** (0.000)	1.144*** (0.000)	6.371*** (0.000)
Fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	16,121	16,121	16,121	17,367	17,367	17,367
R^2	0.681	0.0991	0.118	0.689	0.107	0.0865

Standard errors are in parentheses. *$p < 0.05$, **$p < 0.01$, ***$p < 0.001$.
Country dummies are reported in the Supplementary file Table S3 and can be found at https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755048318000810.

and distributive preferences and mediating effect of these values on support for democracy is positive and statistically significant.

Another criticism can be directed toward the content validity of the dependent variables. The three measures of support for democracy used in the estimations represent perceptions about the political, economic, and electoral dimensions of democracy. This operationalization strategy neglects the civil rights dimension. Among the most important criterion of democracy are "legal freedom to formulate and advocate political alternatives with concomitant rights to free association, free speech, and other basic freedoms of the person" (Linz 1978, 5). Egalitarian preferences may be related to socioeconomic rights that are necessary for exercising all political rights, because individuals with material resources are expected to have higher level of political cognition (Inglehart and Welzel 2005). Egalitarian preferences and benevolent attitudes may increase support for democracy through this indirect mechanism enabling the exercise of political rights.

To account for the "rights" dimension of support for democracy, I created an alternative measure combining responses to two questions: civil rights protect people's liberty against oppression, and in democracies women have the same rights as men (each question has a scale ranging from essential (1) to not essential for democracy (10)). The results in Table 3 (model 5) lend further support to the theoretical mechanisms proposed here. Regardless of the dimension of democratic support, Islamic social justice values increase support for democracy directly and through mediation mechanisms.

Additional analyses include model specifications that use the same control variables for both models predicting social justice values (in equations (1) and (2) of the SUR system). The results also remain robust to these alternative model specifications. Overall, we can be quite confident that Muslim religiosity is positively related to intrinsic support for democracy when we account for the mediating mechanism of religiously informed social justice values. Religion induces egalitarian distributive preferences and holding these values in turn engender support for democracy in Muslim-majority societies.

CONCLUSION

Benevolence and egalitarian distributive preferences lies at the heart of Islamic social justice conceptions (Shariati 1979; Qutb 2000; Ramadan

2004). This study shows that these social justice values are highly relevant in explaining support for democracy in the Muslim world. In addition to their direct effects, benevolent attitudes and egalitarian preferences mediate the effect of religiosity on democratic orientations. This is an important finding, because it resolves some of the ambivalence found in quantitative studies of Muslim political attitudes dealing with the micro foundations of Islam and democracy (Tessler 2002; Ciftci 2010).

The analysis presented here also validates a positive association between Muslim religiosity and intrinsic support for democracy. The results imply that religious Muslims are supportive of democracy not only for extrinsic reasons, but also for democracy's intrinsic value and its certain qualities like free and fair elections or protection of rights. Subsequently, the empirical analysis allows the author to refute the claims of the essentialist argument putting Islam and democracy at odds (Gellner 1991; Huntington 1993; Kedourie 1994; Lewis 2010).

A second contribution of this paper concerns the relevance of values in explaining Muslim political attitudes (Ciftci 2013; Spierings 2014a). Social justice is one of the central concepts of Islamic ethico-political system. This study finds that two Islamic social justice principles, benevolence and attitudes toward economic egalitarianism, engender pluralistic ideas among the pious Muslims. The analysis finds a robust relationship between both perceptions of benevolence and egalitarian distributive preferences and democratic orientations. As such, they lend further credence to the instrumental role of religiously inspired values in forming Muslim political attitudes.

Theoretical scholarship on Islam and democracy argues that principles of legal methodology like *ijtihad* and *ijma* or scriptural principles like *shura* can form the basis for democratic governance (Esposito and Voll 1996). These principles are used to justify flexible interpretations of Islam that makes human-made legislation possible according to the evolving political conditions (Sachedina 2001; Ramadan 2004). This study adds to this literature by showing that social justice values promoting egalitarian distributive principles and benevolence (*ihsan*) can also form the basis of pluralistic ideas among ordinary men and women in Muslim-majority societies.

In an age of global inequality and massive discontent where demands about human dignity and social justice became widespread in the Muslim world, this study opens a new window into understanding Muslim political preferences toward democratic governance. It implies that authoritarian regimes repressing Islamist movements or violent models of Islamic statehood with authoritarian credentials may have no resonance among the ordinary Muslim men and women. Muslim

publics prefer democracy and rather than being impediments, religiously inspired social justice principles can engender the pluralistic ideas underlying democratic governance in the Muslim world.

SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL

The supplementary material for this article can be found at https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755048318000810.

NOTES

1. For an exception see Spierings (2014b) who examines the triangular relation between Islam, support for democracy and gender equality. Although Spierings' model includes mediated effect of religion via egalitarian gender views, his statistical model utilizes multiple ordinary least squares regression estimations rather than mediation analysis.
2. Today, state-run zakat systems are implemented in Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, and Pakistan, but their efficiency is questioned by some scholars (Kuran 2004).
3. However, Islamist parties may also support neo-liberal economic policies and cater to the bourgeois class as one can see in the example of Justice and Development Party in Turkey (Öniş 2006).
4. This conclusion does not necessarily assume that wealth redistribution is a prerequisite of democracy or that democracies always reduce inequality. In effect, some studies find that the ameliorative effect of democracy on inequality is not robust (Gradstein and Milanovic 2004; Scheve and Stasavage 2012). Despite possible institutional and policy constraints, a large body of scholarship finds a strong correlation between democracy and higher tax rates or higher real wages (Rodrik 1999; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006).
5. In this paper, I use *shari'a* in its broadest meaning as a way of life, as all regulations, rules, procedures or principles that help a devout Muslim to live his/her life according to Islam (Hefner 2011). This definition is different from the modern understanding of *shari'a* that limits it to a subset of legal principles about family, women, and criminal law (see Hallaq (2009) for a similar treatment).
6. Explanations of the terms in parentheses are taken from several English translations of the Qur'an.
7. The fieldwork was conducted between 2010 and 2014. This wave includes 20 Muslim-majority countries, but since questions of interest were not asked in all countries, the final estimation contains 16–19 countries.
8. "Control Variables-1" include age, education, and income. "Control variables-2" include the first set of controls as well as personal trust and egalitarian gender beliefs. These model specifications are selected based on the theoretical expectations and the mediation mechanisms. The results are robust to alternative specifications that include the same set of control variables in all equations.
9. The results of the factor analyses are available from the author upon request.
10. Other items evaluating the desire for building a humane society, justifiability of government provision of benefits, and importance of responsibility as a quality in children neither load strongly on any of the social justice dimensions nor they are consistently asked in all countries.
11. All items load strongly on a single dimension in factor analyses.
12. It should be noted that the original models also account for possible endogeneity stemming from the correlation between benevolence and distributive justice preferences. Since these models add a third mediation path linking benevolence to distributive justice preferences, any correlation that may cause a spurious association is ruled out through this mediation mechanism.

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Hiding behind the party brand or currying favor with constituents: Why do representatives engage in different types of constituency-oriented behavior?

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Abstract
Why do representatives prioritize certain types of constituency service in parliamentary systems? This study argues that the choice for constituency-oriented activities is conditioned by both partisan factors and legislative role orientations. Two novel data sets combining behavioral and attitudinal measures of constituency-oriented behavior are used for empirical tests: an elite survey including detailed interviews with 204 members of the Turkish parliament and 4000 parliamentary questions tabled by these members. The results from a series of ordered logit, ordinary least squares (OLS), and negative binomial regression estimations confirm that members of parliament choose different types of constituency-oriented activities based on their visibility to the party leadership and their constituency. This choice is primarily driven by partisanship and members of parliament's perceptions about the influence of party leader in renomination. The analysis provides important insights about the role of partisan factors as drivers of parliamentary behavior.

Keywords
constituency service, legislative roles, parliamentary questions, party leaders, Turkish parliament

Introduction

There is a plethora of research confirming the importance of constituency service in parliamentary systems (Denemark, 2000; Kerevel, 2015; Lancaster, 1986; Soroka et al., 2009; Strøm, 1997; Tavits, 2009). However, our understanding of why representatives choose one type of constituency service over others, especially in parliamentary systems, remains meager. Representatives may engage in different kinds of constituency-oriented activities like ensuring the provision of benefits to a district, spending time to help constituents, pursuing public investments for an electoral district, or by asking constituency-centered parliamentary questions (PQs) on the floor. Why do members of parliament (MPs) choose to pursue different types of constituency-oriented activities? Which institutional and partisan factors affect this choice?

We argue that MPs' choice for engaging in different types of constituency service will be primarily driven by legislative role orientations and partisanship. We map these factors to constituency service activities based on their visibility to the party leadership and the constituents to generate several testable hypotheses about parliamentary behavior. It is proposed that representatives holding constituency-centered roles should be more likely to engage in activities that directly engage the constituents and less likely to spend time on activities appealing the party leadership compared to the MPs holding partisan roles. We offer two hypotheses related to partisanship. First, MPs will engage in constituency service activities

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satisfying the party leadership if they perceive the party leader as the most influential actor in renomination. Second, representatives whose ideological preferences deviate from the average party ideology should pursue constituency-oriented activities that are visible to their constituents. Furthermore, we argue that the behavior of MPs will differ along the partisan lines.

We use two novel data sets to conduct empirical tests of these hypotheses. The first data set includes detailed interviews with 204 members of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM) conducted during the 22nd legislative term (2002–2007). The second data set covers over 4000 PQs tabled by these MPs. The Turkish case provides an opportunity for examining the question in hand in the context of an emerging party system and high level of competition among MPs for renomination during the 22nd term.

The results of multivariate estimations show that constituency-minded representatives frequently engage in activities increasing their visibility among the constituents (constituency hour and pork-barrel politics). This dynamic is especially prevalent among members of the opposition party. MPs who believe that party leadership has the most influence in candidate selection, however, are more likely to ask PQs than spending their times in solving the problems of constituents or engaging in pork-barrel activities. These results remain robust to several alternative specifications.

Our analysis corroborates the utility of a new method that uses nonlegislative parliamentary activities for measuring representational focus while at the same time showing the effect of self-reported role conceptions and partisanship on parliamentary behavior. This study provides a highly nuanced explanation about the reasons for MPs' swaying between the party and the constituency in parliamentary systems and provides important insights about democratic representation. We make a novel contribution to the literature by highlighting the effect of perceived strength of party leadership on parliamentary behavior.

Legislative role orientations and constituency service

There is no dearth of scholarship on constituency-oriented behavior in democratic systems (Cain et al., 1984; Fenno, 1978; Mayhew, 1974; Shepsle and Weingast, 1981). While studies of the American Congress have focused on the electoral advantages of constituency-oriented behavior, most research in the European context has examined parliamentary roles and socialization.

The distinction between the two research traditions, however, is stylistic and generally overstated. Earlier research on constituency-oriented behavior in parliamentary systems has highlighted role orientations (Searing, 1994; Wahlke et al., 1962). In an astute analysis of parliamentary roles, Strøm (1997) argued that MPs are rational individuals who try to use their scarce resources to attain four hierarchically ordered career goals: reselection, reelection, party office, and legislative office. Following Strøm's approach, we assume that reselection and reelection are the two most important goals for MPs motivating them to engage in different types of constituency-oriented activities.

Given the complex situation an MP faces in decision-making, a distinction between constituency service that requires considerable amount of time and investment, such as spending hours to help constituency in solving their problems, and those that require minimal effort but are highly visible to party leadership, such as asking PQs about constituency-related issues, gains a great deal of importance. For example, tabling PQs in legislative sessions provides backbench MPs with the opportunity of "being noticed by party leadership" with the added advantage of sending a signal to local supporters (Franklin and Norton, 1993; Rush and Giddings, 2011: 88). PQs are less time-consuming activities compared to the constituency service activities that require direct contact, a good deal of time, and continuous efforts by the MPs.

If an MP prefers to be a "constituency servant" (Searing, 1994), she may choose to engage in activities requiring significant time and effort. MPs may also find strategic value in this type of constituency service to appeal to the party leadership. Party leaders, presumably, value constituency service for increased electoral gains in a given district (Lancaster, 1986; Strøm, 1997). While it may be difficult to allocate an MP's contribution to specific electoral gains in multimember districts, party leaders are usually well aware of MPs' activities through primaries, communications with local party branches, and informal channels. While this logic should apply to all representatives in parliamentary systems, MPs from opposition parties may especially engage in this behavior to increase their chances of reelection by winning the trust of the party leader and gaining new voters in the district. Therefore, MPs holding constituency-centered roles will frequently engage in activities to boost their image as a constituency servant and to increase their chances of office through credit-claiming (Kerevel, 2015).

A similar dynamic could also be in place for a special type of "low-cost high-gain" constituency service: pork barrel. A pork-barrel project is attractive because it allocates funds toward an electoral district with minimal cost to the inhabitants while at the same time increasing the worth of the representative (Weingast et al., 1981). Although this mechanism will be less visible in large districts where the effect of electoral marginality and credit claiming may be more dubious, MPs may be able to delineate their efforts from the others by engaging in a signaling game with the central party organization. Especially, representatives from the ruling party will be more likely to pursue pork for their district since they have a better chance of obtaining these,

given their party's control over investment resources relative to opposition MPs (Golden and Picci, 2008).

Overall, a representative banking on the reputation of being "constituency servant" will engage in service activities that demand significant time and effort. Through increased contact with the constituents, the MP is likely to increase her worth to the party and earn credibility in the eyes of her supporters. MPs holding partisan roles will pursue activities that are easily visible to the party leaders. One such activity is asking constituency-oriented PQs. Asking PQs is not as time intensive as other activities requiring direct contact with the constituents. However, a representative asking constituency-oriented PQs signals to the party leaders that she cares about constituents and actively pursue their interests. Since PQs are generally used to obtain information about government policies, it is more likely that this tool will be more frequently utilized by opposition MPs who hold a constituency-oriented role (Green-Pedersen, 2010).[1] We propose the following hypotheses based on the preceding discussion:

H1: MPs holding a constituency-oriented role will be more likely to engage in constituency service activities that require direct contact with the constituents than those holding a partisan role.

H2: MPs holding a constituency-oriented role will be less likely to ask constituency-oriented PQs than those holding a partisan role.

H3: MPs holding a constituency-oriented role will be more likely to pursue pork-barrel projects than those holding a partisan role.

H4: MPs from the opposition parties who hold a constituency-oriented role will be more likely to ask constituency-oriented PQs relative to the members of the ruling party.

Partisanship, perceptions, and constituency service

Ideology and the influence of party leaders in candidate selection may play a significant role in the choice over different types of constituency service (Gallagher and Marsh, 1988; Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997; Schattschneider, 1942). Scholars argue that MPs with strong local ties are more likely to behave independently in parliament (Golden and Picci, 2008; Tavits, 2009, 2010, 2011). Representatives may wish to strengthen their local ties to advance their legislative career, especially when they perceive themselves ideologically distant from the party leadership (Proksch and Slapin, 2012). MPs may compensate for this ideological deviation by pursuing constituency service.[2] The opposition MPs whose ideological position deviates from their party will be particularly motivated to engage in time-intensive constituency service activities due to the intense competition they face within the party and from the ruling party MPs who already hold an advantage. We can thus hypothesize:

H5a: As the distance between an MP's ideological position and average party ideology increases, she will be more likely to pursue constituency service that requires direct contact with the constituents.

H5b: Opposition MPs whose ideological position deviates from the average party position will be more likely to pursue constituency service that requires direct contact with the constituents.

Since reselection serves as a gateway to prospect of reelection, MPs may also weigh the influence of different actors in renomination process before they choose to pursue certain types of constituency service. MPs' perceptions about the role of party leadership in renomination are crucial to understanding this choice. While it may be extremely difficult to empirically separate measures of role orientations from perceptions, we can argue that the two are conceptually distinct. Roles are long-term commitments that are developed as a result of political socialization, whereas perceptions are subjective beliefs about the rules of the game at a given time.

Holding legislative role orientations constant, members of parliament will have different views about the influence of party leaders in renomination process (Crisp et al., 2004; Faas, 2003; Gallagher and Marsh, 1988). When party leadership has full control over renomination, constituency-centered legislative behavior may cater to the party leader or party central administration (Strøm, 1997). If legislative office depends on the absolute support of party leadership, "legislators have little incentive to work hard to improve their visibility in the eyes of the voters" (Jones et al., 2002: 658). In general, however, it is the strategic interaction between individual legislators, party leadership, and constituents that shapes the parliamentary behavior of deputies (Hennl, 2014). The role of party leaders in this interaction is supported by the most recent studies finding that the impact of partisan activities on renomination cannot be ignored (Frech, 2016; Hermansen, 2018). We can expect MPs to engage in parliamentary activities according to their views of party leadership strength. When an MP subjectively assigns more weight to the party leadership vis-à-vis the constituents and local actors in renomination, she will engage in activities that are less time consuming but visible to the party leadership (e.g. PQs) than those requiring time and may bear fruit in the long term (e.g. constituency help).

H6: MPs who believe that party leadership has the most influence in candidate selection will be more likely to ask constituency-oriented PQs than engaging in other constituency activities.

Alternative explanations

In addition to the above factors, district size, MPs' rank in the party list, and socioeconomic characteristics of the district may also inform the choice about different types of constituency service. MPs ranked lower in the party list should engage in activities that require direct contact with the constituents. We expect that MPs from smaller districts will engage in all types of constituency service more frequently than those in large districts. MPs from districts with low socioeconomic development should prefer asking constituency-oriented PQs and pursuing investments (pork barrel) for their constituents. We also control for gender of the MPs in the statistical estimations.

Constituency service in Turkey

Constituency service may increase MPs' electoral worth by increasing their personal vote base. This may particularly be evident in countries where a proportional closed-list electoral system is used and legislative turnover is relatively high such as in Turkey (Sayari and Hasanov, 2008; Somit et al., 1994). It is also known that party switching is not uncommon in the Turkish system (Turan et al., 2005). Thus, candidates may enjoy some power to maneuver between different parties, thanks to their worth among the constituents.

There is some empirical evidence confirming that individual legislators pursue different types of constituency service in the Turkish context. These include promoting the interests of the constituency, helping constituents go through bureaucratic difficulties, and finding jobs (Kalaycioglu, 1995), and MPs engagement with their constituents (Hazama, 2005; Ciftci, Forrest, and Tekin, 2008). The timing of the survey used in this study provides additional justification for investigating the choice for different types of constituency service in Turkey. The fieldwork for this survey was carried at the beginning of the 22nd legislative term (2002–2007). The post-2002 environment left Turkey with a nascent party system and a high level of uncertainty due to the unexpected transition to a new political reality in 2002. It is possible that MPs from the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the opposition Republican People's Party (CHP) would have given priority to constituency service activities to build a reputation in their electoral district.

This turbulent period, therefore, introduces important variation in parliamentary role orientations and perceptions of the MPs. Under these conditions, MPs can be expected to sway between the constituents and the party or in some cases engage in different types of constituency service activities that appeal to both. Overall, the Turkish case provides several opportunities for testing the effects of parliamentary roles and partisanship on the choice of constituency service.

Data and variables

We take advantage of two novel data sets for empirical analysis. The first data set is a survey conducted with 204 members of the Turkish parliament in 2003–2004. The second data set is a collection of 4000 oral PQs asked during the same term by these MPs. These novel data sets provide significant leverage for explaining MPs' choice for constituency-oriented service by combining attitudinal and behavioral indicators of parliamentary activities.

Elite surveys can provide useful information for understanding the motives of the legislators engaging in constituency-oriented behavior (Cain et al., 1984; Heitshusen et al., 2005; Martin, 2010; Wood, 2007). Self-reported role conceptions and legislative priorities as reported in elite surveys allow vigorous testing of principal motives behind parliamentary behavior. However, elite surveys do not capture the actual behavior of the parliamentarians. By observing representatives during their work hours in the parliament, PQs provide direct evidence about representative behavior (Martin, 2011). Tabling constituency-oriented PQs may signal the priorities of representatives in allocating their time and limited resources to different tasks.[3] We operationalize different types of constituency service activities by combining attitudinal and behavioral measures.

Dependent variables: We use several measures of constituency-oriented behavior. Our first measure is the simple count of constituency-oriented PQs. The 1982 Turkish Constitution and TBMM's rules of procedure refer to written and oral PQs as means of obtaining information about certain issues from the prime minister or the council of ministers. According to the rules of procedure, at least two working days of every week is reserved as a special time for oral questions. The MP asking the question may request further information on the floor the day her question is addressed. While opposition MPs commonly use PQs to criticize government policies or signal their loyalty to the party, PQs can also serve as an instrument for pursuing constituency service by all MPs (Hazama et al., 2007: 547). In our sample, constituency-oriented PQs are 35% of all questions asked.[4] While only 11% of AKP members ask at least one constituency-oriented question, this ratio is 80% for MPs from the opposition party.

A team of two researchers participated in the collection and coding of the PQs after receiving intense training.[5] These PQs were hand coded and classified as constituency oriented when (i) cities and/or towns are mentioned, (ii) issues that are specifically related to an electoral province are mentioned, and (iii) the question wording referred to organizations and events that are located in the electoral province. We present two examples of constituency-oriented PQs below.[6]

Table 1. Measures of constituency service.

Variable	Item/survey question	Constituency or party focus	Scale
Constituency PQs	Count of constituency-oriented parliamentary questions asked by the MP	Party leadership	0–665 Mean = 11
Constituency hours	On average, how many hours do you spend listening and dealing with the problems of your constituents in a given week?	Constituency	1–75 Mean = 27
Constituency help	How much time did you devote to help solve the constituents' problems in the current legislative term?	Constituency	1 = *Not at all* to 5 = *A great deal* Mean = 3.8
Constituency dialogue	How much time did you devote to establish and strengthen the dialogue with your constituents?	Constituency	1 = *Not at all* to 5 = *A great deal* Mean = 3.7
Pork barrel	How much time did you devote to increase the amount of public investments in your district?	Constituency and party leadership	1 = *Not at all* to 5 = *A great deal* Mean = 3.4

Note: MP: member of parliament; PQ: parliamentary question.

"Regarding the *Konya* Oncology Hospital" (March 13, 2007), Ahmet Isik (MP-Konya province).

"Regarding the housing projects in the province of *Igdir*" (January 24, 2007), Yucel Artantas (MP-Igdir province).

Other measures of constituency service are based on self-reported measures from the survey of Turkish parliamentarians. Questionnaires were first sent to all 550 members in late 2003 and a follow-up was conducted in early 2004. In total, 204 completed responses were received (i.e. a response rate of 37%). The survey produced a highly representative sample with respect to party affiliation, gender, age, and electoral districts. For example, as of fall of 2003, 65% of the MPs in TBMM were from AKP and 35% from CHP corresponding to the ratios of 66% and 34% in the survey, respectively.

Table 1 presents the five dependent variables used in the analysis. The self-reported measures of constituency service tap different activities ranging from average weekly hours spent with constituents (constituency hours) to pork-barrel activities. Some of these activities are visible to party leadership and some require direct contact with the supporters of MPs. The MPs reported that they spend a weekly average of 27 h in dealing with constituents' problems and give priority to helping and building dialogue with the constituents (mean score of 3.7 on a scale ranging from 1 to 5). Some MPs prefer to spend their time on pursuing public investments for their district (pork barrel), a low-cost activity that is also visible to party leadership.

Independent variables: To measure legislative role orientations, we use the following question from the survey:

When there is a conflict between the party interest and the interests of the people in your district, what would be your preference on a scale ranging from 1 to 10 with 1 being "*always prefer party interest*" and 10 being "*always prefer interests of people in the district*"?

At higher values of this variable, we expect that MPs will ask fewer constituency-oriented PQs but will be more likely to engage in activities requiring direct contact with the constituents. We operationalize partisanship with three variables: deviation from the party ideology, perceptions of party leader's influence in candidate selection, and opposition status. The survey asked the respondents to specify their ideological position on a 10-point scale ranging from 1 (*most left*) to 10 (*most right*). We calculated the absolute distance between the ideological position of the respondent and that of the median member of the party to measure ideology in relation to the average score of the party.[7] We expect that as an MP's ideology aligns closer with the party she will be more likely to ask constituency-oriented PQs that are visible to the party leadership.

We use two survey questions to measure the perceptions of MPs about the influence of party leadership and other party branches on renomination:

In the last election, what was the influence of the following actors in candidate selection? (1—*not at all effective* and 8—*a great deal of influence*)

1. party leader and central party administration
2. party general congress.

In addition to these two questions, the survey also asked about MPs' perceptions related to the influence of local party branches, local party members, and supporters in the district in candidate selection. We prefer to use perceptions of party general congress on candidate selection as a proxy for the influence of local actors for both theoretical and empirical reasons. Theoretically, party general congress represents the total effect of local actors in intraparty

politics to the extent that it provides a setting where local branches, party members, and local actors can shape party's future. As the highest authority composed of representatives from local party organizations, party congresses meet periodically (1–3 years). The Turkish intraparty competition and management of factions take place during the party general congresses, which are nationally televised and subject of great media attention. Candidates vying for party leadership and for control of central party apparatus compete fiercely to appeal to local actors. Empirically, responses to items evaluating the influence of local party actors are highly correlated and their inclusion in the statistical models results in loss of efficiency in estimation due to a high degree of correlation.[8] Thus, we keep perceptions about leadership and congress in the models and treat questions about the perceptions of other actors as reference category in the statistical estimations.

The survey responses to these two questions are distributed very similarly for the members of the ruling and the opposition parties. However, the data reveal some variation in responses within each party. It is possible that MPs' perceptions about party leaders differ due to a high level of uncertainty and election of a large number of first-time representatives in the post-2002 environment. The observed variance in perceptions of party general congress might be the result of different weights assigned to local dynamics in candidate selection. Although primaries that give more power to local actors were not common in Turkey at the time of the survey,[9] local dynamics have mattered and have been closely monitored by the central party. We expect that representatives who perceive the party leader and central party administration to be most influential in candidate selection will choose to engage in constituency service activities that cater to the party leadership (constituency-oriented PQs and pork barrel). MPs who perceive the party general congress to be more influential will engage in activities that require direct contact and investment with the constituency.

Finally, we control for government-opposition status with a dichotomous variable (members of opposition party CHP are coded as 1 and those of AKP as 0). Due to the high pressure on MPs toward reelection, we expect that opposition MPs will be more likely to pursue to time-intensive constituency service activities relative to pursuance of pork-barrel projects compared to the ruling party MPs.

We use a question asking the respondents whether they live in their districts (1) or not (0). District size, rank of placement in the party list, and an interaction term between these variables are included to control for the effect of electoral institutions. Our models also include the age and gender (*female* is equal to 1) of the MPs and the logged gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in US dollar for each district obtained from the Turkish Statistical Institute (TUIK). Before conducting the empirical analysis, we collapse PQs by MPs and then match these with the survey data. The summary statistics for the independent variables in the model are presented in the Online Supplemental.

Results

We first present the estimation results for the base models incorporating indicators of legislative role orientations, ideology, and control variables in Table 2. Model 1 runs negative binomial regression because the dependent variable (number of constituency-oriented PQs) includes a large number of zeros with highly over dispersed data (variance larger than mean). Model 2 uses OLS regression and models 3 to 5 utilize ordered probit.

In all models, the main predictor of constituency-oriented role perception (conflict: party vs. constituency) is significant. Models 2 to 5 clearly show that those who prioritize constituency role over partisan roles are more likely to perform constituency-oriented activities demanding time and direct contact with the constituents. This variable takes a negative sign in model 1 to confirm our suspicion that MPs with constituency-centered roles are less likely to ask PQs. Together, these results confirm hypotheses 1 to 3.

Ideological distance from the party median appears to be statistically significant in models 2 and 3. Thus, representatives whose ideology deviates from that of party's spend more time in dealing with constituents' problems but less time in lobbying for local investment. This is highly intuitive; lobbying for pork requires one to be highly constituency oriented and at the same time to have strong connections with party leadership. Although demands for local investment by ideologically distant MPs may be met with great suspicion, the image of "a delivering representative" may be indicative of MP's increasing value to the party leaders that presumably want to increase party's vote share in that district.[10] MPs from the opposition party (CHP) are significantly less likely to perform constituency-oriented activities, except for asking PQs. Since we hypothesized that MPs from the opposition party will prefer to engage in constituency service activities requiring more time and direct contact with the constituents, this finding remains at odds with our expectations (hypotheses 4 and 5b). We explore this finding in more detail in the split sample analysis below.

Institutional variables exert some influence on the choice of different types of constituency service. An MP placed lower in the ballot is more likely to ask PQs, provide help to constituents, and spend more time in establishing dialogue with them relative to an MP placed higher in the list. This effect is moderated by the district size in the negative direction. This result implies that MPs who are placed at lower ranks in the party list will engage in all kinds of constituency service but they will be less likely to do so if they are elected from larger districts.

Table 2. Determinants of constituency service (base models).

	Model 1 Constituency-oriented PQs	Model 2 Constituency hours	Model 3 Pork barrel	Model 4 Constituency help	Model 5 Constituency dialogue
Legislative role orientations					
Conflict	−0.14** (0.05)	1.06** (0.48)	0.075** (0.03)	0.085** (0.04)	0.076** (0.03)
Partisanship					
Ideological distance	0.030 (0.10)	2.89*** (0.74)	−0.21*** (0.07)	0.094 (0.10)	0.038 (0.06)
Opposition status (CHP)	4.01*** (0.49)	−7.97*** (2.84)	−0.19 (0.20)	−0.32 (0.20)	−0.38* (0.20)
Control variables					
List order	0.57*** (0.17)	1.66 (1.05)	0.10 (0.07)	0.24*** (0.09)	0.14* (0.08)
District size	−0.014 (0.04)	0.28 (0.35)	0.0015 (0.03)	0.067** (0.03)	0.032 (0.03)
District size list order	−0.035*** (0.01)	−0.11* (0.05)	−0.0076** (0.00)	−0.015*** (0.00)	−0.0099** (0.00)
Lives in district	0.30 (0.26)	−2.66 (2.93)	0.16 (0.18)	0.29 (0.21)	0.14 (0.18)
Logged GDP	−0.037 (0.35)	2.39 (2.63)	−0.24 (0.20)	−0.31* (0.19)	0.20 (0.19)
Education	0.045 (0.12)	−0.65 (1.07)	−0.13* (0.07)	−0.075 (0.07)	−0.14 (0.09)
Female	0.49 (0.90)	−3.97 (5.01)	0.21 (0.26)	−0.082 (0.30)	0.084 (0.33)
Total PQ	0.011* (0.01)				
Constant	−1.90 (2.63)	5.85 (21.47)			
Ln α	0.45** (0.23)				
Cut 1			−3.29** (1.52)	−2.89* (1.58)	0.11 (1.48)
Cut 2			−2.56* (1.53)	−2.06 (1.56)	0.93 (1.48)
Cut 3			−1.85 (1.53)	−1.28 (1.56)	1.51 (1.48)
Cut 4			−1.23 (1.53)	−0.55 (1.56)	2.27 (1.48)
Observations	190	186	190	176	190
Model	Negative binomial	OLS regression	Ordered probit	Ordered probit	Ordered probit

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. PQ: parliamentary question.
*$p < 0.1$; **$p < 0.05$; ***$p < 0.01$.

Table 3 adds the perception-based measures of partisanship to the empirical models. We present the results for three dependent variables, constituency-oriented PQs, constituency hours, and pork-barrel activities, for a focused analysis.[11] The results remain unchanged with the addition of two variables controlling for perceptions of MPs about candidate selection procedures as seen in Table 3. MPs who prioritize constituency interest over party interest are more likely to spend time with constituents and lobby for local investment and less likely to ask constituency-oriented PQs. Similar to the results presented in Table 2, ideological distance from the party median is statistically significant for constituency hour ($p < 0.05$) and pork-barrel models ($p < 0.01$); however, the latter has a negative sign.

As expected, MPs who believe that party leadership is the most influential actor in candidate selection are more likely to ask constituency-oriented PQs in parliament but are less likely to lobby for local investment and spend time for solving the problems of constituents (hypothesis 5). On the other hand, MPs who perceive the party general congress to be somewhat stronger in nomination decisions are less likely to ask constituency-oriented PQs ($p < 0.05$) as well as to lobby for local investments. Since party general congress represents the combined power of local party, it is not surprising to observe that MPs who view the general congress to be more powerful in nomination process ask fewer constituency-oriented PQs. However, this perception neither makes MPs more likely to engage in pork-barrel activities nor it makes them more conducive to spend time with their constituents. Overall, it is the perceptions about party leadership's role in reselection, not the views about the role of other actors in this process, that drive the choice for the type of constituency service in the Turkish context.

To present substantive magnitudes for these effects, we calculate the predictive margins at different values of each variable for the models in Table 2. These are effects of the main variables on the likelihood of different types of constituency service in our estimations. By and large, Figure 1 shows that an MP's choice for different types of constituency service can be explained by the effect of legislative role orientations and her perceptions about the strength of party leadership in reselection process. When a representative favors constituents, she becomes less likely to ask constituency-centered PQs catering to the party leadership. The margin of error becomes smaller for this effect as the narrow confidence intervals reveal. For constituency hours, we observe relatively larger substantive effects in the expected direction. MPs conceiving the party leadership as the most influential actor in renomination are significantly less likely to spend constituency service hours (approximately 10 h less in a week). Thus, while MPs choose highly time-intensive constituency service

Table 3. Determinants of constituency service (full models).

	Model 1 Constituency-oriented PQs	Model 2 Constituency hours	Model 3 Pork barrel
Legislative role orientations			
Conflict	−0.15** (0.06)	1.06** (0.49)	0.087*** (0.03)
Partisanship			
Ideological distance	0.091 (0.10)	3.26*** (0.75)	−0.19*** (0.07)
Influence of party leadership	0.33** (0.16)	−1.45* (0.83)	−0.14*** (0.05)
Influence of party general congress	−0.088** (0.04)	−0.98*** (0.36)	−0.031 (0.03)
Opposition status (CHP)	4.10*** (0.41)	−8.56*** (2.82)	−0.20 (0.20)
Control variables			
List order	0.59*** (0.17)	1.91* (1.04)	0.12* (0.07)
District size	−0.033 (0.04)	0.27 (0.34)	0.0070 (0.03)
District size * list order	−0.033*** (0.01)	−0.12** (0.05)	−0.0088** (0.00)
Lives in district	0.21 (0.25)	−2.84 (2.90)	0.14 (0.18)
Log GDP	0.15 (0.31)	3.55 (2.68)	−0.24 (0.21)
Education	0.068 (0.11)	−0.50 (1.06)	−0.13* (0.07)
Female	0.20 (0.89)	−4.84 (4.96)	0.20 (0.28)
Total PQs	0.010** (0.00)		
Constant	−5.08* (2.63)	9.23 (22.84)	
Ln α	0.34 (0.23)		
Cut 1			−4.19** (1.65)
Cut 2			−3.43** (1.66)
Cut 3			−2.72 (1.66)
Cut 4			−2.08 (1.66)
Observations	190	186	190
Model	Negative binomial	OLS regression	Ordered probit

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. PQ: parliamentary question.
*$p < 0.1$; **$p < 0.05$; ***$p < 0.01$.

activities, they may be less likely to do so if they view their party leader as the ultimate authority for renomination.

Finally, the bottom panel in Figure 1 presents the marginal effects from the ordered probit regression in Table 3 (model 8). We present the predicted margins for the minimum and maximum response categories: *not at all* (1) and *a great deal* (5). If an MP holds a constituency-oriented role, the likelihood of pursuing investments for her district increases. However, this difference is statistically meaningful only for these MPs who strongly identify as constituents' man (higher values on the scale). We observe the opposite pattern for the effects associated with perceptions of party leadership. As MPs increasingly view the party leadership to be the most decisive actor in candidate selection, they become less likely to pursue pork barrel but still at a higher rate relative to nonpursuance.

We continue our analysis by presenting the marginal effects of ideology and opposition status on constituency-oriented parliamentary behavior in Figure 2. As an MP's ideological position deviates from that of the median member of her party, she becomes more likely to ask constituency-oriented PQs and more willing to allocate her time to help constituents relative to those whose ideology is closer to the party median. Ideological proximity to the party median, however, increases the likelihood of an MP's engagement in pork-barrel activities that aim to bring economic investments to the district. This effect is statistically meaningful only when the difference between the MP's ideological position and the overall party ideology is minimal. MPs who hold extreme positions in relation to the median member of the party are not more or less likely to engage in this kind of constituency service.

According to Figure 2, MPs from the opposition party (CHP) are more likely to ask constituency-oriented PQs but are less likely to spend time helping their supporters solve problems relative to the members of the ruling party (AKP). The difference between the governing and opposition party MPs presents an interesting puzzle. As Table 4 demonstrates, some differences emerge between the government and opposition MPs.[12] Constituency-oriented role (conflict) increases CHP members' likelihood of spending more time with constituents and pursuing pork-barrel projects for their districts but does not affect the likelihood of asking PQs. These results show that opposition MPs are more conducive to pursuing activities that are highly visible to their constituents. Opposition MPs who are ideologically different from the average party ideology are also more likely to spend time with their constituents. Thus, we find support for hypothesis 5b in our analysis. "Ideological distance" increases the likelihood of asking PQs for the AKP members, but it decreases the likelihood of pursuing pork for CHP members. This difference might be related to



Figure 1. Marginal effects for different types of constituency service. *Note*: Marginal effects are calculated from the models reported in Table 3. The circles show predictive margins for each main effect as specified in the title and the vertical lines show 95% confidence intervals.

the larger odds of obtaining investment projects for governing party MPs relative to the members of opposition. Furthermore, in CHP only models, MPs who believe that the party leader has the most influence in candidate selection are more likely to ask constituency-oriented PQs but less likely to pursue pork-barrel projects. Thus, these divergent patterns in MPs' behavior show that the calculus of representatives may be conditioned by their party's opposition and government status. Despite these findings that lend partial support to our hypotheses about differing behavior of opposition MPs, we interpret the split-sample results cautiously due to the small sample size in each estimation.

Robust analysis

The results are robust to alternative model specifications. For example, in some models we use a question asking about the time devoted for defending party policies to capture partisan role orientations with a different item. Previous research finds that explaining policies to the constituency in the district is the most important partisan role for Turkish MPs (Kim et al., 1984). Adding this alternative measure of partisan role orientation does not change the results. The coefficient for this variable is unsurprisingly positive and statistically significant in predicting activities catering to the party leadership (PQs). The results are also robust to alternative measures of perception-based indicators about the influence of local actors in candidate selection. Adding interaction terms between indicators of legislative role orientations and partisanship to the models does not alter the results.[13]

One can argue that the choices regarding different types of constituency service are not independent. To account for such dependency, we also ran several seemingly unrelated regression estimations between various pairs of the dependent variables. The results are also robust to these specifications. Most of these estimations are presented in the Online Supplemental and additional analyses are available from the authors upon request.

Conclusion

This study contributes to the scholarship on partisanship and representation by examining the determinants of MPs'



Figure 2. Marginal effects: ideology, opposition status and constituency service. *Note*: Marginal effects are calculated from the models reported in Table 3. The circles show predictive margins and the vertical lines show 95% confidence intervals.

Table 4. Determinants of constituency service (split sample analysis).

	Constituency-oriented PQs		Constituency hours		Pork barrel	
	AKP	CHP	AKP	CHP	AKP	CHP
Legislative role orientations						
Conflict	−0.071 (0.12)	0.011 (0.07)	0.24 (0.65)	2.27* (1.23)	0.063 (0.04)	0.19** (0.09)
Partisanship						
Ideological distance	−0.35 (0.31)	−0.027 (0.08)	1.37 (1.41)	4.00** (1.55)	0.15* (0.09)	−0.71*** (0.21)
Influence of party leadership	−0.089 (0.20)	0.41*** (0.13)	−0.54 (1.25)	−1.04 (1.88)	−0.066 (0.07)	−0.44* (0.25)
Influence of party general congress	−0.14 (0.08)	−0.032 (0.04)	−0.82* (0.46)	−0.91 (1.12)	0.016 (0.03)	−0.034 (0.07)
Model	Negative binomial	Negative binomial	OLS regression	OLS regression	Ordered probit	Ordered probit
Observations	125	65	121	65	125	65

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. PQ: parliamentary question.
*$p < 0.1$; **$p < 0.05$; ***$p < 0.01$.

choice for different kinds of constituency-oriented service. No single explanation provides an answer to the puzzle of why legislators choose to engage in different kinds of constituency service activities catering to the constituents or the party. The analysis of attitudinal and behavioral data in the Turkish context reveals that legislative role

orientations, opposition status, and perceptions about party leaders' strength in renomination can be instrumental in understanding why MPs choose to engage in different types of constituency-oriented activities.

The decision to choose a certain type of constituency service activity over others is conditioned by a representative's calculus about her reelection and reselection prospects. In addition to institutional imperatives, how MPs perceive political reality may also be consequential for parliamentary behavior. The analysis shows that legislative role orientations and perceptions about the influence of party leaders in renomination process matter in explaining why MPs choose one type of constituency service over the others. Spending time in the district or helping constituents with their problems can require a great deal of time and effort but at the same time it may increase an MP's worth in the district. Asking constituency-oriented PQs is less time consuming, but it may send a signal to the party leadership in their decisions to renominate from an existing pool of candidates. Furthermore, the analysis also clearly shows that opposition and government MPs may choose to ask PQs or pursue investment projects based on their ideology, role orientations, and perceptions of renomination. These findings imply that the mechanisms of MPs' behavior in parliamentary systems can be much more complex than have been previously assumed (Cain et al, 1984; Denemark, 2000; Strøm, 1997) and that partisan factors might play a large role in this equation.

From a theoretical perspective, the results have several implications. First, the analysis confirms the utility of examining the parliamentary behavior through the lens of legislative role orientations (Searing, 1994; Strøm, 1997; Wahlke et al., 1962), elite perceptions of partisan factors, and party id (Golden and Picci, 2008; Green-Pedersen, 2010). Second, rather than pitting the attitudinal and behavioral indicators of constituency service against each other, using these indicators in conjunction will provide significant leverage in the study of comparative parliamentary behavior. Third, it would be wise to apply the theories of parliamentary politics developed for the advanced Western democracies to nascent political systems with a wavering democratization record. In the age of "democratic recession" (Diamond, 2015) where ruling party leaders are gaining significant political power, investigating the constituency-oriented parliamentary behavior in hybrid regimes such as Turkey will provide important insights about the electoral connection in democratic societies. This endeavor is particularly important in the context of the rising tide of populism and executive dominance in democratic societies.

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Supplemental material

The Supplemental Material for this article is available on the Journal site.

Notes

1. However, as we discuss below, parliamentary questions are also utilized by the members of the ruling party insofar as they increase their visibility in the eyes of the party leaders and the constituents.
2. We join the growing body of research that suggests that candidates who are locally known and have strong ties with the regional constituency will be attractive for parties that seek to increase their vote in the region.
3. Although the Turkish members of parliament have obtained significant financial and office support since 2002, members from both ruling and opposition parties have the same limited means to carry their tasks in relation to the legislators in the American congress.
4. Of the survey respondents, 98 of 135 of the members of the ruling party (AKP) did not ask a question, while this ratio is only 8 of 68 for the opposition members of parliament. We present the distribution of parliamentary questions in the Online Supplemental.
5. The intercoder reliability is above 90%.
6. One example of nonconstituency-related parliamentary question is as follows: "Regarding the initiatives the government will take against global warming" (May 07, 2007), Vezir Akdemir (member of parliament from the province of Izmir).
7. One can suspect that ideological outliers are also party switchers, a condition that may influence the choice of constituency service of members of parliament. We identified 11 party switchers in our data set but did not detect a high correlation between switchers and outliers ($p = 0.37$). We thank one of the anonymous reviewers for bringing this to our attention.
8. When we run separate models with these alternative measures or include all of them in one model, the results remain the

same with marginal differences. These results are presented in Online Supplemental.

9. Recently, center left Republican People's Party (CHP) and Kurdish Nationalist Peoples' Democracy Party (HDP) have used primaries in candidate selection.
10. We thank one of the anonymous reviewers for suggesting this discussion.
11. Most of these results are available in the Online Supplemental. Additional models are available from the authors upon request.
12. Table 3 presents only the abbreviated split sample analysis for the variables of interest. Full sample estimation is reported in the Online Supplemental Table S9a.
13. The results of these robust analyses are presented in the Online Supplemental.

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Islam, Religious Outlooks, and Support for Democracy

Sabri Ciftci[1], F. Michael Wuthrich[2], and Ammar Shamaileh[3]

Abstract

Despite a wealth of studies examining Muslim religiosity and democracy, uncertainty regarding Islam and attitudes toward democracy remains. Although the claims concerning the incompatibility of Islam and democracy are generally discarded, public opinion scholarship has yet to build much further from this important first step or incorporate a strong theoretical framework for analysis beyond this basic foundation. This paper seeks to integrate literature in social theory on religious worldviews with novel conceptualizations and measurement of distinct religious outlooks among the religious faithful to explain patterns in attitudes toward democracy. We construct a theory with clear expectations regarding these relationships and use the largest and best available survey data (Arab Democracy Barometer, Wave III) to test our predictions using latent class analysis and a series of multivariate regression estimations. The results of our empirical analysis reveal that there are important differences among practicing Muslims regarding the role that religion should play in the social realm and that these differences are relevant to the analysis of how faith shapes preferences for regime type and democracy. The analysis makes a significant contribution to the study of religion and political attitudes.

Keywords

Islam and democracy, religiosity, post-Islamism, religious communitarian, latent class analysis, Arab barometer

Introduction

The academic debate regarding Islam and democracy spans several decades, yet the literature tackling facets of this issue has retained elements of uncertainty even to the present. The debate has not suffered from a dearth of scholarship, yet, unlike the developing consensus or stalemate that exists in other areas of political research, it would be hard to argue that the existing literature has assuaged the curiosity engendered by the question. At this current juncture, starting with Tessler's (2002) important work, an increasing number of micro-level studies have taken important steps to refute the essentialist claim that Islam and democracy are incompatible (Ciftci 2010; Robbins 2015; Spierings 2014; Tessler, Jamal, and Robbins 2012). Using survey data, this research has shown that the relationship between Muslim religiosity and democratic support is not necessarily negative. This study aims to build on these seminal works that have effectively challenged the essentialist claims and explore with greater nuance the nature of the relationships between distinct categories of religiosity and democratic preferences.

This paper addresses the relationship between Islam and democracy by switching from a conceptualization that measures the impact of religion through an index along a continuum ranging from "religious to non-religious" to an approach that differentiates various outlooks among the practicing individuals. Using social theory regarding religion, we posit the existence of distinct outlooks *within* the domain of those generally categorized in public opinion research as "religious" Muslims. Such a conceptual framework allows us to make an important contribution to the literature by moving away from conventional conceptualizations of religiosity toward an understanding of different positions among the religious individuals that might lead to more or less support for democracy. We argue that important variation in religious outlook exists among the devout, and these have important implications on people's attitudes toward democracy. Therefore, just as others have noted important differences in political participation and voting behavior among various Christian communities in the United States and beyond (Campbell

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2013; McClendon and Riedl 2015; Putnam and Campbell 2010), and as Stark and Finke (2000) have proposed generalizable distributions of faith communities (i.e., niches) that balance church-society relations and are influenced by church-state relations (Driessen 2014; Grzymala-Busse 2015), we predict that various religious communities among those normally designated as "religious" would generate distinct outlooks with different views regarding politics and democracy.

To this end, we develop a simple formal model and provide a theoretical rationale underlying the relationship between different categories (or classes) of religious outlooks—frameworks for understanding the role of religion in regard to social order and interactional norms—and support for democracy. Utilizing individual-level data from the third Arab Democracy Barometer (ADB),[1] we run latent class analysis (LCA) and a series of multivariate statistical estimations to identify divergent outlook patterns among religious individuals and test their effects on support for democracy. The LCA estimation utilizing survey items tapping individual views about the role of religion in social, economic, and political life confirms a theoretically informed four-class solution representing distinct types of Muslim religious outlooks. The results of multivariate statistical analyses, in turn, provide substantial evidence for the contention that these religious outlooks shape individual preferences toward democracy according to our theoretical expectations.

In an age of uncertainty, where the search for different governance formulas in the Middle East has given way to violent incarnations of Islamic state models, our analysis demonstrates the utility of conceptualizing and measuring the impact of religion on public opinion, not by the standard measures of religiosity but according to distinct religious outlooks. Our analysis shows that the relationship between Muslim religiosity and support for democracy is far more nuanced than the essential binary discussions can take us, and we believe this approach is an important initial attempt to take the next steps in the study of Islam and democracy and speaks to the broader literature on religion and political attitudes. Our novel operationalization of outlook categories and nuanced theory makes an important contribution to the scholarship on this topic. The paper concludes with a discussion of the ramifications of our findings and the way forward in future research. The implications of both our theoretical and empirical analyses extend beyond Arab and Muslim societies, and more broadly provide potential insights into the relationship between religious outlooks and political preferences in general.

Religiosity and Democracy in Muslim-Majority Countries

The early macro-level research on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region highlighted a pattern of authoritarianism and tended to draw conclusions of Muslim or Arab exceptionalism, assuming the scarcity of democracies in the region was best explained by cultural incompatibility (Huntington 1993). The causal mechanism to explain the correlation between religion, culture, and democracy, however, was never precisely agreed on. Some have argued that the principles of Islamic faith somehow ensure that democracy is highly unlikely, if not unattainable, for Muslim-majority countries (Gellner 1991; Kedourie 1994; Lewis 2010).

Of course, if Islam were the driving force behind the undemocratic norms that are prevalent in the Muslim world, a negative correlation between Muslim religiosity and preferences for democracy would be observed at the individual level. Research utilizing public opinion surveys, however, has persuasively shown that democracy is not incompatible for people in Muslim majority countries, nor does religiosity significantly affect one's view of democracy. Tessler (2002) used survey data in several Arab countries to show that the vast majority of people from these populations do not hold nondemocratic orientations. When he added religiosity variables to the models, they were nonsignificant in most cases, a finding that allowed him to reject the essentialist claim that Islam is to blame for lack of democracy. In Muslim majority countries, where religiosity had a statistically significant impact, the influence on democratic attitudes operated in different ways from case to case. Ciftci's (2010) analysis of World Values surveys in ten Muslim-majority countries echoes this overall conclusion. Bratton (2003) reports similar findings in comparisons between Christians and Muslims in African societies. Further studies of Arab countries have confirmed persistent support for democracy throughout the region regardless of the level of religiosity (Ciftci 2013; Jamal and Tessler 2008; Robbins 2015; Tessler 2015; Tessler, Jamal, and Robbins 2012).

Although many studies of public opinion in Muslim-majority countries have relied on an index of religiosity based on frequency of religious practices and self-identification as such, there exists a second generation wave of public opinion literature that has taken important initial steps in incorporating some measure of differentiation and nuance. For example, in an important study about religion and inequality, Karakoç and Başkan (2012) introduce a multilevel conceptualization of religiosity. They examine to what extent religion and

religious people should take a role in the public sphere and introduce the novel concept of public religiosity/secularism. Ciftci (2013) divides the religious variable between religiosity and socio-religious attitudes. Greater nuance in these relationships have also been attempted by differentiating the democracy measure, such as including indices that distinguish preferences for secular or Islamic democracy (Collins and Owen 2012). This rich literature highlights the complexity of the relationship between Islamic religious identity and regime preferences, yet despite this complexity, we believe that there are important and theoretically informed ways to move our understanding forward. We argue that distinguishing categories of outlooks *within* the population normally designated religious may give us leverage in understanding the Muslim attitudes toward democracy.

A Multidimensional Classification of Religious Outlooks

While the bulk of the empirical evidence has substantially undermined the contention that Islam is inherently undemocratic, it is unlikely that religion plays *no role* in shaping preferences over regime-type and governance. It is also equally unlikely that there is a uniform religious outlook among practicing Muslims that would correspond to regime preferences and attitudes toward democracy. Therefore, if we desire to delineate distinct outlook categories among individuals lumped together as religious, how would we do so? In this regard, existing sociology theories are particularly instructive. One potentially beneficial contribution could be found in Davis and Robinson's *Moral Cosmology* theory (Davis and Robinson 1996, 2006), which emphasizes two important intra-denominational trends that affect political and economic outlooks. The authors argue that within any religious community, we can distinguish an "orthodox" and a "modernist" trend. The "orthodox" trend espouses the view that divine authority provides an appropriate social order meant for all members of a society. Davis and Robinson assert that this outlook regards individuals as "subsumed by a larger community of like-minded believers who are all subject to the laws and greater plan of God" (Davis and Robinson 2006, 169). Established moral guidance and its benefits and obligations should apply to everyone in the broader sense, and adherence as a whole is of greater benefit than an individual's freedom for personal discretion. Thus, using their terminology and that of others who have sought to measure a similar understanding, we refer to this outlook as "religious communitarian" (Benson and Williams 1982; Leege and Welch 1989). Consequently, it could be argued that these "religious communitarians" would support religious policy, legislation, and leadership with the understanding that divine authority is intended to be everyone's shared good, be it moral prescriptions or charitable provision for the poor (Davis and Robinson 2006).

In contrast, Davis and Robinson (2006) point out that many within a faith community have an outlook that they deem a "modernist" cosmology, which espouses individual choice and responsibility. This understanding "combines support for individual choice and freedom with an expectation of individual responsibility, inclining its adherents to cultural individualism." Whether it is appropriate or not to refer to this as "modern"—as if it were a recent product of the modern condition—it seems reasonable to assume the existence of such "religious individualists." All things being equal, such a position would incline these "religious individualists" within a faith community toward religious pluralism, autonomous moral decision-making, and its accompanying individual responsibility and tolerance for other views.

Focused on societies in the MENA in particular, Bayat's (2007) Islamism and post-Islamism distinction overlaps closely with the intra-faith categories emphasized by Moral Cosmology theory. In this distinction, Bayat's conception of Islamist fits a "religious communitarian" position that champions the need for moral authority systematically structuring social order—that is, "Islam is the solution"—and an attendant focus on the poor and downtrodden.

His categorization of "post-Islamism" represents an outlook that—while maintaining an allegiance to Islamic values—prioritizes the decision-making power of individuals, pluralism, and tolerance toward other viewpoints. The pluralism attributed to this post-Islamist category, however, is understood as manifesting itself as both a condition and a project. Post-Islamism *as a project*, best represented by the reformists and the Green Movement in Iran in 2009, is primarily focused on the activism of a movement more than a category of individual; nonetheless, the people most clearly associated with such movements correspond to either the religious individualists of Davis and Robinson's framework or the special category of *conditioned* post-Islamist that we delineate below.

Bayat (2007) theorizes that, on the more devout side of the spectrum, often through state repression and social marginalization, some erstwhile Islamists realize that an authoritative reordering of society will never be successfully achieved. Here, the resulting "condition" is post-Islamism. Those who have arrived at the "condition" of post-Islamism have been habituated toward an orientation to politics that concludes that they will never really be able to beneficially monopolize the public sphere with their religious ideology alone. The

failed attempts to reorder society under a definitive Islamic framework lead some to re-conceptualize or reinvent their position (Bayat 2007). Thus, despite their high level of religious devotion and ardent beliefs, they come to accept a pluralist public sphere with rights for all, but also desire that their values contribute to the political discussion.

These theoretical concepts—religious communitarian, religious individualists, (conditioned) post-Islamists—ultimately hide behind generic measures of religiosity as operationalized by questions commonly asked in public opinion surveys. The questions asking whether people read the Qur'an, pray, or attend a mosque regularly could not begin to differentiate the variation in individual religious communities, just as questions of whether one goes to church, reads the Bible, or prays could differentiate between Baptists, Catholics, Lutherans, and Latter Day Saints in the U.S. context. Therefore, if we want to capture diversity in outlook to a greater degree among practicing Muslims in MENA, we need a way to track down these different theoretical conceptions of outlooks through different questions and methods.

Using the logic behind these categories, it is possible to consider categorization of religious respondents along two important attitudinal dimensions corresponding to our theoretical concepts proposed earlier. One would be a plurality-conformity attitudinal dimension—that is, how much tolerance do respondents have toward plurality of views and beliefs. The other dimension would relate to whether or not religion should primarily be a public or private phenomenon. A two-dimensional framework would lead to four logical categories:

Religious Individualist: Individuals in this group will tend to be more supportive of religious pluralism and less supportive of religious influence in the public sphere. We refer to this group as "religious individualist" as described by the "modernist" position in Davis and Robinson's conceptualization (Davis and Robinson 2006).[2]

Status Quoist: This group will be less supportive of religious pluralism in society and also less supportive of religious influence in the public sphere. We refer to this group as the "status quo" outlook. Like our religious communitarian category (see the following), they also believe that there is an order that applies to everyone, but they ultimately prioritize "social order" and "social norms" over religious norms.

Religious Communitarian: This group will be less supportive of religious pluralism in society but more supportive of religious influence in the public sphere. We refer to this group as "religious communitarians," and they fit the categories of the so-called "orthodox" religious communitarians of Davis and Robinson, or as those representing "Islamism" as discussed by Bayat (2007).

Post-Islamist: Individuals in this group will tend to be more supportive of both religious pluralism and religious influence in the public sphere. We refer to this group as "post-Islamists," and they fit Bayat's description of erstwhile Islamists who are confronting a "condition" of post-Islamism. Years of battling with state and social norms have brought about openness to other religious views and positions, but they still believe in a prominent role for religious values and leaders in politics.

Figure 1 illustrates how these categorizations would fit along a two-dimensional spectrum, and how these categories, which we will attempt to tease out among devout participants of the ADB III, could be relationally distinguished from one another.

Religious Outlooks and Support for Democracy

Can distinguishing among these classifications help us predict attitudes toward democracy among religious Muslims? Conceptualizing and categorizing the relationship that individuals share with their faith is not simply an exercise meant to provide greater descriptive rigor or clarity. The role that others play in enhancing the quality of a person's religious experience has the potential to fundamentally shape their social, political, and economic preferences (Gaskins, Golder, and Siegel 2013a, 2013b; Grzymala-Busse 2015; McClendon and Riedl 2015). Discussions of religion and democracy that focus exclusively on the intensity of an individual's faith or adherence to a fundamentalist set of beliefs, while often insightful, neglect the influence that the social dimensions of religious belief have on preferences for political regime type. Is religion a private matter, or an inherently social undertaking that requires the participation of others? Do the religious contributions of others enhance an individual's own experience? A person's perspective on issues such as these should influence their beliefs regarding the appropriateness and suitability of democratic governance in their own state. We develop a formal model underlying the discussion and theoretical framework that follows. A nontechnical description of this model is provided in the following. The technical details and the solution of the formal model are presented in the supplemental file.

As Habermas (2006) and Dreyer (2011) contend, there is no inherent unresolvable tension between individual piety and the modern liberal democratic institutional framework. Within a liberal democratic state,



Figure 1. Dimensions of religious outlooks.

both those who are and are not pious are afforded the opportunity to locate themselves ideologically and religiously in their personal lives closer to their preferred location given the regime's imposition of lower costs from deviating from its preferred position. Given liberal democracy's incorporation of freedoms that provide individuals the ability to act according to their own religious preferences at lower costs, why then might some pious Muslims in Islamic societies prefer authoritarian rule?[3] This is arguably because an individual's preference for autocracy over pluralistic democracy derives not from preferences related to her own actions but from her preferences with regard to the actions of others (Feldman 2003; Feldman and Stenner 1997). It is the preference of individuals to limit the actions of others along certain dimensions that lead them to support more repressive regime types. While repression can and does occur in democratic contexts, a liberal democracy that incorporates individual rights regarding freedom of speech and religion largely provides for an environment that constrains the actions of others to a lesser extent than an autocracy. For those who benefit socially from a regime that institutionally constrains or promotes the religious behavior of its constituents, there should be a greater tendency to support an undemocratic regime.

The preceding sections provided a classification of pious Muslims into four categories inspired by social theory. It is reasonable to assume that each of these comes bundled with a set of beliefs regarding the role of Islam in society. While the set of beliefs that characterize each type is undeniably large and nuanced, for our purposes, it is the subset of beliefs that relate to the public and social realm that are of relevance to this inquiry. In particular, the previous sections highlighted the general positions of each category with regard to both social and religious cohesion, which we conceptualize as the inverse of a preference for pluralism, and the presence of religion in the public sphere.

Those possessing a strong preference for social cohesion and conformity implicitly, yet necessarily, prefer a less pluralistic society. Variance in terms of the religious practices of others negatively affects their own enjoyment of social interactions and threatens the social, economic, and political stability of their state (Easterly, Ritzen, and Woolcock 2006; Henrich 2000; Schotter 2008). An autocratic regime's ability to coerce conformity to its preferred ideological and religious position through the imposition of costs for deviation provides benefits to those who have a strong preference for social cohesion (Feldman 2003). Thus, the stronger an individual's preference is for social cohesion and conformity, the lower their support for a liberal democratic regime should be.

A preference for social cohesion is not the only variable related to the social dimensions of piety that is potentially capable of influencing preferences for democracy. As the literature on religion and public goods has repeatedly demonstrated theoretically and

empirically, individuals derive utility from the religious contributions of others (Berman 2000; Iannaccone 1992, 1998; Owen and Vidras 2007). It is not simply conformity to a norm or social cohesion that produces benefits; the active participation of others provides an atmosphere for some that confers benefits that are both conditional and unconditional. For example, an individual may derive greater utility from attending a religious lesson or prayer when others participate as well (Berman 2000). An individual, however, may also benefit from the payment of zakat, or alms-giving, independent of their own pious actions or contributions. Thus, individuals may derive benefits from the religious contributions of others, and may prefer a regime type that increases these contributions, whether or not they contribute themselves.

Although religious contributions to the public domain may be achieved through coercion, the opposite is also true—coercion may be used to limit religious contributions to the public domain (Habermas 2006). Thus, democratization may potentially increase the influence of religion within the public domain or reduce it relative to its autocratic alternatives, contingent on the ideological position of both the society and the nondemocratic alternatives available. Although preferences over regime type may be driven by considerations related to the religious contributions of others, those preferences are tied to an individual's perception of what viable alternatives to democracy exist. Therefore, preferences with regard to regime type and the presence of religion in the public sphere are mitigated by beliefs regarding the importance of social cohesion. Whereas a stronger preference for uniformity necessarily reduces the utility of democracy, a stronger preference for religion in the public sphere may increase or decrease the perceived utility of democracy. Thus, we can conclude that when all other variables are held constant, an individual's support for democracy is decreasing in her preference for social cohesion (see Proposition 1 in the supplemental file) but cannot conclude that a preference for religion in the public domain will generally increase or decrease support for democracy.

Among the four categories of pious Muslims theorized in this article, two categories possess a preference for social conformity and antagonism toward religious pluralism. While religious communitarians and status quoists differ with regard to their support for religion in the public sphere, both are opposed to religious pluralism. The other two categories, religious individualists and post-Islamists, also differ as to their views on religion in the public sphere, but are both less likely to exhibit strong preferences for social conformity. Therefore, we would expect religious individualists and post-Islamists to be more supportive of democracy relative to religious communitarians and status quoists (see Corollary 1 in the supplemental file).

While the implications associated with the classification scheme and theoretical framework presented herein produce a number of potentially testable implications, the analysis that follows will broadly focus on the relationship between Islamic religious outlook and an individual's probability of supporting democracy.[4] The fundamental argument being tested in this article is that individuals who adopt latent religious outlooks that emphasize socio-religious cohesion and homogeneity should be less likely, on average, to support democracy.[5] For our analysis, we reserve the status quo category as the reference category. Thus, all predictions are based on comparisons between status quoists and members of other groups. We present the measurement strategies corresponding to different types of democratic support in the next section.

Hypothesis 1 (H1): Individuals who are religious communitarians should neither be meaningfully more nor less likely to support democracy than individuals who are status quoist.[6]

Hypothesis 2 (H2): Individuals who are post-Islamists should be more likely to support democracy than individuals who are status quoist.

Hypothesis 3 (H3): Individuals who are religious individualists should be more likely to support democracy than individuals who are status quoist.

Data and Variables

To test the above hypotheses, we use the third wave of the ADB. The sample includes Muslim-only respondents in Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Sudan, Tunisia, and Yemen with more than ten thousand individual observations. This dataset includes many items allowing the operationalization of religious categories, democratic orientations, and political attitudes.[7]

Categories of Religious Outlooks

Our theoretical discussion builds on a classification of moderately to highly religious individuals with regard to their preferences for the role of Islam in social and political life. Since our theory proposes that we should observe different religious outlook categories among those who are at least moderately pious and that the simplistic scalar measurement from nonreligious to religious misses critical diversity among the devout, we intentionally truncate our sample to moderately and highly religious respondents to put this notion to the test. We also present the multivariate models with full

sample of both religious and less-religious respondents below, but focus on the reduced sample that provides a more difficult case for testing our theory.[8] From a measurement perspective, it is imperative to observe clusterings of religious respondents into groups roughly corresponding to our fourfold conceptual construct. To that end, we use a statistical technique known as LCA. LCA uses information about the frequency of responses to survey questions and partitions these responses into unobserved groups (classes) based on similarities and differences as well as the probabilities of group membership for each individual. LCA is a finite mixture model that estimates underlying class memberships with categorical and continuous variables (Hagenaars and Mccutcheon 2002; Lazarsfeld 1950).[9]

Since our categories assume variance among the devout with respect to their religious outlooks, we begin by separating the nonreligious from religious and utilizing only the respondents who report to be moderately to highly devout. Once we have selected our pool of respondents based on this category, we leave the variables measuring religiosity out of the LCA estimations. We use three questions tapping frequency of religious practice including daily prayer, Friday prayer attendance, and listening to or reading the *Qur'an*. Responses to these questions range from 1 (*never*) to 5 (*always*). We drop all respondents whose responses are never (1) and rarely (2) to obtain a reduced sample of moderately and highly religious individuals. We believe this strategy is superior to the existing approaches insofar as it allows us to show that empirically, pluralistic Muslims in Arab societies are not necessarily only those nonreligious, nonpracticing nominal Muslims.

Our analysis demonstrates that among the devout, there is, indeed, a heterogeneous set of beliefs regarding pluralism and religion's role in the public square. We use twelve survey questions evaluating individuals' views about pluralism and their preferences regarding the presence of religion in the public/political sphere in LCA estimation.[10] These questions tap individual preferences about the compatibility of law with Islam; the role of shari'a in private life, marriage, and the public sphere; membership in charitable organizations; attitudes toward religious minorities and non-Muslims; perceptions of disagreement among religious scholars; support for religious parties; perceptions about religious leaders taking office; and attitudes about the influence of religious institutions in voting. These questions are good proxies for assessing individuals' positions about the role of religion in social and political life and, hence, allow us to move beyond self-reported religious practice as a measure of religiosity.[11]

While the LCA estimation provides empirical distribution of responses that helps us determine feasibility of different number of classes, it does not guide researchers about how many classes are needed in allocating individuals to unobserved clusters. The choice about the number of classes should be driven by theoretical considerations complemented by the empirical patterns obtained in LCA estimation. In our analysis, we choose four-class specification over alternatives with fewer or more classes primarily based on our theoretical expectations. Supporting these expectations, posterior class probabilities of LCA estimations, percentages of class shares, and additional model fit statistics confirm that a four-class solution is the best fit for the data in hand.[12]

The distribution of posterior probabilities for the response categories of twelve items is presented in Figure 2. The stacked bars show probabilities within the response categories of each variable ordered from the negative to positive preferences. By and large, individuals who prefer a greater role for Islam in social and political life have a higher probability of belonging to religious communitarians or post-Islamists than the other classes. Post-Islamists also lean favorably toward religious pluralism, a tendency that can be observed even more strongly among the members of the religious-individualist class. It should be noted that the empirical patterns from LCA reveal that post-Islamists swing between religious communitarians and religious individualists in their preferences. Therefore, when it comes to their preferences about institutional role of sharia or the religious principles, they may hold at least equally strong preferences as religious communitarians or in their pluralist preferences approach to religious individualists. Status quo class takes the middle positions with respect to religious pluralism and Islam's role in social and political life. The same classification scheme also prevails in estimations with the full sample including both religious and nonreligious respondents.

Figure 3 shows class shares and probabilities along the distribution of religiosity index. As discussed earlier, this is an additive index of questions asking about daily prayer, Friday prayer attendance, and Qur'an readership. We only keep moderately to highly religious individuals in the analysis. According to Figure 3, religious communitarians and status quo categories have the largest class shares (38% and 26%, respectively) followed by post-Islamists (23%) and religious individualists (13%). Not surprisingly, a larger proportion of religious individualists are moderately religious. The class share of religious communitarian and post-Islamists increases at the higher end of religiosity index, but the post-Islamist class percentage also has a secondary spike among the moderately religious. Finally, members of status quo class have considerable shares across all categories of religiosity with a declining pattern at the highly religious end of the scale. Overall,



Figure 2. Distribution of posterior probabilities by religious outlooks.
The bars represent class shares (%) for each response category in a four-class solution according to the LCA estimations. Questions have different response scales. The full text of questions and response categories are presented in the supplemental file. LCA = latent class analysis.

religious communitarians and post-Islamists tend to be more religious, but members of four classes can be found across all categories of devout. Based on these findings, we argue that the four religious outlook categories unfold the variation in religiosity that might have been masked by conventional measures, and hence, religious outlook conceptualizations give leverage in explaining the nuanced relationship between Islam and democracy at the individual level.

Dependent Variable

Our main dependent variable is support for democracy. We use *overt support* for democracy to measure individual preferences that range from solid support to noncommitment to democracy (Inglehart and Welzel 2003; Klingemann 1999).[13] Rather than using a single item asking the respondents about their opinion of the democratic system, "overt support" takes the difference in responses to two questions:

> I will describe different political systems to you, and I want to ask you about your opinion of each one of them with regard to the country's governance—for each one would you say it is very good, good, bad, or very bad?
>
> A democratic political system (Q517.1)
>
> A political system with an authoritarian president (nondemocratic) who is indifferent to parliament and elections (Q517.2)

Both questions are recoded to range from "very bad" (1) to "very good" (4). Then, we subtracted the second question from the first one to obtain an index ranging from −3 (weak support) to +3 (strong support).[14] The distribution of this index has a negative skew with 63 percent of the respondents holding very strong preference for democracy (a score larger than 1 on the index).

Independent Variables

Our main independent variable is the dichotomous variables for class membership obtained through LCA estimation. We keep dichotomous variables measuring *Religious Individualist, Religious Communitarian*, and



Figure 3. Distribution of the four religious outlooks along religiosity index.
The bars represent fraction of religious individuals in the sample. The lines represent posterior probabilities for each group.

Post-Islamist categories in the models and use the *Status Quo* group as the reference category. LCA provides probabilities of each response category in a question belonging to an estimated class. Class memberships for each individual are determined by the size of these probabilities. While one can also create a propensity score to obtain a continuous measure, we prefer the dummy variables approach because our theoretical model distinguishes between religious outlook classes and because this approach is commonly used in previous studies (Blaydes and Linzer 2008; Hagenaars and Mccutcheon 2002; Lazarsfeld 1950).[15]

We also include several control variables commonly used by previous studies. *Interpersonal Trust* is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if respondents believe most other people can be trusted. *Political Trust* is an additive index of items asking the respondents the degree of trust they have in certain political institutions (government, elected council, public security, the army). We use a self-reported level of interest in politics (*Political Interest*) on a scale ranging from not interested (1) to very interested (4). We also control for *Egalitarian Gender Beliefs*, a commonly used indicator of cultural modernization theory by previous studies (Ciftci 2010; Norris and Inglehart 2003). This index ranges between 3 (less egalitarian) and 12 (more egalitarian) and combines responses to three questions measured along a four-point agreement scale: men make better political leaders than women, a married woman can work outside the home, and university education is more important for males. Additional controls include respondents' views about current (four-point scale) and future economic conditions (five-point scale) with higher values showing positive evaluations. All models include controls for gender (female = 1), level of education harmonized across twelve countries (seven-point scale), household income, age, and country dummies.

Results and Discussion

We present the results from the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for the reduced (moderately and highly religious) and full samples in Table 1. Because we propose that the effect of religiosity on democratic orientations can be better captured through religious outlook categories rather than a single religiosity index, we also present the models controlling for this conventional measure of religiosity for comparison purposes. Because we run pooled estimations with a large number of observations, we specify a higher threshold of statistical significance ($p < .01$). Overall, we find substantive

Table 1. Religious Outlooks and Support for Democracy: OLS Regression Estimations.

	Moderately and highly religious		Full sample	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Religious Individualist	0.640**	0.648**	0.557**	0.562**
	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.039)	(0.040)
Post-Islamist	0.227**	0.240**	0.248**	0.254**
	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.032)	(0.032)
Religious Communitarian	0.00574	0.0127	0.000584	0.00306
	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.028)	(0.029)
Religiosity		0.00505		0.00351
		(0.008)		(0.005)
Personal Trust	−0.0382	−0.0343	−0.0129	−0.0102
	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Political Trust	0.0207**	0.0196**	0.0216**	0.0209**
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Political Interest	0.00200	−0.0000923	0.00330	0.00171
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Egalitarian Gender Beliefs	0.0731**	0.0744**	0.0836**	0.0848**
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Economic Perceptions	−0.0571*	−0.0552*	−0.0625**	−0.0617**
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Prospective Economic Perceptions	0.0153	0.0152	0.0134	0.0132
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.011)
Age	0.00298*	0.00291*	0.00252*	0.00242*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	−0.0573	−0.0584	−0.0386	−0.0359
	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Education	0.0309**	0.0303**	0.0351**	0.0349**
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.008)
Income	−0.0111	−0.0133	−0.0149	−0.0157
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Constant	1.032**	0.875**	0.936**	0.827**
	(0.113)	(0.144)	(0.095)	(0.108)
Fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	8,503	8,333	11,713	11,543
Adjusted *R*-squared	.100	.099	.101	.100

Standard errors in parentheses, Country dummies presented in supplemental file, Table S8. OLS = ordinary least squares.
*$p < .01$. **$p < .001$.

evidence supporting the implications of our theoretical model as shown in Table 1.

We find that different social preferences emanating from religious outlooks can explain democratic orientations better than an essentialist approach searching for a negative or positive relationship between Islam and democracy based on binary measurements of religiosity. In the reduced sample estimations (models 1 and 2), religious individualists and post-Islamists are more likely to support democracy than those who prefer status quo. While these results lend support to H2 and H3, we were unable to reject the null hypothesis for religious communitarians' support for democracy. This latter finding supports H1 proposing no difference between religious communitarians and status quoists in their democratic orientations. Thus, as our theory would have predicted, those who have strong preferences for pluralism (religious individualists and post-Islamists) are more supportive of democracy than those who hold strong preferences for social cohesion and conformity (religious communitarians and status quoists).

The significant effects of religious outlook categories remain robust to the addition of the conventional measure of religiosity (not significant) and to the estimations with the full sample. We especially highlight our findings with the reduced sample, because this



Figure 4. Marginal effects of religious outlooks on support for democracy.
Each line shows the change in the average marginal effects for each identity category (0–1) with 95 percent confidence interval. Status quo class is the reference category.

estimation allows us to show that the differences across religious outlook categories with respect to democratic preferences have an empirical foundation, and we can observe these differences among the moderately to highly religious.

We calculated the marginal effects to present substantive differences among different religious outlook groups in relation to level of support for democracy. Figure 4 presents the marginal effects for each religious outlook class in reference to status quoists who form the reference group (models 1 and 3). In substantive terms, religious individualists, the group least likely to prefer social conformist views, hold considerably higher levels of support for democracy compared with post-Islamists who hold certain pluralist views and religious communitarians who are most likely to hold conformist views. These results hold in both reduced and full sample estimations. Post-Islamists, as expected, occupy the middle position between religious individualists and religious communitarians, but they are located closer to the latter group. This could be seen as an illustration of the theoretical relationship we have proposed regarding Bayat's (2007) Islamist and post-Islamist categories. The proposition that these post-Islamists are erstwhile Islamists (i.e., religious communitarians) who have been conditioned into a shift toward pluralism over time seems to fit the relationship of the lines in Figure 4.

The pattern of marginal effects across religious outlook categories in reference to democratic support remains the same in the reduced and full sample estimations. However, the difference between religious individualist and the other two groups is larger in the sample of moderately to highly religious individuals compared with the full sample. In addition, the distance between religious communitarians and post-Islamists gets marginally larger in the full sample estimation. These results once again confirm that political preferences associated with distinct religious outlooks will differ significantly and that some of these differences may be highly visible in the universe of the pious.

Finally, looking at the control variables in Table 1, religiosity has no statistically significant effect on support for democracy. We interpret this result in conjunction with the statistically significant effects of religious outlook dummies as indicative of shortcoming of using a conventional measure of religiosity in the empirical study of Islam and democracy. A binary measurement strategy of less to more religious may be masking the rich variance in the relationship between Muslim piety and support for democracy (Ciftci 2010; Tessler 2002). Highly educated individuals, those holding egalitarian gender views, and those with high levels of political trust are more supportive of democracy. Controlling for religious outlooks, we do not find a statistically significant gender gap in democratic orientations.

Robust Analysis

The results of the LCA and multivariate estimations are robust to alternative specifications. First, we ran the LCA estimation by dropping the questions related to minority rights as these items may favor a positive association between religious individualist category and support for democracy.[16] In these estimations and additional models with different combinations of survey items, four-class solution emerges as the most optimal solution, and the distribution of religious outlook categories and posterior probabilities for each item remain very similar. The results remain robust to alternative specifications of the dependent variable. Inglehart and Welzel's (2003) operationalization of overt support include two additional items tapping the respondents' views about military regime, and their opinion about the statement of "democracy may have problems, but it is better than other regimes" (Q516.4). Because the former is not available in the third wave of the ADB, we created an alternative index with three questions (two questions used in the construction of our dependent variable and Q516.4) and replicated the multivariate analysis with this measure. As reported in the supplemental file (Table S5), the results remain unchanged. We also ran multilevel regressions and models with survey weights, used the posterior probability of class membership in place of absolute class categorizations, and tried alternative specifications adding or dropping certain variables. In all of these specifications, the results remain robust confirming the utility of our conceptualization and theory in explaining democratic orientations.[17]

Conclusion

While the theoretical literature on Islamic ideology has developed nuanced conceptualizations of the various belief systems adopted by Muslims, few scholars have attempted to explore the relationship between the adoption of these religious paradigms and an individual's political preferences. Studies related to Islam and political preferences have largely focused on the intensity of an individual's piety (Ciftci 2010; Robbins 2015; Tessler 2002; Tessler, Jamal, and Robbins 2012). Our analysis provides substantial theoretical and empirical support for the contention that there are important differences with regard to the role that devout Muslims believe religion should play in the social realm, and that these differences are relevant to the analysis of how faith shapes preferences over regime type.

We find that pluralist ideas are not necessarily exclusively supported by nonreligious individuals, but, contrary to the implications of essentialist theorizing putting the religious and nonreligious at odds with respect to their political preferences (Huntington 1993; Kedourie 1994), pious Muslims can actually have distinct outlooks that make them favorable toward democratic ideals. There is significant added value in theorizing religiosity as distinct religious outlooks rather than a binary concept. Most importantly, social preferences about the religious participation of others, a factor underlying different religious outlooks, can be instrumental in explaining orientations toward democracy among the pious Muslims. We believe this is an important contribution to the literature on Islam and democracy (Ciftci 2010; Kedourie 1994; Tessler 2002; Tessler, Jamal, and Robbins 2012).

The theory developed in this article subsequently explored how religious preferences over the social and political realms influence pluralist and conformist ideals, as well as the basis for an individual's support for democracy. We predicted that religious pluralists (religious individualists and post-Islamists) would generally be more supportive of democracy. Our regression analyses corroborated the predictions drawn from our model, finding significant differences between the groups regarding their support for democracy. These results contribute to the literature on Islam and democracy by providing an answer to the questions that stem from the often negligible statistical relationship found between religiosity and support for democracy in many past studies. We find that this negligibility may be in part due to the differential effects of outlooks among pious individuals on regime preferences (see the solution of the formal model in the supplemental file).

The empirical and theoretical analyses in this article present a Muslim population that is far less homogenous in its religious and political preferences than has generally been presented in discourse on Islam and politics. Although significant differences with regard to preferences for democracy were illustrated, further exploration of the relationship between Muslim identity and preferences over regime type would likely be fruitful. Democracies and autocracies take on a large variety of different institutional configurations, and many of these differences may affect the role that religion plays in a society (Buckley 2016). Moreover, while an analysis of cross-country variations in the aggregate levels of our relevant categories of religious outlooks was beyond the scope of this immediate analysis (Grzymala-Busse 2015; Karakoç and Başkan 2012; McClendon and Riedl 2015), our expectation would be that group membership plays a role in explaining differences in aggregate levels of support for democracy between states. The intensity of such differences, however, should be contingent on the ideological location of the regime and perceptions of the ideal point of

society. Thus, while we would expect that Muslim states made up of more pluralistic groupings may be more likely to produce or sustain democracy, such a result may depend on beliefs regarding the ability of democracy to produce religious public goods relative to its most likely political competitor.

The framework of our theory can be extended to explore attitudes and actions related to political violence, economics, social interactions, and other political phenomena. While the focus of this article was on pious Muslims in Arab societies, many of the intuitions that drove this particular study apply equally to individuals in other Muslim-majority countries and to the adherents of other faiths, and the relationship between their particular beliefs and political preferences. Broad conceptualizations of religious identity may serve as a good starting point for analyzing the intersection of religious and political attitudes, but the large variance in religious attitudes within many faiths make analyses of intra-faith differences necessary to adequately understand how religious beliefs influence political, economic, and social preferences. Thus, analyses of the relationship between religion and political violence, political party identification, and policy preferences that account for the social preferences adopted by different segments of the devout may prove to be fruitful.

Ultimately, our analysis shows that while essentialist arguments regarding Muslim political preferences generally lack credible evidentiary support, religious outlooks may play a role in shaping political preferences. This last conclusion has important implications for lack of democracy in the Middle East and the wider Muslim world. According to our results, Islam is not the reason creating a democracy gap in Muslim majority societies. Rather, we can find pluralist orientations among the devout whose access to political power may engender democratic institutions. However, if authoritarian regimes suppress religious individuals with pluralistic orientations, and elites in nascent democracies favor those with communitarian outlooks, democracy will not flourish.

Finally, this paper also raises a question that we were not able to tackle in this study: To the extent that we see variation in religious outlooks among these dimensions, what might the roots of these perspectives be in regard to types of religious communities and practices that exist, and if and how these outlooks vary from country to country? A strong path forward in understanding these religious outlooks and their implications is to track down the social realities on the ground that might predictably influence how members of a particular community are distributed across these outlook classes and the implications of this distribution for the democracy gap in the Middle East.

Authors' Note

Authorship is equal. An earlier version of this manuscript was presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association (2016) in Chicago and at "Social Justice in the Arab World since 2010: Changing Conditions, Mobilizations, and Policies" Conference at the American University of Beirut (AUB) organized by AUB's Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs and the Mamdouha S. Bobst Center for Peace and Justice at Princeton University, February 2–3. 2017.

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Notes

1. Arab Democracy Barometer can be found at http://www.arabbarometer.org/content/about-center
2. These could also share preferences with post-Islamists who see post-Islamism as a project (Bayat 2007).
3. It should be noted that the framework presented here can be applied to non-Islamic societies as well.
4. The supplemental file associated with this article contains further elaboration on the theoretical relationship between the religious outlooks discussed above and the nature of their support for particular regime-types.
5. The literature on Islam and democracy has at times framed the desire for a theocratic autocracy as the offspring of an ideological desire to root the public sphere in a religious tradition and force individuals to contribute to the formation of an Islamic society (Feldman 2008; Lust 2011). Such theories would predict that those who express support for religion's presence in the public sphere will be less supportive of democracy. Thus, religious communitarians and post-Islamists would be the least likely among pious Muslims to support democracy if such a theoretical paradigm were to provide a stronger explanation for the relationship between religious outlook and support for democracy.
6. Hypothesis 1 makes predictions as to the negligibility of the difference between the respective groups compared to status quoist with regard to the relevant dependent variables. Given the lack of any developed standards related to what constitutes a meaningful effect for our dependent variables, testing for equivalence or a negligible effect

would be based upon arbitrary criteria. Therefore, our analysis will not move beyond testing the null (Rainey 2014; Limentani et al. 2005; Morikawa and Yoshida 1995).

7. Sample sizes for these countries along with various statistics about political and economic trends are presented in the supplemental file (Table S4). We also explored the questions in the World Values Surveys and Pew Global Attitudes surveys. While these surveys include some items that could be used to replicate our analysis, none of these surveys simultaneously provide as many questions directly asking about the role of religion in public and social sphere and questions about sharia implementation. These kinds of items are necessary for conducting the latent class analysis (LCA) estimation according to our conceptual and theoretical expectations. Therefore, we prefer the third wave of the Arab Democracy Barometer that provides the most relevant questions in a large sample.
8. The results of the LCA models with reduced and full sample of respondents are presented in the supplemental file (Tables S2 and S3).
9. Another approach could be using factor analysis to demonstrate different conceptual clusterings in the survey data. However, factor analysis demonstrates the correlations between observed responses to variables according to a smaller number of unobserved variables. LCA, on the other hand allows classification of survey respondents according to their likelihood of responses to certain questions. Since we are interested in different religious outlooks, that is, classes of respondents, LCA is a more suitable technique for measuring religious outlook categories. We also ran factor analysis with the items used in the LCA estimation. While the results separate questions into four categories as would be predicted by LCA, the factor loadings do not appear to justify our classification or two-dimensional space. Most factor loadings are not very strong, either (Table S10, supplemental file).
10. We use Generalized Structural Equation Modeling (GSEM) procedure in STATA 15 to run LCA analysis. Thus, the maximization of the log-likelihood function that produced our estimates and predictions are rooted in the EM algorithm implemented by GSEM for categorical latent class models.
11. Full texts of questions used in LCA estimation along with response categories and class probabilities for reduced and full samples are presented in the supplemental file (Tables S2 and S3).
12. The model fit statistics in Table S1 in supplemental file show that four-class solution is superior to two or three-class solutions. Akaike information criterion (AIC) and Bayesian information criterion (BIC) statistics improve only marginally from four-class to five-class solutions again indicating the feasibility of four-class solution.
13. We thank one of the anonymous reviewers for this recommendation.
14. Even with this less than ideal measure, the robust findings in our analysis lend support to the implications of our theory.
15. See the supplemental material for an analysis using the posterior probability of class membership for a different approach (see Table S9).
16. We thank one of the anonymous reviewers for this important insight.
17. The results of the multilevel regressions and of models with weights are presented in Tables S6 and S7 in the supplemental file. Additional analyses are available from the authors upon request.

Supplemental Material

Replication data for this article are available with the manuscript on the *Political Research Quarterly* (*PRQ*) website or they can be requested from the corresponding author at ciftci@ksu.edu or ciftci.sabri@gmail.com.

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Article

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Ethnic violence and substantive representation of minorities in parliament

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Abstract

This study seeks to explain why, to what extent, and in what ways ethnic party representatives remain active on the parliamentary floor when the political representation of minority groups takes place alongside ethnic conflict. To test hypotheses related to these questions, we utilize an original dataset of 14,000 parliamentary questions and speeches and background characteristics of 372 representatives in Turkey. The dataset spans many episodes of the Kurdish conflict over six legislative terms (1991–2015). Our empirical analyses show that the parliamentary behavior of ethnic party representatives is directly linked to the intensity of violence between the state and the insurgent group. We specifically demonstrate that ethnic party representatives, compared to other representatives in conflict-ridden provinces, are more active on the floor and focus more heavily on civil rights and identity issues. These findings contribute to our understanding of various linkages between identity and the substantive representation of minorities during violent conflict.

Keywords

Ethnic conflict, Kurdish conflict, parliamentary behavior, representation, Turkish parliament

Introduction

This study explores how the substantive representation of minorities is affected by enduring violence in an ongoing ethnic conflict. Specifically, it aims to understand why, to what extent, and in what ways the members of ethnic political parties remain active on the parliamentary floor when ethnic representation[1] takes place in tandem with violence. Our analysis is focused upon the long-lasting Kurdish conflict in Turkey. We explore the linkages between the number of insurgent

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deaths on the ground and the activities of representatives on the parliamentary floor. We use a novel dataset that includes both the frequency and content of parliamentary questions (PQs) and floor speeches as instruments of ethnic representation to provide an empirical account of the association between ethnic violence and parliamentary behavior.

While a large number of studies have examined how political institutions prevent or moderate ethnic conflict (Alonso and Ruiz-Rufino, 2007; Coakley, 2003; Ghai, 2000; Hanni, 2016; Lijphart, 1977; Shugart, 1992), we have scant knowledge of how violence during an ongoing ethnic conflict influences the substantive representation of an ethnic minority in the democratic political arena. Our study is one of the first attempts to close this theoretical gap. By focusing on the parliamentary behavior of minority representatives, the analysis provides insights about the mechanisms engendering substantive representation of minority groups in ethnic conflicts.

When positioned between a violent insurgent organization and a hostile nationalist elite representing the majority ethnic group, we contend that minority representatives will engage in a game of parliamentary behavior that takes into account the advantages and risks stemming from the preferences of these different actors. Ethnic party representatives will remain disproportionately active on the parliamentary floor compared to colleagues from other parties insofar as they find instrumental value in using parliamentary activities to appeal to their base. Ethnic party representatives will frequently engage in parliamentary activities geared toward expressions of ethnic identity as well as toward propagation of the ethnic group's political and cultural rights as violence intensifies.

We also theorize that minority representatives will use parliamentary floor procedures selectively to maximize their time on the floor, increase visibility of ethnic demands, or to criticize government policies. In summary, we argue that the intensity of violence will condition the nature and extent of parliamentary behavior either by engendering frequent engagement of minority representatives or by influencing the substantive focus of such engagement on the floor. Our explanation does not exclude a re-election goal or ideology as determinants of parliamentary behavior. Rather, it emphasizes the role that continuing violence in ethnic conflict settings has in explaining the parliamentary behavior of minority representatives.

The study takes advantage of the opportunities presented by the Turkish case that has had an oscillating record of ethnic political representation against a backdrop of ongoing violence in Kurdish-majority provinces since the 1980s. We use an original dataset, the Ethnic Parliamentary Activities Dataset (EPAD), that includes information about all the PQs and speeches of members of the Turkish parliament, elected from districts located in conflict zones over six legislative terms (1991–2015). We run a series of negative binomial regression estimations to test hypotheses about the parliamentary behavior of minority representatives.

The results of our analysis reveal that the intensity of violence significantly increases the engagement of minority representatives on the parliamentary floor. As violent tactics become prevalent, ethnic party representatives from conflict-ridden zones particularly target civil rights and identity-related issues in the elected assembly. Among the different types of activities that are available to them, they make frequent use of PQs. These findings imply that violence exerts a significant conditional effect on the parliamentary behavior of minority representatives.

Ethnic conflict and representation

Participation in debates in parliament constitutes a significant portion of legislators' workload because such debates are key instruments of democratic representation (Bäck and Debus, 2016; Proksch and Slapin, 2012). Though scholars have yet to reach a consensus over the factors that motivate representatives to participate in parliamentary activities, much of the literature takes the

electoral and reputational incentives of representatives to engage in personalized debates as a point of departure (Eggers and Spirling, 2014; Louwerse and Otjes, 2016; Mayhew, 1974; Searing, 1994; Shomer, 2009). Specifically, representatives across the globe have been hypothesized to take to the parliamentary floor to influence the political agenda of government (Green-Pedersen, 2010; Green-Pedersen and Mortensen, 2010), to increase their likelihood of re-nomination and re-election (Eggers and Spirling, 2014; Yildirim et al., 2017), to avoid lagging behind other representatives in parliamentary performance (Louwerse and Otjes, 2016), and for position-taking and credit-claiming (Maltzman and Sigelman, 1996).

Ethnic group consciousness as the driving force behind participation in parliament, however, has received much less academic attention (Minta, 2009). Once elected, minority representatives combine two rather distinct goals, re-election and substantive representation of minority groups, to inform the scope and content of their parliamentary activities (Aydemir and Vliegenthart, 2015; Saalfeld, 2011; Saalfeld and Bischof, 2013). Ethnic party members may remain active in parliament to gain the electoral support of ethnic group voters in competition with other representatives in an outbidding process (Gunther and Diamond, 2003; Horowitz, 1985; Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972). Such behavior is especially likely when continued use of violence by the insurgent group increases the salience of the political representation of the ethnic group. Engagement by ethnic party members on the floor becomes a viable political strategy insofar as it provides opportunities for the representation of group interests through floor speeches, PQs, or committee assignments.

In ethnically heterogeneous societies, some tension may arise between a nationalist elite representing the dominant ethnic group and minority representatives. When either quotas or electoral procedures facilitate the descriptive representation of minority groups, elected assemblies may become an arena displaying this tension. This issue is well noted by Pitkin (1967) in reference to majority and minority group representation. In an empirical study, Kibris (2011) notes that exposure to ethnic violence increases the vote for far-right nationalist parties in a prolonged ethnic conflict. As a result, representatives from nationalist parties may become hostile toward ethnic party members on the parliamentary floor in an effort to please their support base.

Such tension may become intense especially during violent episodes of ethnic conflict. Inadvertently, hostile political tactics by the majority nationalist elite in the parliament, in reaction to ongoing violence, may invoke a right of response for ethnic party representatives to give them extra time on the floor. This dynamic will be particularly relevant when ethnic representatives are viewed as the 'mouthpieces' of the insurgent organization (Watts, 1999) or when all manifestations of an ethnic group identity are deemed illegitimate by the state.

Hypothesis 1a: Ethnic party representatives will be more active than members of parliament from other parties.

Hypothesis 1b: The intensity of violent conflict will increase the extent of parliamentary activities of ethnic party representatives.

During violent campaigns, ethnic identity gains salience thanks to increased group mobilization (Sambanis and Shayo, 2013). Identity politics, thus, is likely to take the lion's share of ethnic party members' time on the floor. This effect, however, is neither automatic nor smooth. In prolonged violent campaigns 'a small but sufficiently potent group of ethnic radicals [can] derail a peaceful equilibrium' (Sambanis and Shayo, 2013, 294). In their study of ethnic conflict in Turkey, Aydin and Emrence (2015: 12) found that due to its organizational and ideological rigidity, the insurgent

group failed to mobilize and prevent divisions among the ethnic group. In such cases insurgent campaigns may not increase the perceived value of ethnic group identity vis-à-vis the 'national' identity and hence may not lead to increased propagation of minority rights in elected assemblies. However, all else being equal, one can reasonably argue that minority representatives will still find value in participating in identity-related debates on the parliamentary floor. In addition to the increased salience of ethnic political mobilization during violent episodes, re-election motives and belief in the importance of the substantive representation of ethnic group interests will drive the engagement of ethnic party representatives in the elected assembly.

Ethnic exclusion and repression might also indirectly increase the political value of identity and civil rights politics on the parliamentary floor. The strategic use of violence by an insurgent organization is likely to trigger repression (of political identity) and ethnic exclusion (Tezcur and Gurses, 2017; Wimmer et al., 2009). This opens up a window of opportunity for the leaders of the ethnic movement (insurgents or parliamentary representatives) who wish to expand their influence on multiple fronts including the conflict zones and the legal-political arena. While repression of ethnic identity and exclusion has far-reaching implications outside the elected assemblies, representation in the parliament provides an additional opportunity for voicing the demands about group identity and civil rights. We propose the following hypotheses based on the discussion above:

Hypothesis 2a: Ethnic party representatives will be more likely than representatives from other parties to emphasize civil rights and ethnic group identity in the parliament.

Hypothesis 2b: The intensity of violent conflict will increase parliamentary activities invoking identity and civil rights issues by ethnic party representatives.

The case of the Kurdish conflict

The Turkish case presents several opportunities for studying parliamentary behavior and ethnic group representation in an enduring ethnic conflict. The struggle between the Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê (PKK) and the Turkish state has continued for more than 30 years. It peaked in the1990s with several attempts to achieve a lasting peace since then (Gurses, 2015). Alongside violent tactics, the leaders of the Kurdish ethno-political movement have also utilized the channels of political representation under highly adverse conditions since the 1990s. The first significant instance of Kurdish representation took place in 1991 when candidates from the pro-minority People's Labor Party (HEP) secured 18 seats under the banner of the Social Democratic Populist Party (SHP). This electoral success triggered a series of reactions by state elites including the closures of parties, arrests, and political bans for ethnic party members. The Peoples' Democracy Party (HDP) managed to win enough seats to form a parliamentary group ($>$ 20 per the rules of procedure) in each of the 3 tense elections since 2015. This descriptive representation occurred against the backdrop of a referendum, an all-out war in several southeastern provinces, a state of emergency following a coup attempt in 2016, and imprisonment of Kurdish representatives and politicians.

The history of the Turkish Parliament as a central institution in the evolution of Turkish democracy (Ciftci et al., 2008; Turan et al., 2005) provides an important opportunity for examining parliamentary behavior in times of violent conflict. The Turkish case is also suitable for analysis of the subject thanks to the presence of various institutional, contextual, and international factors. Some of these include the unusually large electoral threshold in the proportional representation system (10%), the influence of external actors (i.e. European Union (EU)) on democratizing reforms and ethnic group rights, and an active ethnic party in the parliament despite the presence of an insurgent group locked in conflict with the state.

Table 1. Mean scores for parliamentary activities.

	Obs.	Total PQ	Civil PQ	Total speech	Civil speech
Party group					
Justice and Development	91	40.98	8.67	9.63	0.47
Ethnic parties	77	116.47	23.55	14.23	0.90
Center-right parties	85	7.53	N/A	7.40	0.05
Center-left parties	40	50.43	6.88	20.95	0.88
Islamist parties	59	21.88	0.03	12.32	0.12
Nationalist parties	20	48.16	7.00	13.37	0.32
Terms with ethnic representation					
No ethnic party present	217	25.40	11.25	3.75	0.29
Ethnic party present	155	78.23	12.84	14.27	0.65
Legislative term					
1991–1995 (19th)	30	47.03	10.33	0.03	0.10
1995–1999 (20th)	82	3.20	6.26	N/A	0.11
1999–2002 (21st)	83	14.31	14.05	0.02	0.10
2002–2007 (22nd)	52	78.12	14.67	15.62	0.90
2007–2011 (23rd)	49	78.88	18.43	14.24	0.61
2011–2015 (24th)	76	90.29	10.20	19.99	0.89

PQ: Parliamentary questions. Obs: Observations

Note: Ethnic parties include all parties formed since 1990 and the independently elected MPs; center-right parties include True Path Party (DYP) and Motherland Party (ANAP); center-left parties include Republican People's Party (CHP), Social Democratic Populist Party (SHP) and Democratic Left Party (DSP); Islamist parties include Welfare Party (RP) and Virtue Party (FP), and the nationalist parties includes the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP).

Data, variables, and methods

The Ethnic Parliamentary Activities Dataset (EPAD) includes information about the frequency and the content of speeches and PQs in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM) from 1991 to 2015. In coding this large amount of information, we followed the classification of policy areas specified by the Comparative Agendas Project (CAP), which consists of 21 major and over 200 subtopic categories. We compiled the number of speeches and PQs in these major topic areas for a sample of MPs elected from conflict-ridden provinces since 1991. Some examples include civil rights, macroeconomics, health, education, agriculture, immigration, and defense.[2] Two researchers participated in the coding process of the dataset after completing intensive training. The intercoder reliability is over 93% for the content-analytic variables included in the EPAD.

Our sample includes a total of 372 representatives elected during 6 election cycles (1991–2015) from the 19 provinces with sizable Kurdish population.[3] Of these, 77 are ethnic party members. In selecting representatives across different parties, we used party-list order in the same provinces for each election cycle. For example, if province A had four representatives from three different parties with one of them being an ethnic party member, we chose the first elected name in each party list. This strategy has its limitations, but it allows us partially to control for intra-party dynamics related to candidate selection and for the factors pertaining to local party politics. Other parties include center-right, center-left, nationalist, and Islamist parties that have been competing in the Turkish party system since the 1990s (see Table 1).

We work with a sub-sample of data for two reasons. First, since we focus on the effect of violence on parliamentary behavior, we used our limited resources to collect data pertaining only to conflict-ridden provinces. Second, our sample of provinces meets various conditions that are vital

to our analysis, namely, the presence of both ethnic and non-ethnic party representatives, ethnic conflict, and a considerable Kurdish population, allowing us to observe how the parliamentary behavior of representatives varies with ethnic party membership while holding contextual factors (district features, violence intensity, party list etc.) constant.[4] Although not ideal, the data in hand provides a focused analysis of different types of parliamentary engagement given ethnic conflict conditions.

The same MP may appear more than once in the dataset if he or she is re-elected at least once. An examination of seniority across party lines demonstrates that ethnic party members have medium levels of seniority in parliament (online supplemental file, Table S6). For example, 33% of 77 MPs from the ethnic party were elected twice, while the same figure stands at 11% for AKP and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), 46% for the center-right and Islamist parties, and 18% for the center-left parties. Ethnic parties are more likely to elect female candidates (29%) compared to other parties with a range of 10% (MHP) to a mere 2% (center-right parties) during the election cycles included in our analysis.

Variables

Dependent variables

PQs and speeches allow researchers to observe the behavior of representatives in action (Bäck and Debus, 2016; Ciftci and Yildirim, 2019; Eggers and Spirling, 2014; Martin, 2011; Saalfeld, 2011; Saalfeld and Bischof, 2013;). According to the rules of procedure in the Turkish parliament, each parliamentary party as a group and individual members are given the right to speak on the floor. In the Turkish parliament, speeches are highly televised events and give MPs a chance to discuss controversial issues (Yildirim, 2019). Asking PQs is not as time-intensive, but it nonetheless requires preparation and the evaluation of government policies.

We use four different measures of parliamentary activism. *Total activity* is the total number of speeches made and PQs asked (in 21 policy areas) in a given legislative term by each member. It measures the overall level of engagement for a given MP. *Civil total* is the total number of civil rights-related PQs and speeches in a given legislative term by each MP. *Civil speeches* and *civil PQs* provide a breakdown of the second variable. PQs are a proxy for measuring the type of floor engagement that targets government policies and presumably show minority representatives' desire to address cabinet officials. Speeches, on the other hand are good proxies for measuring substantive representation since they provide more floor time. They may also help with re-nomination and re-election goals through increased visibility (Yildirim et al., 2017). Finally, since the representation of ethnic identity and pursuit of political rights gain salience during intense periods of violence, we included civil rights-related measures. In Table 1, we present the mean scores for these parliamentary activities for 372 MPs included in our dataset.

On average, MPs from ethnic parties ask more questions, especially about civil rights issues, than representatives from the Islamist, nationalist, and center-left/-right parties. Ethnic party representatives also utilize general and civil rights related speeches more frequently than other members except center-left party representatives. This result implies that ethnic party members strategically use the parliamentary floor to gain more visibility and, presumably, to help their re-election goals. MPs engage more frequently in parliamentary activities during the legislative terms when an ethnic party is present in the assembly. Members of the nationalist MHP also engage more frequently than the average MP despite their party's non-continual presence on the floor. This result provides preliminary support for our expectation that hostility toward ethnic group demands by nationalist representatives is likely to trigger the parliamentary engagement of minority representatives.

The average number of activities in the four areas reported here are somehow higher during the 22nd term (2002–2007), a period during which the Islamist-leaning Justice and Development Party (AKP) was in government and made significant strides toward democratization. The differences between these various classifications are statistically significant according to the difference of means test (online supplemental file, Table S5). Based on these descriptive findings, we can show that representatives from ethnic parties are much more active on the floor than their colleagues elected from the same districts. The presence of an ethnic party in parliament increases the level of engagement for all MPs from the conflict-ridden provinces. However, we cannot present analysis comparing the behavior of MPs from conflict zones to these from other districts, because the data are not available.

Independent variables

Ethnic party identification is a dichotomous measure of ethnic party membership (1 if affiliated with the ethnic political party). All ethnic party representatives who were elected from the Social Democratic Populist Party (SHP) lists in 1991 later joined the ethnic People's Labor Party (HEP). In the 23rd term, all ethnic representatives competed as independent candidates, but once elected they joined the ethnic Democratic Society Party (BDP). For the 24th term, we included all parliamentary members of the People's Democracy Party (HDP) as ethnic party representatives.[5]

Our second independent variable, *ethnic party representation*, is a dichotomous variable differentiating 3 legislative terms with ethnic party presence (19, 23, and 24) from the terms with no ethnic party presence in the parliament (20, 21, 22, or the period between 1995 and 2007). This variable captures the effect of ethnic descriptive representation on parliamentary activities during the time frame of this study.

To test the conditional effect of violence on parliamentary behavior, we use the log-transformed number of insurgent deaths occurring in the legislative term preceding the current term in each province (*conflict intensity*). We obtained this measure from the Kurdish Insurgency Militants (KIM) dataset (Tezcur, 2016). Following the convention of previous research, we do not use the government security personnel deaths (Tezcur and Gurses, 2017). Figure 1 shows the average number of insurgent deaths occurring during the election cycles preceding each of the six legislative terms under investigation (*bars*) along with the extent of different parliamentary activities (*lines*). Not surprisingly, most insurgent deaths occurred at the height of the conflict in the 1990s. On average, we see an increase in the extent of total parliamentary activities over time. Most of this trend can be attributed to the use of PQs (dashed line) with average frequency of speech lagging behind. The largest increase in the extent of parliamentary activities takes place from the 21st to the 22nd term (1999–2007). Overall, Figure 1 shows that representation and violence are not alternative strategies and that conflict intensity can be high during periods of ethnic descriptive representation.[6]

Kurdish vote and *Kurdish population* variables report the vote share of the ethnic party and Kurdish population for each electoral district respectively.[7] We calculate the '*Kurdish vote/Kurdish population*' ratio for each district to account for the effect of ethnic voting on parliamentary activities. By doing so, we account for the extent to which increased ethnic mobilization in electoral provinces (higher *Kurdish vote/Kurdish population* ratio) affects MPs' parliamentary behavior.

Finally, *Female* is a dichotomous measure of gender, where 32 out of 372 representatives (8.6%) are female. We control for district-level economic development by using provincial GDP per capita as reported by the Turkish Economic and Political Research Foundation (TEPAV).

Figure 1. Ethnic violence and the extent of parliamentary behavior in Turkey.



The bars represent the average number of insurgent deaths during the election cycle preceding each legislative term (source: KIM dataset (Tezcur, 2016)). The lines represent the mean values for total activities, total parliamentary questions, and total speeches during each legislative term (source: Ethnic Parliamentary Activities Dataset (EPAD)).

Statistical model

We use negative binomial regression (NBR) for statistical estimations. NBR belongs to the count models family. Count models are generalized linear models assuming that the outcome variable follows a poisson distribution (Hilbe, 2011). Poisson regression, however, is restrictive, because it assumes that the mean and variance of the outcome variable are equal. In the EPAD, the distribution of our dependent variables is highly overdispersed. Therefore, we prefer NBR over poisson regression in statistical estimations, where we utilize clustered standard errors by province. Clustering by the individual representatives is not a feasible option for two reasons. First, ethnic party representatives were not always present in parliament during the six consecutive terms and when they were elected the number of incumbents was quite small. Second, a significant party system change was observed in Turkey in the 2002 elections; hence a substantial MP turnover was observed in 2002 and 2007.

Results

Table 2 presents the results of the NBR estimations for all legislative terms with the sample of all representatives included in our dataset (372 members).These results show that both descriptive representation (*ethnic representation*) and *ethnic party identification* are positively related to the extent of parliamentary engagement ($p < 0.05$). Controlling for individual and contextual factors, the likelihood of making speeches and asking PQs is consistently higher among ethnic party

Table 2. Negative binomial regression on total parliamentary activities and activities regarding civil rights.

	Total activity		Total civil		(Speech) civil		(PQ) civil	
Ethnic party identification		1.205*** (0.276)		1.428** (0.568)		1.070** (0.443)		1.475** (0.658)
Ethnic party representation	1.219*** (0.293)	0.694** (0.332)	1.639** (0.644)	0.585 (0.794)	1.484*** (0.432)	0.966** (0.434)	1.651** (0.695)	0.489 (0.913)
Kurdish vote	−0.0222 (0.0213)	−0.0360 (0.0279)	0.0109 (0.0494)	0.0265 (0.0534)	−0.0125 (0.0194)	−0.0138 (0.0178)	0.00441 (0.0580)	0.0222 (0.0597)
Kurdish population	0.00130 (0.0191)	0.00305 (0.0219)	0.000128 (0.0328)	−0.0129 (0.0346)	−0.0212 (0.0149)	−0.0252 (0.0159)	0.0129 (0.0480)	−0.00185 (0.0443)
Vote/population ratio	1.345 (0.949)	1.542 (1.001)	3.056 (2.049)	2.006 (1.962)	1.440* (0.810)	1.483* (0.849)	3.835 (3.022)	2.575 (2.634)
Female	0.267 (0.180)	−0.0504 (0.257)	0.379 (0.565)	0.176 (0.672)	0.320 (0.369)	−0.161 (0.478)	0.385 (0.624)	0.227 (0.750)
Conflict intensity (log)	0.268*** (0.0916)	0.319*** (0.113)	0.195 (0.219)	0.165 (0.228)	0.642*** (0.169)	0.648*** (0.176)	0.138 (0.241)	0.0980 (0.244)
GDP (log)	0.0411 (0.125)	0.0651 (0.130)	0.201 (0.237)	0.299 (0.203)	0.00764 (0.139)	0.0516 (0.157)	0.284 (0.323)	0.383 (0.252)
Constant	2.179 (1.857)	1.996 (1.984)	−3.188 (3.559)	−2.896 (3.126)	−2.796 (1.875)	−2.925 (2.061)	−4.729 (5.313)	−4.235 (4.175)
LnAlpha	1.091*** (0.0559)	1.058*** (0.0564)	2.502*** (0.128)	2.471*** (0.129)	1.743*** (0.206)	1.683*** (0.220)	2.864*** (0.168)	2.835*** (0.171)
Log pseudolikelihood	−1651.9	−631.7	−266.8	−552.6	−1644.2	−629.3	−264.3	−551
Observations	372	372	371	371	371	371	372	372

PQ: parliamentary questions; GDP: gross domestic product.
Standard errors (clustered by province) in parentheses, $^{*}p < 0.1$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$.

representatives than other MPs from the same provinces. While the presence of an ethnic party in the parliament (*descriptive representation*) increases the level of parliamentary activities for all MPs, the statistical significance of this effect disappears once we control for ethnic party identification in the models predicting civil rights-related activities (speech and PQ).

Thus, we can be quite specific and point to an independent effect associated with the activities of ethnic party representatives (that is, ethnic party identification) beyond the mere presence of an ethnic party (descriptive representation). Ethnic party membership, thus, matters for the substantive representation of minorities in elected assemblies.

PQs and speeches are different floor activities, but ethnic party representatives choose to utilize the former more frequently than the latter (Tables 2 and 3). PQs are instruments of representation that allow MPs to inquire about government policies by asking questions to cabinet ministers on a daily basis. This could be part of an agenda-setting strategy or the desire to gain visibility on the floor by the ethnic party representatives, but it does not necessarily indicate policy influence since the ministers are not likely to change policy based on requests outlined in PQs.

MPs from provinces with higher levels of electoral mobilization (share of Kurdish party votes) are more likely to engage with civil rights issues on the floor. Finally, conflict intensity increases the number of total parliamentary activities and civil rights-related engagement on the floor. According to these results, we can argue that representatives from districts with increased ethnic voting might be emphasizing civil rights issues for re-election goals.

Table 3. Negative binomial regression on total parliamentary activities and activities regarding civil rights (19th, 23rd, and 24th legislative terms only).

	Total activity		Total civil		(Speech) civil		(PQ) civil	
Ethnic party identification	1.996*** (0.308)	0.860* (0.478)	2.418*** (0.623)	1.390*** (0.532)	1.146*** (0.368)	0.506 (0.347)	3.321*** (0.658)	2.040*** (0.617)
Kurdish vote	−0.0954*** (0.0274)	−0.111*** (0.0262)	−0.0511** (0.0207)	−0.0766*** (0.0215)	−0.0154 (0.0374)	−0.0139 (0.0367)	−0.0641*** (0.0238)	−0.100*** (0.0247)
Kurdish population	0.0237 (0.0214)	0.0381 (0.0246)	0.00975 (0.0244)	0.0342 (0.0252)	−0.0399 (0.0287)	−0.0399 (0.0281)	0.0140 (0.0291)	0.0482 (0.0294)
Vote/population ratio	3.519*** (0.998)	3.841*** (1.058)	2.705*** (0.939)	3.872*** (0.941)	0.431 (1.318)	0.315 (1.262)	3.414** (1.332)	4.937*** (1.208)
Female	−0.315 (0.261)	−0.415 (0.260)	0.235 (0.451)	0.0644 (0.410)	−0.689** (0.327)	−0.532 (0.329)	0.191 (0.475)	−0.0223 (0.431)
Conflict intensity (log)	0.566*** (0.140)	0.234 (0.173)	0.397* (0.216)	0.0874 (0.209)	0.487** (0.223)	0.303 (0.200)	0.419* (0.244)	0.0768 (0.257)
Ethnic × clash intensity		0.576*** (0.159)		0.556*** (0.144)		0.286* (0.151)		0.684*** (0.139)
GDP (log)	0.0256 (0.144)	0.0296 (0.160)	0.154 (0.168)	0.258* (0.136)	−0.306* (0.165)	−0.333** (0.167)	0.211 (0.223)	0.379** (0.173)
23rd term	0.932*** (0.360)	1.103*** (0.365)	5.214*** (1.072)	5.288*** (1.142)	1.820* (0.990)	1.814* (0.976)	7.535*** (0.717)	7.568*** (0.816)
24th term	−0.341 (0.387)	−0.252 (0.345)	3.757*** (0.908)	3.700*** (1.067)	1.568** (0.682)	1.559** (0.682)	5.403*** (0.852)	5.320*** (1.011)
Constant	1.569 (2.165)	1.530 (2.382)	−5.727*** (2.084)	−7.304*** (1.954)	1.297 (2.938)	1.864 (2.863)	−8.918*** (2.836)	−11.37*** (2.302)
LnAlpha	0.958*** (0.0751)	0.915*** (0.0827)	1.442*** (0.177)	1.391*** (0.203)	1.046*** (0.242)	1.001*** (0.266)	1.537*** (0.186)	1.481*** (0.210)
Log pseudolikelihood	−746.2	−742	−388.5	−386.3	−139.2	−138.6	−364.2	−361.5
Observations	155	155	154	154	154	154	155	155

Standard errors (clustered by province) in parentheses, *$p < 0.1$, **$p < 0.05$, ***$p < 0.01$.
GDP: gross domestic product.

Table 3 presents the results testing the effect of *ethnic party identification* on parliamentary behavior conditional on *conflict intensity*. These models exclude the legislative terms without ethnic party presence (1996–2007) but include representatives from both ethnic and other parties. According to the results, ethnic party representatives, in comparison to members of other parties from the same districts, are significantly more likely to be active on the parliamentary floor in general and regarding civil rights issues in particular when their election to parliament is preceded by intense episodes of violence. We can be statistically confident that violence preceding representation drives both the extent and the focus of ethnic party representatives' parliamentary behavior. The *Kurdish vote/Kurdish population* ratio achieves high statistical significance in all models except 'Speech (civil)' models. This indicates that electoral imperatives such as the prevalence of ethnic voting forces ethnic party members to engage in parliamentary activities, and especially to ask civil rights-related PQs. Thus, in addition to violence, electoral incentives may play a role in engagement on the parliamentary floor.

The statistically significant interaction term between *conflict intensity* and *ethnic party identification* shows that ethnic party members increasingly diverge from non-ethnic party members in

Figure 2. Substantive effects of the conflict intensity on parliamentary behavior.



their parliamentary behavior (i.e. the number and type of floor activities) in response to intensified violence in their electoral district. Finally, the positive and statistically significant effects for the legislative term dummies show that MPs have gradually become more likely to pursue civil rights issues on the floor relative to the 19th legislative term (1991–1995). This could be due to a 'learning curve' or increased mobilization accompanying insurgent operations. These results could also be related to the effect of the EU's pressure for democratization after Turkey obtained candidate status in 2004. EU conditionality requiring democratic reforms (Schimmelfennig et al., 2003) may have facilitated the increased engagement of ethnic party representatives in the parliament.

To further probe the role of violence, we calculated the average effect of ethnic party membership on the extent of parliamentary activities conditional on conflict intensity. In Figure 2, we illustrate the contrast of predictive margins (i.e. difference) for ethnic and non-ethnic representatives for the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile values of the insurgent deaths given the highly right-skewed distribution of this variable.[8]

Ethnic party representatives diverge significantly from other MPs in their parliamentary activities as *conflict intensity* increases in their districts. This difference is particularly strong for the effect of *conflict intensity* on the extent of overall parliamentary activities, PQs and speeches about civil rights (combined), and for PQs regarding civil rights issues. In 'speech-only' models we do not detect significant differences between the parliamentary activism of minority and other representatives, perhaps due to the small number of speeches concerning civil rights. While speeches are visible to other members of parliament and the larger public, ethnic party representatives may prefer to ask PQs which have the added advantage of transmitting ethnic group demands to cabinet ministers. Another explanation could be related to the willingness of hostile MPs to speak on the floor about civil rights issues when conflict intensity increases. This dynamic may remove any

statistical difference in engagement through speeches between ethnic and non-ethnic party representatives on the floor. By and large, our empirical findings strongly support the hypotheses regarding the linkages between ethnic party affiliation, conflict intensity, and engagement (H1a, H1b) as well as the civil rights focus on the floor (H2a, H2b).

These results are significant for understanding how violent insurgency shapes parliamentary behavior geared toward the representation of ethnic groups. When a violent insurgent campaign takes place in tandem with democratic representation, minority representatives are likely to play a complex game of engagement in the parliament. Their activities will generally focus on identity and civil rights issues, but they may also exploit floor opportunities to enhance the prospect of re-election. We find that parliamentary behavior at times of intense violence is not simply characterized by a significant increase in floor activities. Rather, ethnic party representatives utilize specific parliamentary procedures such as PQs to voice ethnic identity and civil rights issues in parliament. We discuss the implications of these results for ethnic violence, representation, and democratization below.

Robustness analysis

For robustness checks, we ran a series of additional models that use different dependent and independent variables. The EPAD includes information about defense-related PQs and speeches for the 372 members of parliament included in the analysis. Defense-related speeches and PQs include many references to the Kurdish insurgency and the state's counter-insurgency operations. The results with these alternative measures remain very similar to the main results (online supplemental file, Tables S3 and S4). In these additional models, *ethnic party identification* does not always reach statistical significance, especially for speechmaking. We suspect that the lack of statistical significance for this variable is due to the willingness of non-ethnic party representatives to talk about national security issues from a nationalist perspective, a motive that makes them as active as ethnic party members on the floor (hence removing any statistical difference between the two groups).

We also estimated several models replacing the number of militant deaths with extrajudicial killings as an alternative measure of conflict intensity (Tezcur, 2016). In these models, ethnic party identification does not reach statistical significance, but an increase in extrajudicial killings increases the extent of floor activities (online supplemental file, Table S2). We interpret these results with a grain of salt, because the data for extrajudicial killings are limited and available for only the 19th and 23rd legislative terms.

The models presented above include some variables with high levels of correlation, including Kurdish population and Kurdish vote (a correlation of 0.74). To deal with this problem, we alternated these variables in various model specifications. These results can be found in the online supplemental file (Tables S9–S12). By and large, we can be quite confident that the substantive results about the effect of ethnic party membership and the conditional effect of violence on parliamentary engagement are robust. The only difference concerns the main effect of *conflict intensity* that loses its statistical significance in some models.

Discussion and conclusions

This study supports the contention that the substantive representation of ethnic minorities can occur simultaneously with violent ethnic conflict. The analysis moves beyond the utility of *descriptive representation* to demonstrate the ways in which ethnic party representatives engage in *substantive representation* utilizing the parliamentary podium under the shadow of arms. The floor of

parliament may become a space facilitating the promotion of ethnic identity and civil rights issues. Minority representatives, in fact, do exploit different opportunities in parliament including speeches and PQs toward that end. At the same time, they especially use PQs to direct the government's attention toward the demands of their constituents. While asking PQs does not necessarily lead to policy change, it serves the goals of minority representatives—directed toward either re-election or ideology—by giving visibility to themselves and their group interests.

The use of parliamentary activities concerning identity and civil rights issues is arguably tied to the increasing salience of group identity, presumably due to ethnic mobilization following political repression or the operations of a potent insurgent organization. Our data is not conducive to making a causal claim about this link and our explanation does not propose that members from ethnic parties are solely responding to insurgent group tactics. Ethnic party members, once elected, may be developing their own political strategies within a complex game shaped by pressures from the insurgent group, voters, the nationalist elite representing the majority group, and international actors. Given these constraints and ongoing violence, we believe that minority representatives will find it prudent to utilize legal-political avenues to voice ethnic group demands when presented with the opportunity. While their engagement on the floor will take into account the preferences of these different actors, they will remain disproportionally active on the floor regardless. Due to data limitations, we were unable to provide an in-depth analysis of interactions between ethnic party representatives and the insurgent leadership, nationalist elite, or international actors. It would be of great interest to investigate such interactions among these actors for a complete explanation of the 'ethnic conflict–parliamentary behavior' nexus.

Conflict resolution requires democratization and political inclusion of ethnic group elites. Opening parliamentary space to minority representatives provides an opportunity for voicing ethnic group demands such as preferences for autonomy, cultural rights, and recognition of ethnic identity. Such openings, however, are often unacceptable to the nationalist elite representing the majority ethnic group. Our findings imply that continued violence and visible parliamentary activism concerning group rights will create a backlash from the nationalist elite. Eventually, the nationalist elite representing the dominant ethnic group may choose to repress all manifestations of ethnic identity and close the formal representative space to ethnic party members. Incidentally, in the Turkish context, such closure strategies have been implemented since 1991. The latest incidence facilitating such political closures is the new constitutional design (2017) assigning sweeping powers to a president at the expense of the powers of the parliament.

Beyond the Turkish case, these results could help us explain the parliamentary behavior of minority representatives in cases like Colombia, Sri Lanka, and other ethnically heterogeneous societies. Several conditions that shape the parliamentary behavior of ethnic party representatives in Turkey may be informative for understanding minority representation in these other cases. For example, the 10% national electoral threshold for parties within the proportional representation system forces the ethnic party to engage in vigorous campaigning and to participate in elections with independent candidates. The case of Columbia is comparable insofar as the institutionalization of a two-party system despite the proportional representation electoral design has recently led many challengers to field independent candidates.

In Turkey, the ethnic political cleavage pits a dominant nationalist majority in parliament against ethnic party representatives and sets the stage for a hostile environment against the latter. Inspired by theories of representation, we argue that this dynamic may inadvertently motivate increased engagement of ethnic party members on the floor. Such clear delineation in strategy may be replaced with highly complex calculations in parliament when various cross-cutting and reinforcing cleavages along the ethnic, linguistic, and religious lines define the ethnic politics. In Sri Lanka, for example, a large majority of Sinhalese exist with several minority groups, but there are also

religious divisions that cross-cut these ethnic cleavages. In such contexts, parliamentary politics will lead to multi-layered, complex calculations and bargaining between the majority and minority representatives as well as violent and peaceful ethnic organizations.

International factors may also play an important role in shaping parliamentary behavior. EU conditionality (Schimmelfennig et al., 2003)[9] and the resulting international pressure for democratization in Turkey encouraged the increased engagement of ethnic party representatives in parliament. Most ethnic conflicts are prone to the involvement of international actors. The involvement of international actors may not always end with democratization or substantive representation of minorities as has been observed in Turkey.

The study of parliamentary behavior under enduring violence is likely to reveal different mechanisms about minority representation in other cases of ethnic conflict. This study, nonetheless, provides the first insights about the substantive representation of minority groups and the nature of parliamentary behavior when representation takes place in tandem with violent ethnic conflict. It is our hope that future research will build on these initial findings and investigate the mechanisms underlying the substantive representation of minority groups under different contextual and international conditions. While the Turkish case provides excellent opportunities for studying the effect of violence on parliamentary behavior, a comparative focus on other cases will increase our understanding of the link between conflict and ethnic representation.

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Supplemental material

Supplemental material for this article is available online.

Notes

1. We define ethnic representation as parliamentary activities of members of parliament (MPs) aiming to advance political and cultural rights of an ethnic group. Our inquiry focuses on members of an ethnic party specifically described as 'a party that is the champion of the particular interests of one ethnic category or set of categories' (Chandra, 2011: 155). In this paper, we use the terms 'ethnic party members' and 'minority representatives' interchangeably.
2. These areas are listed in Table S16 in the online supplemental file. Information about CAP coding process can also be found at www.comparativeagendas.net.
3. Most of these provinces are located in Southeastern Turkey and have majority or significant proportions of Kurdish population. These provinces are Adana, Adiyaman, Agri, Bingol, Bitlis, Diyarbakir, Hakkari, Istanbul, Kars, Mardin, Mersin, Mus, Siirt, Van, Sirnak, Batman, Tunceli, Sanliurfa, Igdir, and Van.
4. The cost of collecting data across six legislative terms for all MPs is substantial. We hope to collect these data and make it freely available to scholars of comparative legislative politics in the long run. We present some descriptive tables in the online supplemental file (see Table S15) to show parliamentary engagement of all MPs in Turkey using a preliminary sub-sample of full data. We follow the advice of

Simmons et al. (2011) and report the limitations, decisions to add or remove the data, and coding procedures in the text. We thank one of the anonymous reviewers for this suggestion.

5. We replicated the analysis by using a continuous variable measuring the number of seats for the ethnic party. The results work in our favor, but we prefer to use the dummy variable approach for ease of interpretation. See Table S14 in the online supplemental file.
6. Significant variation exists across provinces in the number of insurgent deaths as shown in the statistical analysis below. We present province level distribution of insurgent deaths in the online supplemental file (Figure S1).
7. Ethnic voting data are extracted from the Turkish Statistical Agency (TUIK). Kurdish vote figures are obtained from Mutlu (1996) and Kibris (2011).
8. The predictive margins for continuous distributions show that the difference between ethnic and non-ethnic party members is most visible at the high end of the continuum. These results are available upon request.
9. Our use of term dummies in the models partially accounts for EU conditionality, but we cannot draw a decisive conclusion about its effect on parliamentary behavior.

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

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Islamist parties, intraparty organizational dynamics, and moderation as strategic behaviour

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ABSTRACT

This paper highlights the intraparty institutional dynamics at play that influence Islamist party moderation and its manifest behaviour and ideology. We conceive of moderation as a strategically contingent act that is best explained by intraparty realities operating within particular political dynamics. This shifts the focus from the inclusion/moderation process debate and towards the discussion of party organizational capacity and social movement ties. We provide several propositions about party organizational strength, social movement linkages, and ideological legacy as determinants of Islamist party behaviour. Observations across a variety of cases support these propositions and the salience of a strategic behavioural approach to Islamist party moderation.

KEYWORDS Islamist parties; moderation; intraparty structures; social movement organizations

Introduction

The debate regarding the possibility of Islamist party moderation (Wickham, 2004; Clark, 2006; Schwedler, 2011; Tezcur, 2010a), which began with analogies drawn from Christian democratic and socialist parties in Europe (Bermeo, 1997; Huntington, 1991; Przeworski & Sprague, 1986) has expanded rapidly since the turn of this century. The bulk of this literature has attempted to either establish or challenge a conceptual framework in order to explain what a moderation *process* for Islamist parties may or may not look like. Disagreement about what constitutes the moderation of radical parties[1] abounds, and this debate is often centred on whether or not its manifestation should be primarily observed through expressed change of ideology and/or a behavioural change in the party members or its leadership. This paper contributes to the literature on Islamist party moderation by addressing the particular question of why we observe vacillations of moderation – in ideology (word) or behaviour (actions) – by Islamist parties in short periods of time, especially in terms of vote-seeking, office-seeking, or social support. To that

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end, it focuses on two contextual factors, intraparty organizational structure and party-movement linkages, to explain how these variables influence the short-term strategic acts of the elites within Islamist political parties.

To answer the above question, we turn to the primary reference of scholarship on Islamist party moderation, the Inclusion-Moderation Thesis (Mecham, 2004; Schwedler, 2006, 2011; Tezcür, 2010b; Wickham, 2004). At the most basic level, this thesis anticipates that participation in state-sanctioned political processes entices anti-system political groups to move away from their radical goals and moderate their positions. One of the key debates regarding inclusion/moderation (IM) is the causal mechanism that explains the nature of the moderation being observed. Hence, positions in the literature on inclusion/moderation (IM) range from conceptualizations of moderation in behaviour and ideology as pro-democratic to pro-system. In the former version, the radical Islamist actor through inclusion in the system is becoming more democratic; in the latter, the same actor is becoming a politician who is better able to take advantage of opportunities in the status quo political system as it is. Of course, some scholars envision a process in which the impetus behind the moderate behaviours is pro-system or status quo, but anticipate that this transitions to pro-democratic transformations over a long-term process.

Although the understanding and implications behind the alterations of ideology and behaviour by Islamist organizations participating in their national political systems hold great importance, the debate over the inclusion-moderation hypothesis has left the issue of moderation in a stalemate of sorts. This arises largely from the fact that persuasively measuring the reality of a long-term process of moderation – by any definition – for a very broad type of political organization (Islamist), across many cases and contexts while *in process* is extremely difficult, if not impossible. This would be true even if the literature agreed on the causal mechanism behind the moderation, the impetus behind it, and the nature of the relationship between behaviours and ideology. It is no coincidence that the strongest literature on the 'democratic moderation' process for social democratic and Christian democratic parties in Europe occurred decades after the completion of the process (Kalyvas, 2000; Przeworski & Sprague, 1986). Although the inclusion-moderation hypothesis literature has effectively illuminated key challenges and concerns in the study of the moderation of Islamist parties and organizations, it seems beneficial to disaggregate the moderate behaviours and pronouncements and understand them within their current environment as contingent and strategic actions.

Therefore, rather than entering the debate of whether or not observed instances of behavioural or ideological moderation by an Islamist party are clearly indicative of a long-term process of democratization we propose, instead, to understand these actions as instances of political calculations

that address challenges as they become relevant (Brocker & Künkler, 2013; Karakaya & Yildirim, 2013). In this way, we highlight the contextual variables that are influencing how these parties behave in the short term, and it is at this level – rather than that of a long-term process – that we can understand the dynamics that shape the observed variation in moderation behaviours by Islamist parties in their particular contexts in many Muslim-majority countries around the world.[2] In particular, this article illustrates that actors' capabilities to change their ideology and behaviour stem internally from party organizational structures, a party's social movement linkages, and externally from political system imperatives. While we discuss these the effect of external factors including the domestic institutional structure or international system (Brocker & Künkler, 2013), we especially prioritize the intraparty structures and dynamics often in play for Islamist parties in Muslim-majority countries.

Such an intraparty framework can shed light on Islamist parties that seemingly demonstrate both moderate and radical behaviour and pronouncements within short spaces of time (such as the Freedom and Justice Party in Egypt) and those that swing back and forth under different political conditions (such as the Justice and Development Party in Turkey). This approach is useful to the extent that it explains the actions of parties as tactics that allow Islamist actors to survive in the face of short-term challenges and opportunities (Karakaya & Yildirim, 2013), generated by the regime and electoral dynamics. Attending to the pattern of moderation in the moment and its contingent dynamics can also illuminate the various contextual building blocks that may contribute to or inhibit a longer run moderation process.

We first briefly discuss the existing conceptualizations and measurement of moderation as a process to present the main contours of the subject within the existing scholarship, and then introduce our framework based on intraparty institutional dynamics. We highlight these factors through the discussion of various cases of Islamist parties across Muslim-majority polities. These well-known cases confirm the utility of this approach and underscore the significance of intraparty institutional dynamics as predictors of Islamist party moderation. Thus, this article contributes to the literature on the subject by proposing that intraparty structures in tandem with an Islamist party's social movement organizational linkages can explain the short term and strategic actions of Islamist parties towards both ideological and behavioural moderation in different contexts.

Revisiting the moderation literature

The discussion of the moderation of radical political parties is not at all new. The breadth of this literature conceptualizing 'moderation' can be divided into two major approaches: one, stemming from a classical understanding of moderation that prioritizes a *relational* (i.e., pro-system or status quo)

understanding of the concept, and other more recent approaches that infuse moderation with *substantive* (pro-democratic) meaning. The former is best illustrated by the concept of organizational conservatism as envisioned by Michels (1962). In this classic work, Michels (1962, p. 339) establishes moderation – i.e., the process of becoming 'conservative' – as acquiescence to the regime's existing status quo in order to preserve one's organizational gains. It is an attitude measured by the party's 'timidity' and 'prudence' in policy-making and behaviour, and the atrophying of its 'revolutionary talons'. It describes the mechanism behind a radical party's willingness to play the political game as it is. This is due both to the investment and incentives gained by being 'absorbed' by the system and the fear of punishment and loss (El-Ghobashy, 2005). This relational logic in regard to moderate behaviours is also captured by Tezcür's (2010a) use of the word 'domestication' or Brown's (2012, p. 5) concept of 'politicization', 'the extent to which [parties] focus their energy on participation in an existing system, within the rules and boundaries set by that system'.

Some recent studies of Islamist parties and moderation have proposed more substantive, normative democracy-oriented definitions of the term. One of the most notable is proposed by Wickham (2004, p. 206): 'Ideological moderation refers to the abandonment, postponement, or revision of radical goals that enables an opposition movement to accommodate itself to the give and take of "normal" competitive politics. It entails a shift toward a substantive commitment to democratic principles, including the peaceful alternation of power, ideological and political pluralism, and citizenship rights'. The first sentence in the definition addresses a relational disposition to the regime while the second part of the definition importantly prioritizes 'moderation' along a continuum whose end is the internalization of liberal democratic principles.

Within the category of substantive definitions, two other trends deserve note. The first is minimizing or simplifying the substance of the concept. Driessen (2012, p. 173) argues that, because the radicalism of Islamism is based an insistence on the absolute sovereignty of God and the imposition of the divine order on all citizens, concept of moderation for Islamists should simply be 'the reduction of religious exclusivity' by these parties. The second trend has been to de-link behavioural and ideological moderation from an implicit causal chain. In this vein, Tezcür (2010b, pp. 10–11) defines moderation into separate, but substantive, ideological, and behavioural conceptualizations.

The debate over how moderation is defined is important for a number of reasons. Relational understandings of the term weakens the certainty that moderation and democratization are indelibly linked. While relational considerations may factor into a substantive democracy-oriented moderation process for Islamists participating in the system, the causal mechanism

behind this notion of moderation does not guarantee it. What it does presume is that radical actors participating in the system will adjust to the status quo, which in many cases is not liberal democracy but often somewhere between authoritarianism, competitive authoritarianism, and quasi-democracies. Tezcür (2010b) notably points out the link between moderation and 'domestication' that seems, at least in the short term, to bolster the regime's illiberal status quo. While the relational assumptions behind moderation anticipate the rational position that Islamist parties will adjust to accommodate the rules of the system and become less disruptive participatory actors as they moderate, it speaks only partially, at best, to a process of internalization of democracy.

This is where parallels between Communist and Christian Democratic Parties in Europe break down. The difference in comparison is not in the comparison of radical parties, but the political context. The relational moderation in the democratic systems of Europe has a different endpoint outcome – at least as can be deduced from the comparison. Christian Democratic and Communist parties were accommodating themselves to nascent democratic systems while Islamist parties are entering into a fickle, limited, and less transparent political opening in their national political context. To be sure, this is no discredit to the parties themselves: they cannot be held accountable for the political system in which they find themselves, but this understanding of the causal mechanism behind the moderation process leaves the implications for party democratization less conclusive.

During the uprisings that spread across much of the Middle East and North Africa in 2010 and 2011, the very fact that the existing Islamist and opposition party organizations were, in every case, the latecomers to the streets and squares (Khatib & Lust, 2014) exemplify the prevalence of moderation that is ultimately *Michelsian* organizational conservatism at work. In other words, while individual members might have independently joined the protest in the initial days, basic organizational survival instincts caused almost all of these 'old guard' opposition political organizations (Islamist or not) to hesitate to formally engage in collective mobilization. While the hesitation to incur risk was far more rational than hypocritical, it nonetheless points to the fact that inclusion in the existing system gave them something to lose, forcing a calculated delay in official support for protests that most of these parties would have supported in principle.

Berman (2008) offers two additional causal mechanisms for inclusion-moderation of radical parties that nonetheless have trouble transferring to most contexts in which Islamist parties operate. The first relates closely with a relational notion of moderation: successfully playing the game to maximize gains to the extent these are provided. She points out that the increased spending of time on the everyday concerns of governance, like waste management and pothole repair, can lead to a redirection of focus away from the

original radical aims. While we have seen this occur in Turkey, or in local governance, in countries like Malaysia and Morocco, the pothole-focusing reflex comes, nonetheless, from a desire to strengthen the party's legitimacy in the existing system, and to prove to their supporters that they can provide effective governance. Islamist parties have also been widely observed to put a high focus on the formal and informal provision of social services, even as a social movement organization (Masoud, 2014; Tessler, 1997), and, of course, this is very different than the dynamics of provision through governance, but the intention to garner social support and approval operates similarly. Radical parties who engage in good 'everyday' governance when they have opportunity also tend to exhibit moderate behaviours, but the extent to which they are doing so to gain in the existing system or because they are democratizing is less clear. Certainly, non-democratic leaders also have incentives to prove they can govern effectively prior to consolidating power in the system, and, in any case, Islamist parties are only afforded such opportunities for local governance in a handful of contexts.

Berman (2008) also argues that the encouragement to moderate arises from a need to attract the median – more moderate – voter. However, the 'rules' as determined by non-democratic regimes ensure that too successfully attracting the median voter would actually jeopardize an opposition party. The game is constructed for the opposition to lose, and Islamist parties have often been observed running a limited field of candidates in elections in many cases (Brown, 2012; Hamid, 2014). In non-democratic contexts opposition parties are not accountable simply to voters but also the 'winning coalition', the essential cohort of regime-backing elites (De Mesquita et al., 2005).[3] It is to these elites and not the median voter that they must ultimately cater to survive and continue playing the game in their political environment. Thus, the logic of median voter is primarily applicable to particular cases where electoral institutions are decisive for the distribution of governing power (e.g., Indonesia, Tunisia, and probably still Turkey).

Finally, Wickham (2004, p. 224) provides another possibility: inclusion in the game results in increased contact with actors representing other interests and opportunities for alliance and policy-convergence, along with exposure to diverse social interests, which leads to 'democratic learning'. The evidence, however, for the effectiveness of 'learning' has been the hardest to determine empirically. Considering the capricious nature of the various quasi-democratic and non-democratic contexts in which Islamist political elites find themselves, they have no strong incentives, and often disincentives, to trust other opposition actors (Buehler, 2018; Lust, 2011). Therefore, if scholarship is focusing on the inclusion-moderation thesis in order to determine whether or not radical Islamists will become democratic, then we are circling around a colossal conceptual and theoretical *Gordian Knot*.

Thus, while we do not discount the possibility that a process of inclusion-moderation over time might lead to democratization or 'democratic learning', what can be more readily seen, in the relatively short period of time that Islamists have been included in the system, is that they are, at least, learning to 'play the game' and operating as a system-supporting party. As the research that further problematizes the process of moderation notes (Buehler, 2013; Schwedler, 2011; Wickham, 2013), Islamist parties have frequently shown inconsistencies in their level of moderation within short periods of time. Such behaviours are hard to capture and explain when the intention is primarily to determine whether a long-term process is taking place. This article argues that these instances of moderate and radical actions are important to track and understand in and of themselves. From these, we are able to see the Islamist party's internal and external context, and they highlight the dynamics that might facilitate or hinder a process of moderation in their political system.

Going behind the inclusion-moderation debate also allows us to address the complexity of behaviours exhibited by Islamist and religious conservative parties when they have received a measure of governing power. Egypt's Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) and President Morsi, in their short period in government, exhibited a complex array of behaviours that included radical pronouncements and actions with moderate ones. In that case, FJP's political/religious competition with various groups including Al-Wasat and Salafi parties, the interaction between the Brotherhood and the party, and the nascent internal structure of the party might be considered possible explanatory factors. In Turkey, time has revealed Erdoğan's intolerance towards opposition to the extent that Turkey is now often described as a competitive authoritarian regime (Esen & Gumuscu, 2016). Nonetheless, it would be difficult to argue that Erdoğan's ideology has not moderated from his earlier days with the Islamist Welfare Party; the trouble with the AKP is not reversion to a more radical Islamist ideology, but behaviours that silence the opposition and criticism and disregard democratic norms and institutional horizontal accountability.

Ennahda in Tunisia, on the other hand, in many ways represents precisely a party that has moderated in both ideology and behaviour. It has ultimately behaved as a democratic actor, even in government, during this delicate transitional period of Tunisia's democratization process (McCarthy, 2018). It did so, nonetheless, without a history of being included in the political system (Cavatorta & Merone, 2013). The Party of Justice and Development in Morocco, however, with its role as the lead party in parliament since 2011, could be seen as displaying the behaviour of a party with power that reflects a moderation process. Taken together, although these cases create problems for the approaches emphasizing moderation as a long-term process, we

believe our approach highlights systematic dynamics that can explain these divergent outcomes.

Systemic and intraparty organizational requisites of moderation as strategic interaction

Scholars within the Islamist party moderation literature have provided examples of ideological and behavioural moderation and some compare these parties with European social democratic parties in the twentieth century. As mentioned above, this long-term process comparison has problems, starting with the difference in regime types that the radical parties are operating in. There are studies, however, that address the dynamics of parties attempting to change their ideology in response to changing political contexts. As Przeworski and Sprague (1986) and Kitschelt (1994) indicate, for example, social-democratic (SD) parties have taken distinct approaches and operated on differing ideological tangents with varying degrees of success based on their domestic political context. Both works present a potential guide by taking into account the society, the particular alignments in the individual party systems and the nature of the party's leadership, ideology, and organizational structure to explain ideological change and the political fortunes of SD parties across different cases. This could be the transferable wisdom from this scholarship to the study of Islamist party moderation. While we acknowledge that the context in which Islamist parties operate is different, similar dynamics may be applicable to explaining Islamist party moderation and democratization.

Kitschelt (1994), for example, is not claiming or intending to measure a *process* of change among SD parties. Instead, his observations of SD party behaviour span only two decades (the 1970s and 1980s) in order to study variation in the incorporation of 'left-libertarian' ideals into party platforms as *strategic behaviour* operating in a specific inter- and intra-party environment. This might be a key point of transferable wisdom from Kitschelt's (1994) work; in most cases, we only have enough observations of Islamist parties to discuss 'moderate' or immoderate (strategic) behaviour, not an extended timeframe that would allow us to draw definitive conclusions on a *process*.

A similar dynamic might be argued to exist for Islamist parties within their political environments. It is reasonable to assume that tendencies and opportunities to be moderate or radical in one's position exist within these political movements. Furthermore, based on existing dynamics, a party's desire or ability to behave accordingly will vary, even for the same party across time. As Przeworski and Sprague (1986, p. 82) succinctly put it: 'Histories of particular parties are replete with strategic reversals, with changes of direction, with controversies and schisms'. Thus, we will understand better these parties' manifestations of moderation or radicalism and the decisions they make if we

more systematically account for patterns across cases arising from external and internal factors. These behaviours, understood as occurring within particular environments, thus, also provide us with indications of the operating of the whole system, of which the Islamist party is one part.

Party organizational structure and moderation

Up to this point, we have argued that the use of more moderate or radical behaviours or pronouncements by party leadership would depend on extra- and intra-party forces. Although some literature touches on the nuances of external and internal dynamics as factors that influence the *process* of moderation (Buehler, 2013; Tomsa, 2012; Wegner, 2011), we would like to emphasize how such forces affect strategic decision-making whether or not the end result is the consolidation of relational i.e., *Michelsian* or pro-system) or substantive (pro-democratic) moderation. Since these instances of moderate or radical behaviour or manifest ideology stem from members or groups of members within a party, a logical starting point in the investigation of determinants of such behaviour is the internal party organizational structure and dynamic. While the environment external to the party – i.e., socioeconomic structures, political and electoral institutions, party system dynamics, electoral demographics, etc. – certainly conditions group strategy (Volpi & Clark, 2019), it is the dynamics and structures within the party that determine to what extent the party is able to respond quickly and/or consistently to strategic opportunities (Masoud, 2014). As Kitschelt (1994, p. 216) argues, 'the key intervening variable is a party's organizational structure that facilitates or impedes strategic flexibility'.

The longer and more extensively an Islamist party has established itself and built up a material and organizational structure, including elements created by a pre-existing social movement organization, the more it has to gain from self-preserving moderate behaviour. Whether or not the political arena is glutted with Islamist party options is another critical issue. For example, if the party has to worry about positioning itself against a rival already occupying a more moderate position, opportunities might exist in which more radical behaviour or pronouncements might be strategically welcome (Tepe, 2012). In this regard, Indonesia's PKS seems to illustrate this dynamic: it is an Islamist party with a moderate Muslim party to its left and more radical Islamists to its right in Indonesian political space. Though evidence abounds that this party has clearly established itself within the system as a pragmatic player, its continued balancing act between moderate and more radical positions seems to reflect the strategic manoeuvring of a party with important rivals to its ideological right and left (Buehler, 2013; Tomsa, 2012).

We would normally discuss the median voter in democracies in relation to a party's position relative to the centre. However, the authoritarian or quasi-democratic contexts of many Islamist parties require us to consider their ideological position relative to the regime's 'winning coalition'. In most cases, though, as with the electorate, the regime is less radical than the Islamist parties. Thus, moderate behaviours, but also moderate interpretations and applications of ideology, are still strategically beneficial for Islamist parties. This course of action helps gain greater social support to avoid the ire of the regime and to protect one's organizational network and infrastructure. Why is it, then, that we encounter uncertainties and different outcomes in moderation, sometimes in short periods of time, that do not always seem to work to the advantage of Islamist parties?

We propose that manifestations of party behaviour and ideology stem from two broad internal factors: 1) the level of the centralization of power within the party (Kitschelt, 1994; Luebbert, 1986) and 2) the nature of the institutional and ideological linkage with a social movement (Brown, 2012; Wegner, 2011). Thus, we argue that *hierarchical political party leadership structures, which can ensure discipline and control factions, will moderate (or behave radically) strategically in response to the systemic environment*.[4] The flexible strategic capability of certain Islamist parties stands in contrast to the inconsistent pronouncements and actions of decentralized parties that are composed of powerful factions or that have diffused resources and organizational structures. Time also often plays a critical role in strengthening the leadership hierarchy as Michel's 'Iron Law' anticipated more than 100 years ago; Islamist parties newly developing their organization are unlikely to have the hierarchical strength and professionalization that would ensure discipline and control factions that seasoned parties would.

When it comes to strongly hierarchical or centralized party structures in Kitschelt's (1994, p. 214) typology, of particular relevance is the 'Leninist cadre party', which he describes as 'a small, tightly knit network of political leaders at the helm and, beneath them, a vast transmission belt of party-subordinated and incorporated mass organizations'. Considering the tendency of Islamist parties to utilize existing formal and informal ties to religious communities and associations in order to mobilize support (El-Ghobashy, 2005; Karakaya & Yildirim, 2013; Schwedler, 2011; Wickham, 2004), the description provided by Kitschelt for Europe has close parallels to the organizational structure of many Islamist parties in most Muslim societies. To the extent that the party has strong central leadership, such an Islamist party should be able to engage in moderation of its ideology and behaviours where it is strategically expedient. Where power is not centralized in one location, even if organizational capacity and hierarchy is strong, moderate actions and stances should be less frequent and more volatile due to internal power conflicts and factionalization.

Established parties inevitably contain factions that would interpret party ideology or steer party strategy differently. As Kitschelt (1994, p. 207) suggests, parties are 'miniature political systems with contending actors', not 'unitary actors'. Therefore, the extent to which a party has the organizational capacity to enforce its will, this determines whether the party is likely to move quickly and flexibly in a strategic direction or whether its behaviour will appear capricious. While many Islamist parties in Muslim-majority countries have centralized authority structures and strong capacity, there are cases where the organizational capacity or coherence is strained, creating significant challenges to strategic moderation. A prime historical example of a party in such a predicament is the Islah party in Yemen. The party was a coalition of religious and conservative power centres that initially formed to ensure the dominance of the northern political elites over those of the South and the Yemen Socialist Party (Schwedler, 2006). Composed of prominent religious leaders, tribal leaders and merchants, and members of Yemen's Muslim Brotherhood organization, the party has not established a strong centralized power structure and is splintered among several factions with distinct interests. The civil war between the Houthis and the weak regime propped up by Saudi Arabia has largely sidelined the earlier non-militia political entities, but the loose social networks tying together the factions of this Islamist party have not fared well in crisis.

Malaysia's PAS provides another example of a party that, due to the federal structure of Malaysia, has had competing loci of power and strategic realities between the national and state leadership. Although it does have a central party organ and strong organizational capacity, Malaysia's federal structure and politics, which has allowed PAS to address potholes at the state governance level, creates competing interests within the party and variation in behaviour and speech within the party depending on the context of the audience (Chin, 1996; Moten & Mokhtar, 2006). How the party presents itself in Kelantan state often differs greatly in rhetoric to the national stage. In both of these cases above, the parties have frequently generated contradictory responses to the strategic environment due to decentralization in the respective party's power structure. PAS in Muslim Malay dominant states has often made a much more explicit appeal to Islamic law provisions than PAS elites in the more ethnically and religiously diverse states. Success among different electorates in different regions encourages the contradictions from state to state.

Turkey provides support for the flip side of our argument with an Islamist party that developed a strong organizational capacity and an increasingly centralized base of power that has allowed great strategic flexibility. Within a few years from its founding, the success of the AKP and its leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, was based on his ability to take advantage of a free hand to strategically moderate or radicalize. Mecham (2004, p. 351) argues that the

AKP's success resulted from the ability of its leadership to make and implement strategic decisions that 'transformed the dominant Islamist movement in Turkey into a politically sophisticated, progressive, and moderate participant in normal politics'. Erdoğan has proven to be sophisticated, but his strong control of the party has enabled him freely to behave moderately or more radically according to his perceptions of the strategic context (Lancaster, 2014)

Interestingly, in a vein quite unique for contenders for government rule in Turkey, when the AKP was young organizationally, it promoted tenets of intra-party democracy with primary elections for the party list, extensive debates on policy formulations, and checks on leadership – strong evidence for the internalization of democratic moderation. This intra-party democratic experiment within the AKP was short-lived, arguably for the politically strategic reasons anticipated by Michels (1962). Allowing all factions a voice, particularly the Islamists, created problems for a party framing itself as the new political centre. Channelling all decision and speaking power to Erdoğan and his select few ensured the flexibility to respond to national and international political dynamics as needed (Lancaster, 2014; Tepe, 2005). The building of a centralized power structure as the party developed allowed the AKP to compete effectively with its rivals and avoid instances of evident lack of discipline, like the party's failure to pass a resolution concerning the 2003 Iraqi invasion due to dissent among their own members (Kesgin & Kaarbo, 2010).

During their first two national election campaigns, the AKP refused to take positions considered the domain of religious conservatives, even the socially popular prospect of creating legislation to liberalize the restrictive headscarf law. Instead, in 2002 Erdoğan's campaign repeatedly emphasized that the AKP was at the very 'social center of society' and took strong positions on honest governance and economic policy (Wuthrich, 2015). Their turn towards increasing nationalist and religious rhetoric in their campaign speeches during and after the 2011 national elections points out once again the AKP's and Erdoğan's strategic flexibility. In 2011, their major rival to the left, the Republican People's Party (CHP), under new leadership, moved towards the centre and began to make policy appeals that muddled the lines between the parties in terms of policy output and appeal. In response, the AKP tapped into religious conservative rhetoric while maintaining its pragmatic policy appeals. Seizing the opportunity casued by a sex tape scandal within the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), their switch to a nationalist campaign discourse was an attempt to lure MHP's voters and cause that party to fall below the required 10 per cent national threshold, potentially bringing more seats to the AKP (Wuthrich, 2015). Since 2011, Erdoğan has further centralized his authority in the party (and throughout the country as

a whole) enabling him to flexibly engage strategically to take advantage of the political environment.

The moderation trend of PKS in Indonesia lends further support to the proposition above. The genesis of PKS, *Jemaah Tarbiyah*, was formed as student-led ideological political movement characterized by strict internal procedures and hierarchical rules in the 1970s. After a political party (PK) formed following the resignation of Suharto in 1998, the leaders of the movement quickly realized that the party needed to be steered in a more pragmatic direction in the face of poor electoral outcomes. A visible split between idealists and pragmatists marked the consecutive legislative and presidential elections. However, the strong centralized leadership hierarchy of the party (named PKS after 2003) did not allow internal factional politics to interfere with strategic manoeuvring despite operating in a federal and decentralized political system (Buehler, 2013). While there were exceptions as observed in the debate about pornography law, the party managed to tone down the Islamist ideology and form alliances with even non-Muslim groups (Tomsa, 2012). The impressive showing in the 2004 elections consolidated the power of party leadership and made further moderation possible. Thus, moderation became possible for PKS to the extent that the organizational structure and centralized leadership inherited from *Tarbiyah* allowed party leaders to overcome factional politics.

Social movement linkages and moderation

Considering that the political structures of most new multi-party environments would encourage organization around a strong leader or central leadership, where would competing sources of power come from in Islamist parties that might hamper strategic opportunities to moderate? Arguably, there has been one major obstruction to centralized power in Islamist parties: competing loci of power from a parent social movement organization, and this has two outcomes. First, *parties who remain organizationally intertwined with an institutionalized social movement demonstrate ideological strategic flexibility more infrequently than those without such a movement.*

A number of scholars have noted the limiting influence of social movement organizations (SMO) on the political parties initiated by them (Brown, 2012; Wegner, 2011). The reason is fairly predictable. A social movement is created to affect a change within society proper, and for most Islamist movements this involves both a spiritual mission or calling (*da'wa*) – i.e., spreading the knowledge and virtues of the faith – and a social welfare one – i.e., responding to the needy and downtrodden. Such movements require a clear mission, a central hierarchy that can implement the mission, and an effective organizational structure. When movements initiate parties to represent their 'brand name' as political openings arise, it necessitates the creation

of two organizational structures within the umbrella movement. The political elite emerging from the organization do not become the new centre of the movement, but rather an important wing, its political representative.

Wegner (2011, pp. 58–59) highlights this in her analysis of the PJD in Morroco: 'From the ISMO's [i.e., Islamist social movement organization] point of view … the party will never be more than a means to an end – an instrument designed for a special field of social action'. This creates a tension of competing interests between two centres of power, ultimately limiting the strategic capacity of the political organization, centralized and capable though it may be in its own organizational structure. This does not mean that SMOs themselves and their accompanying ideology are static, and recent scholarship has shown the flexibility of social movements to shift goals and understandings, especially during 'moments of crises' (Volpi & Clark, 2019). However, the party's reason for existence, at least initially, is to represent the parent SMO, and thus, they cannot appear to be diverging from the vision of the movement leaders. This naturally restricts the political wing's range of motion and speed in which to act. No matter how expedient a strategically moderate move might be to bolster mobilization for the political wing, in such cases where the party and SMO are linked, they are tethered to the resources and social capital that the established movement provides. Thus, party leadership is regularly forced to acquiesce to the outlook of the leadership of the parent SMO, who see political engagement as secondary to the ultimate goal (Wickham, 2013). This tension resembles a common obstacle for Western European Social Democratic parties whose dependence on class-based membership and trade unions imposed significant constraints on party electoral strategies (Przeworski & Sprague, 1986).

Furthermore, not only does the parent SMO of a dependent representative party provide a competing centre of power with often competing strategic interests but it also provides an established ideology that cannot simply be dismissed for strategic reasons. In this case, the established set of traditions and ideology have been institutionalized prior to party existence, and the party leadership is groomed within these ideas; thus, the constraints on moderation, particularly on its ideological element, will necessitate long debates and usually reinterpretations of the traditional discourse rather than mere abandonment of it to reach strategic goals. Parties created from such movements must be distinguished from parties who create their own political movement.

The distinction of the purpose and originator of the party-social movement linkage is illustrated by comparing the factional break-away parties of *Al-Wasat* from the Muslim Brothers in Egypt and the AKP from the *Milli Görüş* movement in Turkey. The Al-Wasat group broke away from the Muslim Brothers but only made a minor dent in their parent organization and encountered mediocre reception from the regime and the electorate (El-Ghobashy, 2005; Stacher, 2002). The AKP in Turkey, however, split from the *Milli Görüş* movement's ideological framework and went on to acquire

virtually all of the parent party's mobilized electoral support, achieving greater success than the parent parties ever did.

What made the difference? The best explanation for the very distinct turn of events seems to be the nature of the movements' legitimacy and its relationship to the organizational structure. At the time of the split, both movements had a large network of social outreach organizations and associations that were essential to the mobilization of popular electoral support. For the Muslim Brothers, however, that network was grounded in the institutional framework of an SMO with a well-established 'brand name', and the long-established mission of this network restricted the strategic flexibility of the movement's political representatives (El-Ghobashy, 2005). They could not simultaneously operate with strategic flexibility and reap the gains of a social movement that was tied to its well-established mission and principles.

In Turkey, although Necmettin Erbakan entered national politics on behalf of an Islamist viewpoint in 1969, the well-known Islamist movement he brought into existence, *Milli Görüş* (MG), was formulated as a description of his party's political outlook (Erbakan, 1975). Although his foray into politics has been attributed to support from the Sheikh of a large Nakshibendi order connected to the İskenderpaşa mosque, Mehmet Zahid Kotku (Çakır, 1990; Yavuz, 2003), the party was conceived as a larger umbrella that would draw the support of many other religious communities (Yıldız, 2003). Thus, the MG was a vehicle for party political mobilizatıon. As a platform and movement, it developed in more coherent ways after the first party closure in 1971 when there was a need to sustain political momentum between party closures by the state. It was in the 1980 s that this political platform took on the characteristics of a grassroots political movement tied to a party, and it was bolstered primarily by an informal network of devout social activist organizations (White, 2002). The activists associated with the movement were primarily concerned with political change, and party mobilization was the movement's primary goal.

For Erdoğan and the AKP founders, the split from the MG movement banner occurred at a time when the ageing Necmettin Erbakan was severely limited in his capacity to lead the movement tied together by his personalistic leadership, especially since the 1980s. Thus, when Erdoğan and the others split after the party closure in 2001, most of the cadre from the mobilization network strategically moved with this opportunity for new charismatic leadership, based on Erdoğan's political fame and popular myths formed around his personality, leaving an empty shell of a political movement behind.[5] Since a leader with pious Muslim credentials (e.g. Erbakan) had been one of the defining features of the movement, when his ability to continue leading was in question, it was possible to make a strategic shift. This points out that the when and why behind the creation of a movement matters; a movement created to sustain a political party might redefine itself as different leaders arise from the movement. Such a scenario is far less likely for a party that is

created to represent an established social movement with a well-defined social identity and presence. Furthermore, the consequences of breaking away from a well-known SMO and its mobilizing resources also explain why political parties do not always disentangle themselves from the party to gain enhanced strategic flexibility.

Morocco's PJD is another interesting example demonstrating that, if a party can amicably disentangle itself organizationally from the mother SMO – i.e., when it is no longer beholden to its parent movement resources – it increases its ability to behave more strategically and moderate its discourse. For the PJD, unlike the previous cases, the break was not a factional split from the parent SMO, but a mutual decision to part ways between the party and its parent social movement for mutual benefit (Wegner & Pellicer, 2009). While the Movement of Unity and Reform (MUR) was more influential over the party in 2000 and 2002 with respect to decisions not to join the government, this changed in 2003 when PJD organized its election campaigns independently, distanced itself from MUR, and engaged more strategically towards political system dynamics. During the period PJD was beholden to MUR, its moderation was largely behavioural and functioned to protect the SMO from punishment from the state. As autonomy increased, so did flexibility and moderation regarding the Islamist agenda, and this led to major gains for the party, including the Prime Ministry, following the 2011 and 2016 elections.

A second obstruction preventing an Islamist party to engage more freely is the issue of ideological rigidity, which is also tied to the limitations of pre-existing SMOs. *Thus, we argue that for parties engendered by pre-existing social movements with well-established ideology, instances of moderation will occur comparatively more often in behaviour rather than in ideology*. Where constraints on party leadership's strategic decision-making capacity do exist, the strategic pressure to moderate will most frequently find an outlet in behaviours rather than in pronouncements. Behaviours are naturally temporal and contingent and, thus, more easily justified even when apparently contradictory to principles.[6] Where a party operates as a representative for an SMO, moderate behaviours by the representative party often help ensure that the interests and gains of the social movement are not endangered by the regime. In this regard, from the standpoint of the SMO or the principles that are seen as the end, the moderate behaviours (working with or uniting in opposition to regime policy) can more easily be understood as the means that are, thusly, justified. This is not to say that repeated behaviour that contradicts traditional principles will not lead to re-interpretations of those principles, but where decision-making constraints exist, moderate behaviours require less justification and debate, help the movement protect its gains, and, therefore, will likely be a more frequent strategic recourse.

The detailed accounts of Islamist parties provided within the moderation-inclusion literature also bears out this phenomenon. Jordan's Islamic Action Front has portrayed a party that has been far more flexible behaviourally (rather than ideologically) demonstrated by its willingness to cooperate with the regime or opposition parties when it served their interests, even though these too involved deliberation (Schwedler, 2006). Ideological moderation, where it occurred at all, involved the reframing of the long-established ideological concepts like *shari'a* rather than an abandonment or deletion of the concept altogether. With time, IAF leaders were able to justify (behavioural) participation in elections or cooperation with Leftists as strategic though radical references to Islam remained on the table (Schwedler, 2013).

This same phenomenon was observed in the political wing of the Muslim Brothers and their short-lived Freedom and Justice Party offshoot in Egypt. In the period immediately before and after the Egyptian presidential elections in the summer of 2012, on the behavioural side, Morsi made efforts to ensure that Egypt would uphold its international agreements, particularly its peace treaty with Israel, helped broker a cease-fire between Hamas and Israel, installed independents and technocrats in key positions, and made overtures to Copts and women. Thus, while the Muslim Brothers' political wing evidenced a movement whose political behaviour demonstrated a willingness to play by the rules, it was still beholden to an SMO, whose spokesman was simultaneously pronouncing: 'We created a party to serve our ideas and wider mission. This is a matter of belief and we can never abandon it. The Shari'a is what God handed down to the people as a source of guidance' (reported in Wickham, 2013, p. 187). The tension between the SMO's ideological vision and the political wing's need for strategic space to manoeuvre was evident throughout the transition period in Egypt during the parliamentary debates and in the various positions taken in the presidential candidate selections. The events of 2013 put a halt to this dynamic tension, making it difficult to predict how this would have played out as the Freedom and Justice Party tried increasingly to operate in the new political space that had briefly opened up in Egypt.

In Tunisia, however, Ennahda, provides an opportunity to observe a party grappling with these dynamics over a short period of time. The party began as the political outgrowth of the MTI (Islamic Tendency Movement) when the potential for political participation presented itself in the late 1980s. As with many other organizations, the party was split in its priorities and approach between politics and da'wa. In the midst of this conflicting dynamic, the state ultimately cracked down heavily on Ennahda and some of the other opposition parties, imprisoning or exiling party members in the 1990s. Until Ben Ali stepped down, the party's main objective was essentially survival (Allani, 2009). Therefore, when the party began to reform following Ben Ali's departure, although there was a central leadership figure, Rachid Ghannouchi, there was little infrastructure in place to ensure discipline and a shared vision

Table 1. Overview of propositions and cases.

	Propositions	Inconsistent moderation	Strategic moderation
Party Organizational Structure	*Stong and centralized party leadership structures will be more free to moderate strategically in response to the systemic environment*	Structurally weak and/or not centralized • Islah (Yemen) • PAS (Malaysia) • Ennahda, pre-2014 (Tunisia)	Strong and centralized • AKP, post-2003 (Turkey) • Ennahda, post-2014 (Tunisia) • PKS (Indonesia)
Party-Social Movement Linkages	*Parties tied to a pre-existing social movement will show less ideological strategic flexibility than those operating autonomously from such a movement Parties tied to pre-existing social movements with established ideology will moderate more often in behaviour than ideology*	Strong Founding Social Movement • Ennahda, pre-2014 (Tunisia) • Islamic Action Front (Jordan) • Freedom and Justice Party (Egypt) • PJD, pre-2003 (Morocco) • Milli Görüş-Felicity Party, post 2001 (Turkey)	Strong Party • AKP (Turkey) • Milli Görüş Parties, pre-1998 (Turkey) • PJD, post-2007 (Morocco) • Ennahda, post-2014 (Tunisia)

in the quickly expanding movement (Cavatorta & Merone, 2013; Guazzone, 2013). This led to various behaviours and political pronouncements by a variety of activists who had signed on to the party. As the party centralized its decision-making, especially from 2014 on, Ghannouchi and the party leaders took steps to disentangle Ennahda from cultural, social, and charitable activities and focus solely on politics (McCarthy, 2018). In doing so, they increasingly demonstrated the flexibility to operate strategically in the new political environment.

The party took an electoral loss in 2014, largely due to its inability to govern well and the mixed messages in its early years, but the centralizing infrastructure and detachment from SMO activism have provided the party with a freer strategic hand to engage in compromise and collaboration, for good or bad, in the new democratic order (Yardımcı-Geyikçi & Tür, 2018). Ghannouchi and Ennahda have structured the party in this environment to be fully 'politicized' to use Nathan Brown's terminology. Nonetheless, in a country with a great deal of dissatisfaction for the slow pace of reforms and high degree of corruption, it is yet to be seen how their incorporation into the current system will play out for them, or Tunisia, going forward.Table 1 provides an overview of our discussion of intraparty dynamics for Islamist parties.

Conclusion

In this paper, we contribute to existing scholarship by highlighting the significant role of various intraparty dynamics such as organizational strength, social movement linkages, and ideological legacy as determinants of Islamist parties' moderate or radical behaviours in the context of the broader trend of moderation. The common organizational development of parties from Islamist SMOs often have a critical influence on the ability of an Islamist party to behave strategically. Inconsistent statements and positions may be the offshoot of the grappling between factions to lay claim to the guidance of the party or movement like Ennahda between 2011 and 2013, PAS in Malaysia, or the Islah Party in Yemen. Or behaviour and statements of political elites might be a balancing act between deference to foundational ideology and attempting to respond to openings in the current political environment, like the FJP in Egypt or IAF in Jordan. Ennahda since 2014, Turkey's AKP, and Morocco's PJD represent parties that have been able to create strong parties that are unleashed from the constraining linkages to a pre-existing SMO.

Although we believe that the inclusion-moderation debate has provided a rich theoretical debate on Islamist parties, a complete analysis of moderation requires the incorporation of such factors as organizational capacity, social movement roots, and the established ideological background of the party. The intraparty organizational dynamics, though strengthened, weakened, or altered by external forces, provide explanative power regarding the nature and frequency of moderation acts by Islamist parties. Thus, this study has taken a modest step in developing a broader conceptual and theoretical approach to the study of Islamist party moderation. We hope future scholarship will continue to illuminate these internal and external contextual factors that influence Islamist party behaviour.

Notes

1. We use the term radical to refer to political parties whose expressed ideology, if not action, is anti-system, i.e. intending a holistic change of the existing political system. In much of the literature, 'radical' parties of the right and left are discussed relative to democratic systems, but we are using the term specifically to describe the position of a party relative to the existing political system in which it resides. However much (or little) these parties might choose to operate within the boundaries of conventional politics, the expressed intent is to drastically restructure the political system once provided with governing authority. Many Islamist parties, similar to Communist and Christian Democratic Parties of earlier decades in Europe, promise a holistic change to the system of national government that is incompatible with its current configuration.

2. Useful categorizations exist that capture the variation of Islamist parties observed across Muslim-majority countries. Ozzano's (2013) typology would place most Islamist parties in a range between conservative and fundamentalist, matching Ayoob's (2009) and Yıldırım's (2016) categories of Muslim Democratic parties (conservative) and traditional Islamist parties (fundamentalist). Some parties in Muslim-majority countries, like Malaysia's PAS exhibit some elements of Ozzano's 'nationalist' category also.
3. They use the term *winning-coalition* as those whose support is essential to keep the ruler in power. In authoritarian regimes, this is often only a handful of powerful people.
4. This argument is similar to Kalyvas's (2000) argument who argues that hierarchical, autocratic, and centralized religious institutions can contribute to democratization. We differ from Kalyvas in two ways. First, our theory focuses on party organization and not a broader category of religious institution. Second, our main contention is that centralized and hierarchical party organizations will increase the likelihood of strategic moderation whereas Kalyvas is interested in explaining contribution to democratization through solution of commitment problems.
5. AKP's ideology and its credentials for building a coalition of four different ideological groups (liberal, conservative, Islamists, and leftists) also mattered in the party's success. However, our argument is mainly concerning the movement in relation to the party and thus we focus on the prospects of the party leader.
6. Psychology research provides ample evidence in support of this proposition (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977; LaPiere, 1934).

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İSLAM, MEZHEP VE ANTİ-AMERİKANCILIK KISKACINDA ORTADOĞU'DA DIŞ POLİTİKA MÜCADELESİ

Dindarlık, Sünni-Şii ayrımı ve anti-Amerikancılık bölgesel güç stratejilerini ve bölgesel güç dengelerini önemli oranda etkilemektedir. Sünniliğin kalesi konumundaki Suudi Arabistan, jeopolitik çatışmaların mezhepsel bir kimlik kazanmasıyla yumuşak gücünü arttırmaktadır. İran ise hem anti-Amerikancılık hem de popülist İslami yönetim şekliyle bölgede taraftar bulmaktadır. Türkiye ise Arap kamuoyunda hala laik ve Amerika müttefiki bir ülke olarak algılanmaktadır.

Sabri ÇİFTÇİ & Güneş Murat TEZCÜR

ABD'nin Afganistan ve Irak'ı işgallerinin hem askeri hem de siyasi açıdan başarısız olması, bu ülkenin Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde devam eden bölgesel hegemonyasını önemli ölçüde zayıflatmış ve bölgesel güçler için yeni fırsatlar doğurmuştur. Ayrıca Arap ayaklanmaları, bölgede önemli güç merkezlerinden olan Mısır'da büyük bir iç istikrarsızlığa, Suriye'de ise çok kanlı bir iç savaşa yol açmış ve bu ülkelerin bölgedeki ağırlıklarını kaybetmelerine sebep olmuştur. Bu yeni jeopolitik düzen Ankara, Riyad ve Tahran'ın bölgesel gücünün hiç olmadığı kadar artması sonucunu doğurmuştur. Bu üç ülke, mezhepsel çatışmaların yoğunlaştığı bölgesel mücadelelerde öne çıkmak için din-devlet düzenlerini Arap dünyasına bir model olarak sunmaktadır. Bu yüzden Arap kamuoyunda İran, Türkiye ve Suudi Arabistan'ın ortaya koyduğu siyasal ve din-devlet modellerinin algılanış biçimi, bu ülkelerin dış politika amaçlarının gerçekleştirilebilirliğinin ve bölgesel güç olma ihtiraslarını önemli ölçüde belirleyecektir. İslam'ın en kutsal kentleri Mekke ve Medine'nin hamisi olan Suudi Arabistan, Vehhabi yorum odaklı Sünni şeriat modeli ortaya koyarken, kitlesel bir devrimin mirası üzerine kurulu İran ise popülist öğelere sahip Şii teokratik bir devlet yönetimini temsil etmektedir. Türkiye ise uzun yıllar boyunca seküler bir yönetim tarzını temsil ederken, özellikle son yıllarda İslam-demokrasi kaynaşmasını öne çıkaran bir siyasi modeli sunmaktadır. Her üç ülke de 'yumuşak güç' oluşturma stratejisine bağlı olarak kendi ülkelerinde oluşturdukları bu farklı siyasal yapıları bölge halkına ideal modeller olarak sunmaya gayret etmektedirler. Foreign Policy Analysis dergisinde çıkan 28 Ocak 2015 tarihli ve "Ortadoğu'da Yumuşak Güç, Din ve Anti-Amerikancılık (*Soft Power, Religion and Anti-Americanism in the Middle East*)" başlıklı makalemize dayanarak, Arap halklarının bu üç ülkeyi ve modellerini nasıl algıladıklarını ortaya koyan bulguları sunacağız.

Dış Politika ve Yumuşak Güç

Bir ülkenin dış politikadaki etkinliği, askeri gücünün yanı sıra yumuşak gücü ile de ölçülebilir. Yumuşak güç, bir devletin uluslararası alanda 'ikna' kabiliyetini kullanarak diğer devletlere kendi stratejik amaçlarını kabul ettirmesi olarak tanımlanabilir. Böylesine bir ikna gücü son tahlilde o devletin örnek teşkil edebilecek siyasal, kültürel ve sosyal değerlerinin ve imajının diğer ülkelerde kabul görmesi ile ortaya çıkabilir. Bu yüzden de yumuşak güç, ancak yabancı kamuoylarının pozitif algıları üzerine bina edilebilir. Amerikan hegemonyasının çökmesi ve Arap ayaklanmalarının ardından bölgede oluşan güç boşluğu, Türkiye, İran ve Suudi Arabistan'ın bölgesel ihtiraslarında askeri gücün yanı sıra yumuşak güç stratejilerinin önemini arttırmıştır.

Yumuşak gücün dayandığı önemli faktörlerden biri ekonomik ilişkilerdir. Bu açıdan bakıldığında, Türkiye ve Suudi Arabistan, yaptırımların kıskacındaki İran'a kıyasla daha avantajlı durumdadırlar. 2013 IMF rakamlarına göre, Türkiye dünyanın en büyük on yedinci, Arabistan on dokuzuncu, İran ise otuz ikinci ekonomisine sahiptir. Özellikle, 2008 küresel ekonomik krizinin ardından Türkiye, bölgedeki ekonomik ağırlığını artırmıştır. 2012 yılı itibariyle, Türkiye hem Almanya hem de Fransa'nın önüne geçip Ortadoğu ülkelerinin en büyük sekizinci ticaret ortağı durumuna gelmiştir. Yine aynı yıl içinde, Türkiye, Mısır, Ürdün, Lübnan ve Tunus'un ilk on dış ticareti ortağı arasında yer alan tek bölge ülkesidir. Suudi Arabistan, Ürdün'ün en büyük dış ticaret ortağıyken bu ülkenin Mısır'la olan ticaret hacmi önemli boyutlara ulaşmaktadır. İran ise bu dört ülkenin ilk onda yer alan ticaret ortakları arasındadır.

Arap Kamuoyunun İran, Suudi Arabistan ve Türkiye Algısı

Bölgesel güç olma stratejisi, askeri ve ekonomik etkinin yanı sıra bu ülkelerin bölge halkları arasında pozitif imajlar oluşturmasıyla da yakından ilgilidir. Daha önce belirtildiği gibi Ortadoğu'da oluşan yeni güç dengeleri içerisinde bahsi geçen her üç ülke de farklı bir modeli öne çıkarmaktadır. İran popülist bir teokrasi olarak konumunu, Amerikan emperyalizmine ve Filistin'i tahakküm altında tutan İsrail'e karşı bir direnç merkezi olarak belirlemektedir. Arap ayaklanmalarını da bir nevi İslami uyanış olarak nitelendiren İran, bu tavrının bölgedeki dindar insanlar ve özellikle Şiiler tarafından cazip bulunacağı beklentisi içindedir. Suudi Arabistan ise bölgesel düzenin savunucusu olarak bölgedeki dindar Sünnilere hitap eden bir dış politika oluşturma çabasındadır. Suudiler İslam'ın Vehhabi yorumunu yaygınlaştırmak amacıyla petro-dolarları kullanarak eğitim, sivil toplum ve basında etki alanları oluşturmaktadırlar. Son olarak, AK Parti yönetimindeki Türkiye, sürdürebilir ekonomik büyümeye ulaşmış ve siyasi istikrara sahip bir ülke imgesini ortaya koymakta ve İslam, liberalizm ve demokratik yönetimin bağdaştığı bir 'Türkiye modelini' bölge halklarına sunmaktadır. Ayrıca, Türkiye dış politikada eskisine göre çok daha aktif bir rol edinmekte ve İsrail'e karşı daha sert bir tavır takınmaktadır. Öte yandan, İran'dan farklı olarak

Yumuşak gücün dayandığı önemli faktörlerden biri ekonomik ilişkilerdir. Bu açıdan bakıldığında, Türkiye ve Suudi Arabistan, yaptırımların kıskacındaki İran'a kıyasla daha avantajlı durumdadırlar. 2013 IMF rakamlarına göre, Türkiye dünyanın en büyük on yedinci, Arabistan on dokuzuncu, İran ise otuz ikinci ekonomisine sahiptir.

hem Suudi Arabistan'ın hem de Türkiye'nin ABD'yle yakın ilişkilere sahip olması, anti-Amerikan görüşlerin yaygın olduğu Arap kamuoyunda olumsuz etkilere yol açabilir. Arap ayaklanmalarının sonrasında kamuoyu algısının daha çok önem kazandığı Ortadoğu siyasetinde bu üç ülkenin yönetim şekillerinin ve algı yönetimlerinin başarısının önemli jeopolitik sonuçları olacaktır.

Çalışmamızda Pew Araştırma Merkezi'nin 2012'de Lübnan, Mısır, Tunus ve Ürdün'de düzenlediği anketleri analiz ederek İran, Suudi Arabistan ve Türkiye'nin bu dört ülkedeki imajlarıyla ilgili ilginç sonuçlara vardık. Bu anketlere göre, Arap vatandaşlarının İran hakkında çok olumlu görüşlere sahip olmadıkları, ama Türkiye ve Suudi Arabistan hakkında pozitif bir algı taşıdıkları görülmektedir. Ürdün

Şaşırtıcı bir şekilde, Arap halkları arasında demokrasiye yönelik destek ile Türkiye'nin olumlu algılanışı arasında doğrudan bir ilişki ortaya çıkmamaktadır. Demokrasi taraftarı Araplar arasında Türkiye'ye karşı özel bir teveccüh yoktur. Öte yandan, Türkiye'nin 'laik' yapısı laik dünya görüşüne sahip Araplar arasında destek bulmaya devam etmektedir.

ve Mısır'da yüzde 80'lerin üzerine çıkan bir kesimin Suudi Arabistan'a yönelik olumlu tutumlar taşıdığı görülürken, araştırmanın konusu olan dört ülkede de (Mısır, Ürdün, Lübnan, Tunus) Türkiye hakkında olumlu görüş belirten kişilerin yüksek oranlara ulaştığı ortaya çıkmaktadır. Örneğin, Tunus'ta katılımcıların %78'i Türkiye hakkında olumlu görüşler taşımaktadır. İran'la ilgili en olumlu görüşler, büyük bir Şii nüfusa sahip Lübnan'da görülmektedir.

Çalışmamızda, dindarlık, laiklik, anti-Amerikancılık ve mezhepsel kimlik gibi etkenlerin İran, Türkiye ve Suudi Arabistan'a yönelik algıları nasıl etkilediğine de baktık. Bu amaçla uygulanan istatistiksel analizin sonuçlarına göre, Arap ülkelerinde dinsel dünya görüşü ve mezhepsel kimlik Türkiye, İran ve Suudi Arabistan ile ilgili algıları belirlemede önemli rol oynamaktadır. Sünnî Araplar arasında İran'ın imajı oldukça düşük seviyedeyken, Suudi Arabistan Sünni Araplar arasında olumlu bir imaja sahiptir. Özellikle Suriye İç Savaşı'yla birlikte jeopolitik çıkarların ve mezhepsel fay hatlarının örtüşmesi, İran'ın yumuşak gücünü önemli ölçüde sınırlandırmaktadır. Mezhepsel kimliğinin Türkiye algısı üzerine etkisi daha sınırlı kalsa da Sünni Araplar arasında Türkiye taraftarlığı Şiilere kıyasla daha yaygındır. Mezhepsel ayrımlar, İran açısından olumsuz bir algı oluştururken, İran'ın İslami idare tarzını popülist kurumlarla harmanlayan siyasal yapısı, bu ülkeyi siyasette dinsel ilkelerin yer almasına önem veren dindar Araplar nezdinde avantajlı bir konuma getirmektedir. Suudi Arabistan'ın temsil ettiği Vehhabi şeriat modelinin ise benzer bir etkisi mevcut değildir.

Çalışmamızda ortaya çıkan en ilginç ve yaygın kanılara zıt düşen bulgulardan biri de Türkiye'yi Arap halkları nezdinde cazip kılan temel etkenin sanıldığı gibi Türkiye'nin öne çıkarmaya çalıştığı 'Müslüman Demokrasi' modeli olmadığıdır. Şaşırtıcı bir şekilde, Arap halkları arasında demokrasiye yönelik destek ile Türkiye'nin olumlu algılanışı arasında doğrudan bir ilişki ortaya çıkmamaktadır. Demokrasi taraftarı Araplar arasında Türkiye'ye karşı özel bir teveccüh yoktur. Öte yandan, Türkiye'nin 'laik' yapısı laik dünya görüşüne sahip Araplar arasında destek bulmaya devam etmektedir. Bir diğer enteresan bulgu ise anti-Amerikancılık ile ilgilidir. Anti-Amerikancılık Türkiye ve Suudi Arabistan ile ilgili olumsuz algıya yol açarken, bölge halkaları arasında İran'ın imajını olumlu yönde etkilemektedir. Dolayısıyla, bölgede yaygın bir tutum olan anti-Amerikancılık, Türkiye ve Suudi Arabistan gibi ülkelerin yumuşak güç stratejilerini olumsuz yönde etkilerken, Amerikan politikalarına karşı çıkan İran'ın bölgesel ihtiraslarına olumlu etkide bulunmaktadır. Bu bakımdan İran dış politikasının önemli sacayaklarından olan anti-Amerikancılık, İslam Cumhuriyeti açısından stratejik bir değer ifade etmektedir.

Sonuç olarak dindarlık, Sünni-Şii ayrımı ve anti-Amerikancılık bölgesel güç stratejilerini ve bölgesel güç dengelerini önemli oranda etkilemektedir. Sünniliğin kalesi konumundaki Suudi Arabistan, jeopolitik çatışmaların mezhepsel bir kimlik kazanmasıyla yumuşak gücünü arttırmaktadır. İran ise hem anti-Amerikancılık hem de popülist İslami yönetim şekliyle bölgede taraftar bulmaktadır. Türkiye ise Arap kamuoyunda hala laik ve Amerika müttefiki bir ülke olarak algılanmaktadır. AK Parti iktidarının ortaya koyduğu 'Müslüman demokrasi' imajının Arap kamuoyunda kabul gördüğüne dair bir veri yoktur. Zira Arap kamuoyunda demokratik tutumlar ve yabancı ülke algıları arasında doğrudan bir ilişki yoktur. Bu durumda, Türkiye'nin yumuşak gücünü muhafaza edip arttırması, esas olarak Suudi ve İran modellerinden farklı olarak laik bir yönetime ve dinamik bir ekonomiye sahip olan bölgesel bir ülke imajını perçinlemesine bağlıdır.

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MARCH 12, 2015

Islam, Social Justice, and Support for Democracy in the Muslim World

Guest post by Sabri Ciftci

Arab Spring has brought about great enthusiasm about the prospect of democratization in the Middle East. However, the initial optimism about the future of democracy has quickly disappeared in the midst of democratic reversals, political instability, and the ensuing civil wars. Despite Middle East's decent into chaos, a vast majority of its citizens continue to support democracy according to the public opinion polls. The puzzling case of democracy gap in the Middle East and in much of the Muslim world, therefore, continues to garner significant academic and policy attention. The bulk of the debate is centered around Islam's compatibility with democracy leading to inquiries about the nature of association between one's faith and democratic preferences. Does Islam play a role in shaping individual preferences about different governance models? Which values matter in shaping democratic and authoritarian orientations among citizens of the Muslim-majority societies? In a recent article published in *Politics and Religion*, I employ a novel perspective to answer these questions. The study uses survey data to explore the formative effects of religiously inspired social justice values on support for democracy in Muslim-majority societies.

Once, essentialist approaches proposing a cultural incompatibility between Islam and democracy, supposedly due to contentious civilizational discourses, dominated the debates about Islam and democracy. This is no longer the case. The debate has now shifted into the empirical social science field where numerous studies explored the associations between Muslim piety and regime preferences. After more than a decade of quantitative research in the field, however, much ambivalence remains about the precise mechanisms linking religiosity to support for democracy in Muslim-majority societies. At the current juncture, we can be confident that individual piety is either irrelevant to or at least not a negative determinant of democratic orientations among ordinary Muslim men and women. Yet, these correlations do not provide much insight into whether values emanating from one's faith can be foundational in generating democratic preferences.

In *Islam, Social Justice and Democracy*, I argue that religion plays an indirect role in engendering democratic preferences through values that are prominent within the Islamic belief system. Social justice is a significant element of Islam's ethical system that have important implications for governance, legitimacy, and economic policy in the Muslim world. The importance of social justice can clearly be observed in the scripture and in the writings of the Islamist intellectuals of both classical and modern ages. In effect, the political debates about the succession problem in the early periods of Islamic empire were exclusively centered around the notion of justice. There are numerous passages about charity and benevolence in the *Qur'an* and the *Hadiths* (i.e. sayings of prophet Mohammed). It is not only charity and the almsgiving (*zakat*) that are perceived as religious obligations that make social justice values so prominent among practicing Muslims. Largely neglected is the notion of *ihsan* which can be translated as benevolence toward people or graciousness in individuals' dealings with others. *Ihsan*or benevolence is an important dimension of Islamic social justice conception.

In my article, I argue that egalitarian social justice values and perceptions of acts related to benevolence (*ihsan*) inform pious Muslims' regime preferences. First, it can be established that, all else equal, a devout Muslim will hold economically egalitarian views due to the strong emphasis placed on charity and distribution of wealth in Islam. Second, I assume that benevolent acts should be widespread among the devout given its scriptural significance and especially the emphasis put on *ihsan* by Islamic religious authority. Islamic social justice values, in turn, form the basis for two indirect mechanisms linking Muslim faith to support for democracy. The crux of the argument is this: devout Muslims will lean favorably toward democratic governance thanks to the belief that implementation of redistributive policies in this system is more likely. Such preference stems from democracy's policy compatibility with Islam's egalitarian focus. Furthermore, religious individuals should favor democracy over other regime types, because preference for benevolence will engender favorable opinions about democracy as the most preferred governance model. This mechanism, I argue, operates through the central role of benevolence in achievement of *maslahah* (public interest), defined as the most important goal of policy-making in Islamic government (*siyasa shar'iyya*). Some theological schools argue that the election of the ruler (Imam or the Caliph) require the consensus (*ijma*) of the *ummah* (Muslim community). This proposition relies on the assumption that democratic institutions are better suited to realize public interest and this feature of democracy makes it acceptable to the pious Muslims. As a governance model, democracy has a comparative advantage, or at least to be perceived as such, in realizing public interest. As a significant Islamic value, *ihsan*, then is likely to be instrumental in generating favorable perceptions of democracy thanks to this capacity.

Is there empirical support for these propositions? The World Values Surveys (WVS) provide the best available data for empirically testing the above propositions. WVS include several questions about religious belief, religious attendance, distributive preferences, altruistic behavior, charity, and government involvement in provision of welfare services. These questions allow me conduct nuanced statistical tests. Figure 1 shows the distribution of 19 Muslim-majority countries according to their average scores of benevolence and distributive justice preferences across levels of religious devotion.

Figure 1: Benevolence and Distributive Justice



According to Figure 1, while there is a positive association between benevolence and egalitarian justice preferences, this association becomes less prominent among the most religious. This is highly counter-intuitive, but the on average, we can reasonably be confident that egalitarian beliefs and benevolence are related. More specifically, the Egyptian and Iraqi public opinion favors both benevolent and egalitarian attitudes whereas in Qatar and Malaysia social justice orientations remain relatively weak. By and large, a clear-cut division emerges between low-benevolence and high-benevolence countries with most Arabic speaking countries concentrated at the higher end and non-Arabic speaking societies at the lower end. What do these patterns imply for individual attitudes, especially with respect to religion's indirect effect on support for democracy? Figure 2 shows the indirect effect of religiosity on support for democracy which is mediated by social justice values based on multivariate statistical analysis (see the statistical models here).

Figure 2: Islam, Social Justice Values, and Support for Democracy



The chart shows average mediated effects and percentage of indirect effects explained.

As Figure 2 shows, being a devout Muslim increases support for democracy and a good deal of the statistical effect can be attributed to Islamic social justice values. Social justice values serve as mediators linking one's devotion to her preference for democracy. Islamic social justice values constitute 21% and 78% of total effect of religiosity on intrinsic support for democracy and support for distributive democracy respectively. The role of social justice values in informing favorability for democracy perceived in terms of elections (procedural democracy) is somehow less prevalent. When we break down these effects to the elements of Islamic social justice values, we find that some portion of the effect of religiosity on support for democracy works through benevolence. Benevolence, taken as a proxy for *ihsan* here, helps us uncover some of the ambiguity in the "Islamic religiosity-support for democracy" nexus. More importantly, survey responses highlighting one's attitude about benevolence appear to be more relevant than the egalitarian distributive preferences.

Social justice values are highly relevant in explaining support for democracy in the Muslim world. This is an important finding, because it resolves some of the ambivalence found in quantitative studies of Muslim political attitudes dealing with the micro foundations of the association between Islam and democracy. Personal religiosity informs social justice values and these values in turn generate democratic orientations among pious Muslims. Students of "Islam and democracy" believe that scriptural principles like *shura* or concepts of legal methodology like *ijtihad* and *ijma* can form the basis for democratic governance. The analysis of survey data in 19 Muslim majority countries show that social justice values promoting egalitarian distributive principles and benevolence (*ihsan*) can also form the basis for pluralistic ideas among ordinary Muslim men and women.

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

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The Caliphate of Man: Popular Sovereignty in Modern Islamic Thought by Andrew F. March (review)

Sabri Ciftci

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In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

Reviewed by:

Sabri Ciftci (bio)

***The Caliphate of Man: Popular Sovereignty in Modern Islamic Thought*, by Andrew F. March. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2019. 328 pages. $45.**

This volume is an essential read for students of political theory, Middle East studies, and Muslim politics. Andrew March masterfully demonstrates that, in Islam, conceptions of divine and popular sovereignty stem from the same theology that introduces possibilities of popular sovereignty and Islamic democracy. *The Caliphate of Man* is an important contribution to Islamic political theory by locating Islamist intellectual discussions within the broader debate about democratic governance. It offers rich insights about the "invention of popular sovereignty in modern Islamic thought" (p. xviii) by focusing on difficulties and paradoxes inherent in the political theology of Islam. The book centers its argument around the duality between omnipotent nature of divine command that leaves little room for human legislation and man's vicegerent status assigning him freedom and responsibility in making legislation. The parts of this duality are not necessarily in contradiction and can be integrated in a unique doctrine. The doctrine of the "caliphate of man" rests on freedom of man and popular sovereignty. It provides the intellectual foundation that may lead to Islamic democracy or acceptance of deliberative processes within the political theology of Islam. The volume presents the trajectory of doctrine of Islamic political sovereignty (the caliphate of man) and traces the resolution of paradoxes and theoretical difficulties in this doctrine in the works of early modernists (Chapter Three), late Islamists including Pakistani intellectual Abu al-A'la Mawdudi (Chapter Four) and the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb (Chapter Five), and one of the most prominent contemporary intellectuals, Rached Ghannouchi (Chapter Six).

Chapter One problematizes the puzzle of democratic governance in Islam by providing examples from modern constitutions in Iran, Egypt, and Pakistan and by presenting the main problematic of the book. Chapter Two delves into the problem of sovereignty in classical political tradition. After a brief overview of classical governance model resting on equilibria among power of rulers, moral authority of 'ulama, and dynamic applications of shari'a, March demonstrates that this tradition cannot establish the conception of the sovereignty of the Muslim community (*umma*) as a political principle in Islamic theology. He also does not find any justification for popular sovereignty in the premodern conceptualizations of the caliph (from *khalifa*, Arabic for vicegerent) "as a basis justifying the Muslim community's derivative political sovereignty over its worldly rulers and the custodianship of the *shari'a*" (p. 37). This issue, for March, is at the heart of the political debate as seen in the works of 20th century Islamists. Chapter Three focuses on the caliphate crisis after the abolition of this institution by the Turkish republic in 1924. After differentiating this moment from the modernizing reforms and constitutionalist movements of 19th century, March provides an account of the works of Rashid Rida and 'Abd al-Razzaq al-Sanhuri. He finds that the attempt to rescue the institution of caliphate as a religious obligation by Rida (and many other intellectuals) places his political thought within the premodern paradigm of political authority as opposed to the modern paradigm of mass political participation.

March finds the foundations for the doctrine of the caliphate of man in the writings of Mawdudi and Qutb (Chapters Four and Five), both of whom represented a theocratic tradition that relies on the ideas of absolute divine sovereignty and self-sufficiency of Islam as a holistic faith. Nonetheless, while rejecting Western political models, both developed political models that make divine sovereignty a basis for popular sovereignty and the mass participation of the *umma*. Whether it is Mawdudi's theo-democracy or Qutb's **[End Page 164]** utopian vision of harmonious Islamic society, March argues that these intellectuals lay the foundation of popular sovereignty, largely informed by the agency of believers. While it is more difficult to establish a link from divine sovereignty to the notion of popular sovereignty within the "high utopian Islamism" of Qutb (p. 75), his argument concerning the harmony between divine law and human nature leads to an emancipatory view that, nonetheless, opens the...

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PHILOSOPHY, RELIGION, AND SCIENCE

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ISLAMOPHOBIA AND RACISM IN AMERICA

Author: Erik Love
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Reviewer: Sabri Ciftci | October 2017

Islamophobia and Racism in America is a timely book that examines the racial dimension of Islamophobia in the Unites States. Islamophobia is not a new phenomenon, but it has increasingly become widespread in social and political discourse since the 9/11 terrorist attacks. In this book, Erik Love describes Islamophobia as a racism problem, and presents several compelling arguments about its origins, its relation to the civil rights movement, and its implications for Americans from the Middle East. In this fine scholarly treatment of racism and Islamophobia, Love also provides some clear policy guidelines about countering this particular fear, for civil rights advocacy, and concerning the rights of Middle Eastern-Americans. To support his arguments, the author combines rich theoretical arguments with a wealth of evidence, including governmental documents, historical records, and in-depth interviews conducted with civil rights advocates.

The text first introduces the notions of "racial dilemma" and "racial paradox" faced by Arab, Muslim, Sikh, and South Asian minorities in the U.S. These groups come from distinct ethnic and religious backgrounds, but they confront the same Islamophobic attitudes and acts. Love argues that due to their distinctive physical features, all these groups are perceived as being "Muslim." The primacy of race and its social construction in American culture is, he says, the main reason underlying this occurrence. Since "Muslim" or "Middle Eastern" is one of the most commonly ascribed racial categories in America, racism is at the heart of the current Islamophobia. Such a racial framework necessitates that Arab, Muslim, Sikh, and South Asian minorities be grouped under the single category of Middle Eastern-American. In contemporary America, however, the difficulty of ascribing racial labels to a religious group complicates any acknowledgement of such a racial identity. This "racial paradox" results in a "racial dilemma" that makes it very difficult for civil rights advocates representing Arab, Muslim, Sikh, and South Asian communities to represent Islamophobia as a racist phenomenon. Consequently, confronting Islamophobia becomes more difficult, especially in a political environment characterized by diminishing protections against discrimination. The paradox and the dilemma have been further exacerbated by the transition from "race-conscious" policies to a supposed "colorblind ideology" since the 1980s.

The author grounds his argument in sociological theories of race and civil rights. Building on this theoretical foundation, Love presents rich historical evidence about slavery, the persistence of racial institutions, and the transformation of the civil rights movement. He also explores linkages between historical events and the construction of racial categories concerning the Arab, Muslim, Sikh, and South Asian communities. Chapter 2 presents statistical figures about changing immigration patterns, the linked histories of these various communities, and the transformation of civil rights advocacy with respect to these groups. Love presents a compelling argument about the dominance of the racial approach in America, and how this approach still underlies policies and public attitudes toward the groups he describes. Chapter 3 examines the rise of Islamophobia, and chapter 4 discusses the attempts to confront Islamophobia by civil rights groups. The author, once again, starts with a brief history of political and cultural Islamophobia and ties this history to the most recent manifestations of this phenomenon as observed in the public discourse and in government policies. He provides a wealth of evidence from governmental documents, the media, and the activities of advocacy groups to show the transformation of Islamophobic discourse. Since 2001, Islamophobia has increasingly been defined with reference to terrorism and violence, with the Muslim faith being singled out as the main cause of insecurity. In this transformation, the racial perspective has remained highly salient. The response of advocacy groups to such racial discriminatory policies has been inefficient at best. The "racial dilemma" and "racial paradox" make any racial strategy to confront Islamophobia impractical. The framing of Islamophobia with reference to a religious group and a certain faith somehow blocks the effective utilization of a racial perspective. In addition, the major differences in the social identities of the distinct ethnic and religious groups forming this Middle Eastern- American category has prevented the coalition of relevant advocacy groups, who might otherwise have come together. Love also argues that certain systemic factors also contributed to the inefficient strategies. For example, the gains obtained after the civil rights movement in political, institutional, and social areas have been gradually undermined as a result of transformations from race-conscious policies to colorblind ones. The success of conservative groups in framing the race problem with reference to colorblindness obscured the discriminatory practices and the erosion of civil rights. Neither Arab-American groups with their well-established advocacy infrastructure, nor the newly emerging Muslim advocacy groups such as the Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR) and the Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC) or groups like the South Asian American Leading Together (SAALT) could avoid the racial dilemma. In an age where colorblindness dominates the civil rights discourse, it becomes very difficult and impractical to confront religiously framed Islamophobia without using racial references. The divisions within and between civil advocacy groups only intensifies this dilemma.

The changing race discourse also prevented consequential coalitions among Middle Eastern- American advocacy groups. To explain the lack of long-term and far-reaching coalition building among these advocacy groups, Love uses a classification developed by William J. Barber. This classification involves two types of coalition building: transactional and transformational. The former is an issue-based, temporary type of coalition formed on an ad hoc basis. The latter coalitions, on the other hand, are long-term commitments requiring significant resources and compromises to create significant changes in multiple issue areas. Middle Eastern- American advocacy groups failed to build transformational coalitions due to their reluctance to use racial strategies. This is quite puzzling, given the government's push to bring these groups together in order to form a "post-9/11 community." Despite all attempts from government agencies to bring these groups together to form transformational coalitions, and mostly along racial lines, Arab, Muslim, Sikh, and South Asian communities did not take advantage of these government-led initiatives. Presenting evidence from in-depth interviews carried out with members of advocacy groups, Erik Love convincingly demonstrates that Middle Eastern- Americans missed a significant opportunity to improve their civil rights after 2001. The interviews reveal that the advocates did not engage in transformational and race-based coalitions for several reasons. First, most advocates believed in the distinctiveness and self-sufficiency of their group, and hence did not feel the need to engage in long-term commitments. Second, skepticism about the utility of transformational coalitions in reaching the political goals of each group played a role. For example, the focus of Arab-American groups on Palestine and the Middle Eastern/Muslim groups' connections to the conflict-ridden Middle East led to the perception that discussion around these issues would not provide fertile ground for a broad-based coalition in the American context. Third, many advocacy leaders voiced concerns about the size of their respective communities, and questioned whether "Islamophobia" was a big enough problem to warrant such broad coalition-building. Consequently, Middle Eastern- American groups chose to define their activities around the theme of improving the rights of their community members with reference to citizenship and integration into American society. Love argues that the dominance of the "colorblind ideology" pushed Middle Eastern -American groups to discard race as a viable strategy. He also relates this outcome to the change that occurred in the strategies of the civil rights movement from the 1900s to the 2000s. The dominance of a "colorblind ideology" not only inhibited these minority groups from realizing the potential of using a racial strategy in confronting Islamophobia, it also indicates a troubling development concerning reversals of the civil right gains since the 1960s.

The author provides several important insights and policy recommendations based on the findings of this study. First, he warns the reader that if the trend about the narrowing of rights and the dominance of the "colorblind ideology" continues, the future of civil rights remains bleak in America. Second, he argues that building transformational coalitions not only within the Middle Eastern- American category, but across different groups, including African-Americans and Asian-Americans, is crucial to the future of civil rights. Third, he believes that the debate about Islamophobia will be crucial in shaping civil rights discourse, racism, and future policies. Middle Eastern- American advocacy groups have the potential to lead a new era of civil rights by renegotiating and transforming the meaning of a "colorblind ideology" in their interactions with a racialized state. Overall, *Islamophobia and Racism in America* is a welcome contribution to multiple research programs, including any with a focus on Islamophobia, Arab-American studies, civil rights, and racism. It is a must-read not only for students and faculty of such research programs, but also for civil rights advocates and policymakers.

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